Editing Political status of Taiwan (section)

== Developments since 2004 ==

=== Political ===
{{original research section|date=July 2021}}

Although the situation is complex, most observers believe that it is stable with enough understandings and [[gentlemen's agreement]]s to keep things from breaking out into open warfare. The current controversy is over the term ''one China'', as the PRC insists that the ROC must recognize this term to begin negotiations. Although the Democratic Progressive Party has moderated its support for Taiwan independence, there is still insufficient support within that party for former President Chen Shui-bian to agree to one China. By contrast, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the [[People First Party (Republic of China)|People First Party]] (PFP) appear willing to agree to some variation of one China, and observers believed the position of the PRC was designed to sideline Chen until the [[2004 ROC presidential election|2004 presidential election]] where it was hoped that someone who was more supportive of [[Cross-Strait Unification|Chinese unification]] would come to power. Partly to counter this, Chen Shui-bian announced in July 2002 that if the PRC does not respond to Taiwan's goodwill, Taiwan may "go on its own ... road." {{citation needed|date=January 2020}} What ROC president, Chen Shui-bian, means by this is that there are other ways of combatting China as a powerful hegemon. For example, "If Taiwan's Chen Shui-bian had declared legal independence by a popular referendum, scholars agree that is could have immediately triggered a crisis in China, due to its political sensitivity on the mainland".<ref>Wei, C. N. (2010). "China's Anti-Secession Law and Hu Jintao's Taiwan Policy". ''Yale J. Int'l Aff.'', 5, 112. p. 115, Par. 2, Lines 7–10.</ref> Taiwan's forced establishment of sovereignty scares the PRC; so when they implement laws, such as the Anti-secession law, it angers ROC's public opinion, and actually creates a "rallying around the flag" effect<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Baker |first1=William D. |last2=Oneal |first2=John R. |date=October 2001 |title=Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?: The Nature and Origins of the "Rally 'Round the Flag" Effect |journal=[[Journal of Conflict Resolution]] |language=en |volume=45 |issue=5 |pages=661–687 |doi=10.1177/0022002701045005006 |issn=0022-0027 |jstor=3176318}}</ref> in support of the Taiwanese independence movement.

With Chen's re-election in 2004, Beijing's prospects for a speedier resolution were dampened, though they seemed strengthened again following the Pan-Blue majority in the [[2004 ROC legislative election|2004 legislative elections]]. However, public opinion in Taiwan reacted unfavorably towards the [[Anti-Secession Law|anti-secession law]] passed by the PRC in March 2005. Following two high-profile visits by KMT and PFP party leaders to the PRC, the balance of public opinion appears to be ambiguous, with the Pan-Green Coalition gaining a majority in the [[2005 ROC National Assembly election|2005 National Assembly elections]], but the Pan-Blue Coalition scoring a landslide victory in the 2005 municipal elections.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

Legislative elections were held in Taiwan on [[2008 Republic of China legislative election|12 January 2008]]. The results gave the Kuomintang and the [[Pan-Blue Coalition]] an absolute majority (86 of the 113 seats) in the Legislative Yuan, handing a heavy defeat to President [[Chen Shui-bian]]'s Democratic Progressive Party, which won the remaining 27 seats. The junior partner in the [[Pan-Green Coalition]], the [[Taiwan Solidarity Union]], won no seats.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

The election for the 12th President of ROC was held on [[2008 Republic of China presidential election|22 March 2008]]. Kuomintang candidate Ma Ying-jeou won, with 58% of the vote, ending eight years of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leadership. Along with the 2008 legislative election, Ma's landslide victory brought the Kuomintang back to power in Taiwan. This new political situation has led to a decrease of tension between both sides of the Taiwan Strait and the increase of [[cross-strait relations]], making a declaration of independence, or war, something unlikely.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

Taiwan's [[Straits Exchange Foundation]] (SEF) and its Chinese counterpart&nbsp;– the [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait]] (ARATS)&nbsp;– signed four agreements in Taipei on 4 November 2008. Both SEF and ARATS have agreed to address direct sea links, daily charter flights, direct postal service, and food safety.<ref>{{cite news|title=Taiwan reached deals with China at the expense of sovereignty and democracy|publisher=[[European Federation of Taiwanese Associations|EFTA]]|date=6 November 2008|url=http://www.eutaiwan.org/en2.html|access-date=25 June 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110726042820/http://www.eutaiwan.org/en2.html|archive-date=26 July 2011|url-status=dead}}</ref>

It has been reported that China has set a 2049 deadline for the unification of Taiwan with Mainland China, which is the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Bagshaw|first=Eryk|date=2021-01-29|title=Why Taiwan might be the next global flashpoint|url=https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/why-might-taiwan-be-the-next-global-flashpoint-20210129-p56xya.html|access-date=2021-03-11|website=The Sydney Morning Herald|language=en|archive-date=24 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210224035547/https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/why-might-taiwan-be-the-next-global-flashpoint-20210129-p56xya.html|url-status=live}}</ref> [[General Secretary of the Communist Party|CCP general secretary]] [[Xi Jinping]] has been saying that unification was part of the [[Chinese Dream]].<ref>{{Cite web|title=Taiwan's Tsai shoots down Xi's unification road map|url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Taiwan-s-Tsai-shoots-down-Xi-s-unification-road-map|access-date=2021-03-11|website=Nikkei Asia|language=en-GB|archive-date=12 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210212073025/https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Taiwan-s-Tsai-shoots-down-Xi-s-unification-road-map|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2021, the China's Taiwan Affairs Office stated that they would not allow pro-Taiwan independence people into China, including Hong Kong and Macau, naming Taiwanese Premier [[Su Tseng-chang]], Legislative Yuan Speaker [[You Si-kun]] and Foreign Minister [[Joseph Wu]] as people who are "stubbornly pro-Taiwan independence".<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-05/china-taiwan-independence-banned-hong-kong-macau/100599500|title=If you support Taiwan's independence, China won't let you into the mainland, Hong Kong, or Macau|newspaper=[[ABC News (United States)|ABC News]]|date=5 November 2021|via=www.abc.net.au|access-date=5 November 2021|archive-date=5 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211105154312/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-05/china-taiwan-independence-banned-hong-kong-macau/100599500|url-status=live}}</ref>

=== Taiwanese public opinion ===
{{Further|Opinion polling on Taiwanese identity}}
Public opinion in Taiwan regarding relations with the PRC is notoriously difficult to gauge, as poll results tend to be extremely sensitive to how the questions are phrased and what options are given, and there is a tendency by all political parties to [[spin (politics)|spin]] the results to support their point of view.<ref>{{cite journal | doi=10.1177/0021909616649210 | title=Change and Continuity in Taiwan's Public Opinion on the Cross-Strait Economic Interactions | year=2017 | last1=Lin | first1=Yitzu | last2=Hsieh | first2=John Fuh-Sheng | journal=Journal of Asian and African Studies | volume=52 | issue=8 | pages=1103–1116 | s2cid=148166577 }}</ref>

According to a November 2005 poll from the [[Mainland Affairs Council]], 37.7% of people living in the ROC favor maintaining the status quo until a decision can be made in the future, 18.4% favors maintaining the status quo indefinitely, 14% favors maintaining the status quo until eventual independence, 12% favors maintaining the status quo until eventual unification, 10.3% favors independence as soon as possible, and 2.1% favors unification as soon as possible. According to the same poll, 78.3% are opposed to the "[[One Country, Two Systems]]" model, which was used for [[Hong Kong]] and [[Macau]], while 10.4% is in favor.<ref>{{cite web |script-title=zh:民意調查：「民眾對當前兩岸關係之看法」結果摘要 | access-date =18 October 2006 | publisher=[[Mainland Affairs Council]] | url= http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/pos/9411/po9411ch.htm |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070927003332/http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/pos/9411/po9411ch.htm <!-- Bot retrieved archive --> |archive-date = 27 September 2007}}</ref> However, it is essential to consider current events or newly developing positions when determining public opinion in order to maintain accuracy and efficiency, especially when it comes to conducting foreign policy and determining Taiwan's political status and hopeful eventual independence. For example, "Large jumps in the proportion of independence supporters after China's missile test in mid-1996 (from 13% in February to 21% in March) and Lee Teng-hui's "special state-to-state" speech in mid-1999 (from 15% in March to 28% in August) suggest that the cross-Strait tension influenced the Taiwanese to become more independence-minded".<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Sobel |first1=Richard |last2=Haynes |first2=William-Arthur |last3=Zheng |first3=Yu |date=2010 |title=The polls—Trends |journal=[[Public Opinion Quarterly]] |language=en |volume=74 |issue=4 |pages=782–813 |doi=10.1093/poq/nfq045 |issn=1537-5331}}</ref> According to a June 2008 poll from a Taiwanese mainstream media [[TVBS]], 58% of people living in Taiwan favor maintaining the status quo, 19% favors independence, and 8% favors unification. According to the same poll, if status quo is not an option and the ones who were surveyed must choose between "Independence" or "Unification", 65% are in favor of independence while 19% would opt for unification. The same poll also reveals that, in terms of self-identity, when the respondents are not told that a Taiwanese person can also be a Chinese person, 68% of the respondents identify themselves as "Taiwanese" while 18% would call themselves "Chinese". However, when the respondents are told that duo identity is an option, 45% of the respondents identify themselves as "Taiwanese only", 4% of the respondents call themselves "Chinese only" while another 45% of the respondents call themselves "both Taiwanese as well as Chinese". Furthermore, when it comes to preference in which national identity to be used in international organizations, 54% of people in the survey indicated that they prefer "Taiwan", and only 25% of the people voted for "Chinese Taipei".<ref>{{cite web |script-title=zh:民意調查：兩會復談前國族認同民調 | access-date=20 June 2008 | publisher=TVBS | url=http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/even/200806/even-20080610175239.pdf | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080626155825/http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/even/200806/even-20080610175239.pdf | archive-date=26 June 2008 | url-status=live }}</ref>

According to an October 2008 poll from the Mainland Affairs Council, on the question of Taiwan's status, 36.17% of respondents favor maintaining the status quo until a decision can be made in the future, 25.53% favors maintaining the status quo indefinitely, 12.49% favors maintaining the status quo until eventual independence, 4.44% favors maintaining the status quo until eventual unification, 14.80% favors independence as soon as possible, and 1.76% favors unification as soon as possible. In the same poll, on the question of the PRC government's attitude towards the ROC government, 64.85% of the respondents consider the PRC government hostile or very hostile, 24.89% consider the PRC government friendly or very friendly, while 10.27% did not express an opinion. On the question of the PRC government's attitude towards the people in Taiwan, 45.98% of the respondents consider the PRC government hostile or very hostile, 39.6% consider the PRC government friendly or very friendly, while 14.43% did not express an opinion.<ref>{{cite web| script-title=zh:「大陸政策與兩岸協商」民意調查(民國97年10月10日~10月12日)問卷及百分比分布 | access-date=16 October 2008|publisher=Mainland Affairs Council of the Republic of China| url=http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/pos/9710/9710a.pdf| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081029155949/http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/pos/9710/9710a.pdf| url-status=dead| archive-date=29 October 2008|language=zh}}</ref>

In May 2009, Taiwan's (Republic of China) Department of the Interior published a survey examining whether people in Taiwan see themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both. 64.6% see themselves as Taiwanese, 11.5% as Chinese, 18.1% as both, and 5.8% were unsure.<ref>{{cite web| script-title=zh:「民眾的政治態度及族群觀點」民意調查 加權百分比摘要表| access-date=11 June 2009| publisher=Taiwan's (Republic of China) Department of the Interior| url=http://www.rdec.gov.tw/public/Data/952711431071.pdf| language=zh| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111008164032/http://www.rdec.gov.tw/public/Data/952711431071.pdf| archive-date=8 October 2011| url-status=dead}}</ref>

According to a December 2009 poll from a Taiwanese mainstream media [[TVBS]], if status quo is not an option and the ones who were surveyed must choose between "Independence" or "Unification", 68% are in favor of independence while 13% would opt for unification.<ref>{{cite web | title=Taiwanese text | access-date=23 December 2009 | publisher=TVBS | url=http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/doshouldo/200912/doshouldo-20091218191946.pdf | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110927053933/http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/doshouldo/200912/doshouldo-20091218191946.pdf | archive-date=27 September 2011 | url-status=live }}</ref>

A June 2013 poll conducted by DPP showed that 77.6% consider themselves as Taiwanese.<ref name=":4">{{cite web |last=Lee |first=Hsin-fang |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/07/07/2003566539 |title=DPP poll finds 77.6% identify as Taiwanese |date=7 July 2013 |access-date=7 July 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130707182016/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/07/07/2003566539 |archive-date=7 July 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref> On the independence-unification issue, the survey found that 25.9 percent said they support unification, 59 percent support independence, and 10.3 percent prefer the "status quo." When asked whether Taiwan and China are parts of one country, the party said the survey found 78.4 percent disagree, while 15 percent agreed. As for whether Taiwan and China are two districts in one country, 70.6 percent disagree, while 22.8 percent agree, the survey showed. When asked which among four descriptions—"one country on each side," "a special state-to-state relationship," "one country, two areas," and "two sides are of one country"—they find the most acceptable, 54.9 percent said "one country on each side," 25.3 percent chose "a special state-to-state relationship," 9.8 percent said "one country, two areas", and 2.5 percent favor "two sides are of one country," the survey showed.<ref name=":4" />

A June 2023 poll conducted by the [[National Chengchi University]] showed 62.8% identified as Taiwanese, 2.5% as Chinese, and 30.5% as both.<ref>{{cite web |title=Election Study Center, NCCU-Taiwanese / Chinese Identity |url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961 |website=esc.nccu.edu.tw |language=zh-TW |access-date=8 October 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210306094327/https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961 |url-status=live }}</ref> Regarding independence, 32.1% indicated status quo forever, 28.6% wanted to decide later, 21.4% said status quo moving toward independence, and 5.8% said status quo moving toward unification.<ref>{{cite web |title=Election Study Center, NCCU-Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainl |url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 |website=esc.nccu.edu.tw |language=zh-TW |access-date=8 October 2023 |archive-date=26 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211026231952/https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 |url-status=live }}</ref>