Editing Suez Crisis (section)

=== French response ===
The French Prime Minister [[Guy Mollet]], outraged by Nasser's move, determined that Nasser would not get his way.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 144">{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|p=144}}</ref> French public opinion very much supported Mollet, and apart from the [[French Communist Party]], all of the criticism of his government came from the right, who very publicly doubted that a socialist like Mollet had the guts to go to war with Nasser.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 144"/> During an interview with publisher [[Henry Luce]], Mollet held up a copy of Nasser's book ''The Philosophy of the Revolution'' and said: "This is Nasser's ''Mein Kampf''. If we're too stupid not to read it, understand it and draw the obvious conclusions, then so much the worse for us."<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 145">{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|p=145}}</ref>

[[File:Suez nationalization.ogv|thumb|upright=1.15|thumbtime=2:32|1956 newsreels about Western reactions to the nationalisation. Pictured: [[John Foster Dulles]], US Secretary of State, and British Foreign Secretary [[Selwyn Lloyd]] at conference in London.]]

On 29 July 1956, the [[Government of France|French Cabinet]] decided upon military action against Egypt in alliance with Israel, and Admiral Nomy of the French Naval General Staff was sent to Britain to inform the [[leader]]s of that country of France's decision, and to invite them to co-operate if interested.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 145"/> At the same time, Mollet felt very much offended by what he considered to be the lackadaisical attitude of the Eisenhower administration to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 156">{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|p=156}}</ref> This was especially the case because earlier in 1956 the Soviet Foreign Minister [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] had offered the French a deal whereby if Moscow ended its support of the [[National Liberation Front (Algeria)|FLN]] in Algeria, Paris would remain in [[NATO]] but become "semi-neutralist" in the [[Cold War]].<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 156"/>

Given the way that Algeria (which the French considered an integral part of France) had become engulfed in a spiral of increasing violence that French leaders longed to put an end to, the Mollet administration had felt tempted by Molotov's offer, but in the end, Mollet, a firm [[Atlanticism|Atlanticist]], had chosen to remain faithful to NATO. In Mollet's view, his fidelity to NATO had earned him the right to expect firm American support against Egypt, and when that support proved not forthcoming, he became even more determined that if the Americans were not willing to do anything about Nasser, then France would act.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 156"/>{{additional citation needed|date=August 2024}}