Editing Teleological argument (section)

===Classical===
The original development of the argument from design was in reaction to atomistic, explicitly non-teleological understandings of nature. Socrates, as reported by Plato and Xenophon, was reacting to such natural philosophers. While less has survived from the debates of the Hellenistic and Roman eras, it is clear from sources such as [[Cicero]] and [[Lucretius]], that debate continued for generations, and several of the striking metaphors used still today, such as the unseen watchmaker, and the [[infinite monkey theorem]], have their roots in this period. While the Stoics became the most well-known proponents of the argument from design, the atomistic counter arguments were refined most famously by the [[Epicurus|Epicureans]]. On the one hand, they criticized the supposed evidence for intelligent design, and the logic of the Stoics. On the defensive side, they were faced with the challenge of explaining how un-directed chance can cause something which appears to be a rational order. Much of this defence revolved around arguments such as the infinite monkey metaphor. Democritus had already apparently used such arguments at the time of Socrates, saying that there will be infinite planets, and only some having an order like the planet we know. But the Epicureans refined this argument, by proposing that the actual number of types of atoms in nature is small, not infinite, making it less coincidental that after a long period of time, certain orderly outcomes will result.<ref name=sed/>

These were not the only positions held in classical times. A more complex position also continued to be held by some schools, such as the Neoplatonists, who, like Plato and Aristotle, insisted that Nature did indeed have a rational order, but were concerned about how to describe the way in which this rational order is caused. According to Plotinus for example, Plato's metaphor of a craftsman should be seen only as a metaphor, and Plato should be understood as agreeing with Aristotle that the rational order in nature works through a form of causation unlike everyday causation. In fact, according to this proposal each thing already has its own nature, fitting into a rational order, whereby the thing itself is "in need of, and directed towards, what is higher or better".<ref>Chiaradonna, Riccardo. "[https://books.google.com/books?id=7Wt2BgAAQBAJ&pg=PA31 Plotinus' account of demiurgic causation and its philosophical background]". Pp. 31–50 in ''Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity'', edited by A. Marmodoro and B. D. Prince. Cambridge: [[Cambridge University Press]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=7Wt2BgAAQBAJ&pg=PA31 p.&nbsp;31].</ref>