Editing Terrorism (section)

== Counterterrorism strategies ==
[[File:1080 Poisoning Scare At New World in Wellington.jpeg|thumb|upright=0.8|Sign notifying shoppers of increased surveillance due to a perceived increased risk of terrorism]]
Responses to terrorism are broad in scope. They can include re-alignments of the [[political spectrum]] and reassessments of [[value system|fundamental values]].

Specific types of responses include:
* [[Anti-terrorism legislation|Targeted laws, criminal procedures, deportations, and enhanced police powers]]
* [[Target hardening]], such as locking doors or adding traffic barriers
* [[Preemptive strike|Preemptive]] or reactive military action
* Increased [[Strategic intelligence|intelligence]] and [[surveillance]] activities
* Preemptive [[humanitarian]] activities
* More permissive [[interrogation]] and [[Detention (imprisonment)|detention]] policies

=== Terrorism research ===
<!---Redirect Terrorism studies here.--->
Terrorism research, also called terrorism studies, or terrorism and counter-terrorism research, is an academic field which seeks to understand the causes of terrorism, how to prevent it, as well as its impact in the broadest sense. Terrorism research can be carried out in both military and civilian contexts, for example by research centres such as the British [[Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence]], the [[Norwegian Centre for Violence and Traumatic Stress Studies]], and the [[International Centre for Counter-Terrorism]] (ICCT). There are several academic journals devoted to the field, including ''[[Perspectives on Terrorism]]''.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Tinnes |first1=J |year=2013 |title=100 Core and Periphery Journals for Terrorism Research |url=http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/258 |journal=Perspectives on Terrorism |volume=7 |issue=2 |access-date=December 29, 2015 |archive-date=November 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151127173222/http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/258 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| first= Benjamin| last= Freedman| journal= [[Perspectives on Terrorism]]| date= November 2010| volume= 4| issue= 5| pages= 48–56| url= https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26298483.pdf| title= Terrorism Research Centres: 100 Institutes, Programs and Organisations in the Field of Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, Radicalisation and Asymmetric Warfare Studies| jstor= 26298483| access-date= April 11, 2021| archive-date= March 9, 2023| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20230309075010/https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26298483.pdf| url-status= live}}</ref>

=== International agreements ===
One of the agreements that promote the international legal counterterrorist framework is the Code of Conduct Towards Achieving a World Free of Terrorism that was adopted at the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly in 2018. The Code of Conduct was initiated by [[President of Kazakhstan|Kazakhstan President]] [[Nursultan Nazarbayev]]. Its main goal is to implement a wide range of international commitments to counterterrorism and establish a broad global coalition towards achieving a world free of terrorism by 2045. The Code was signed by more than 70 countries.<ref>{{cite web |title=70 countries sign Counter-Terrorism Code initiated by Kazakhstan |url=https://www.inform.kz/en/70-countries-sign-counter-terrorism-code-initiated-by-kazakhstan-says-president_a3450890 |website=inform.kz |date=November 8, 2018 |access-date=November 9, 2018 |archive-date=November 10, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181110000308/https://www.inform.kz/en/70-countries-sign-counter-terrorism-code-initiated-by-kazakhstan-says-president_a3450890 |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Response in the United States ===
{{See also|War on Terror}}
[[File:Backscatter large.jpg|thumb|left|[[Backscatter X-ray|X-ray backscatter technology]] ([[Advanced Imaging Technology|AIT]]) machine used by the [[Transportation Security Administration|TSA]] to screen passengers. According to the TSA, this is what the remote TSA agent would see on their screen.]]

According to a report by Dana Priest and William M. Arkin in ''[[The Washington Post]]'', "Some 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies work on programs related to counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence in about 10,000 locations across the United States."<ref>{{cite news |url=http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/ |title=A hidden world, growing beyond control |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=July 19, 2010 |first1=Dana |last1=Priest |first2=William |last2=Arkin |access-date=July 19, 2010 |archive-date=September 5, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180905202715/http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>

America's thinking on how to defeat radical Islamists is split along two very different schools of thought. Republicans, typically follow what is known as the Bush Doctrine, advocate the military model of taking the fight to the enemy and seeking to democratize the Middle East. Democrats, by contrast, generally propose the law enforcement model of better cooperation with nations and more security at home.<ref name="ankony1">Ankony, Robert C., "A New Strategy for America's War on Terrorism", ''Patrolling'' magazine, 75th Ranger Regiment Association, Winter 2011, 56–57.</ref> In the introduction of the ''U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual'', [[Sarah Sewall]] states the need for "U.S. forces to make securing the civilian, rather than destroying the enemy, their top priority. The civilian population is the center of gravity—the deciding factor in the struggle.... Civilian deaths create an extended family of enemies—new insurgent recruits or informants—and erode support of the host nation." Sewall sums up the book's key points on how to win this battle: "Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.... Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.... The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted.... Sometimes, doing nothing is the best reaction."<ref>Sewall, Sarah, introduction to ''The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual'', Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (2007).</ref> This strategy, often termed "courageous restraint", has certainly led to some success on the Middle East battlefield. However, it does not address the fact that terrorists are mostly homegrown.<ref name="ankony1" />

=== Ending terrorist groups ===
[[File:RANDterroristGpsEnd2006.svg|thumb|upright=1.35|How terrorist groups end (n = 268): The most common ending for a terrorist group is to convert to nonviolence via negotiations (43%), with most of the rest terminated by routine policing (40%). Groups that were ended by military force constituted only 7%.<ref>The researchers found 648 terrorist groups active between 1968 and 2006. Of those, 136 splintered and 244 were still active in 2006 (Jones and Libicki, 2008, p. 19)</ref>]]

Jones and Libicki (2008) created a list of all the terrorist groups they could find that were active between 1968 and 2006. They found 648. Of those, 136 splintered and 244 were still active in 2006.<ref>Jones and Libicki (2008, p. 19)</ref> Of the ones that ended, 43% converted to nonviolent political actions, like the [[Irish Republican Army]] in Northern Ireland; 40% were defeated by law enforcement; 7% (20 groups) were defeated by military force; and 10% succeeded.

42 groups became large enough to be labeled an insurgency; 38 of those had ended by 2006. Of those, 47% converted to nonviolent political actors. Only 5% were ended by law enforcement, and 21% were defeated by military force. 26% won.<ref>Jones and Libicki (2008, p. 101, Table 5.4)</ref> Jones and Libicki concluded that military force may be necessary to deal with large insurgencies but are only occasionally decisive, because the military is too often seen as a bigger threat to civilians than the terrorists. To avoid that, the [[rules of engagement]] must be conscious of [[collateral damage]] and work to minimize it.

Another researcher, Audrey Cronin, lists six primary ways that terrorist groups end:<ref>{{cite book |last1=Cronin |first1=Audrey Kurth |title=How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns |date=2009 |publisher=Princeton U. Press |isbn=978-0-691-13948-7}}</ref>
# Capture or killing of a group's leader (Decapitation)
# Entry of the group into a legitimate political process (Negotiation)
# Achievement of group aims (Success)
# Group implosion or loss of public support (Failure)
# Defeat and elimination through brute force (Repression)
# Transition from terrorism into other forms of violence (Reorientation)