Editing Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (section)

==Political events==
===Initial Soviet denial===
General Secretary [[Yuri Andropov]], on the advice of Defense Minister [[Dmitriy Ustinov]], but against the advice of the [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Soviet Union)|Foreign Ministry]], initially decided not to make any admission of downing the airliner, on the premise that no one would find out or be able to prove otherwise.<ref name="Oberdorfer">Oberdorfer, p. 51</ref> Consequently the [[Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union|TASS]] news agency reported twelve hours after the shoot-down only that an unidentified aircraft, flying without lights, had been intercepted by Soviet fighters after it violated Soviet airspace over Sakhalin. The aircraft had allegedly failed to respond to warnings and "continued its flight toward the Sea of Japan".<ref name="Oberdorfer"/><ref name="Daniloff-294"/> Some commentators believe that the inept manner in which the political events were handled by the Soviet government<ref name="Dallin">Dallin, p. 89</ref> was affected by the failing health of Andropov, who was permanently hospitalised in late September or early October 1983 (Andropov died the following February).<ref name="Pry"/>

In a 2015 interview [[Igor Kirillov]], the senior Soviet news anchor said that he was initially given a printed TASS report to announce over the news on September 1, which included an "open and honest" admission that the plane was shot down by mistake (a wrong judgment call by the Far Eastern Air Defence Command). However, at the moment the opening credits of the ''[[Vremya]]'' evening news programme rolled in, an editor ran in and snatched the sheet of paper from his hand, handing him another TASS report which was "completely opposite" to the first one and to the truth.<ref>{{cite interview |last=Kirillov |first=Igor |interviewer=Natalia Rostov |date=January 11, 2016 |access-date=January 13, 2016 |script-title=ru:Телезвезды: Игорь Кириллов: Интервью легендарного диктора программы «Время» |language=ru |url=https://meduza.io/feature/2016/01/11/telezvezdy-igor-kirillov}}</ref>

===U.S. reaction and further developments===
[[File:KAL 007 protests.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Demonstrators near the White House protest the Soviet shoot-down of KAL 007 (September 2, 1983)]]
[[File:Korean Association of NY on the news regarding KAL 007 (1983).jpg|thumb|260px|Korean Americans in New York reading the news about the shootdown (1 September 1983)]]
The shoot-down happened at a very tense time in the U.S.–Soviet relations during the [[Cold War]]. The U.S. adopted a strategy of releasing a substantial amount of hitherto highly classified [[Military intelligence|intelligence]] information in order to exploit a major propaganda advantage over the Soviet Union.<ref>Johnson, pp. 117–121</ref>

Six hours after the plane was downed, the South Korean government announced that the plane had merely been forced to land abruptly by the Soviets and that all passengers and crew were safe.<ref name="foot">{{Cite book |last=Johnson |first=RW |title=Shootdown: The verdict on KAL&nbsp;007}}</ref>{{page needed|date=February 2023}} U.S. Secretary of State [[George P. Shultz]] held a press conference about the incident at 10:45 on September 1, during which he divulged some details of intercepted Soviet communications and denounced the actions of the Soviet Union.<ref name="Daniloff-294">Daniloff, p. 294</ref>

On September 5, 1983, President Reagan condemned the shooting down of the airplane as the "Korean airline massacre", a "crime against humanity [that] must never be forgotten" and an "act of barbarism... [and] inhuman brutality".<ref>{{cite press release |first=Ronald |last=Reagan |url=http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/90583a.htm |author-link=Ronald Reagan |title=Address to the Nation on the Soviet Attack on a Korean Civilian Airliner |date=September 5, 1983 |access-date=January 12, 2009 |publisher=U Texas; [[United States government]] |archive-date=February 18, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120218184324/http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/90583a.htm |url-status=dead}}</ref> The following day, the U.S. ambassador to the UN [[Jeane Kirkpatrick]] delivered an audio-visual presentation in the [[United Nations Security Council]], using audio tapes of the Soviet pilots' radio conversations and a map of Flight 007's path in depicting its shooting down. Following this presentation, TASS acknowledged for the first time that the aircraft had indeed been shot down after warnings were ignored. The Soviets challenged many of the facts presented by the U.S. and revealed the previously unknown presence of a USAF [[Boeing RC-135|RC-135]] [[surveillance aircraft]] whose path had crossed that of KAL&nbsp;007.

[[File:Over the horizon antenna.JPG|thumb|left|Japanese [[signals intelligence|listening post]] at [[Wakkanai]]]]
On September 7, Japan and the United States jointly released a transcript of Soviet communications, intercepted by the [[Signals intelligence|listening post]] at [[Wakkanai]], to an emergency session of the [[United Nations Security Council]].<ref>Ball, pp. 42–46</ref> Reagan issued a [[Presidential directive|National Security Directive]] stating that the Soviets were not to be let off the hook, and initiating "a major diplomatic effort to keep international and domestic attention focused on the Soviet action".<ref name="Richelson-385">Richelson, p. 385</ref> The move was seen by the Soviet leadership as confirmation of the West's bad intentions.

A high-level U.S.–Soviet [[Summit (meeting)|summit]], the first in nearly a year, was scheduled for September 8, 1983, in Madrid.<ref name="Oberdorfer"/> The [[George P. Shultz|Shultz]]–[[Andrei Gromyko|Gromyko]] meeting went ahead but was overshadowed by the KAL&nbsp;007 events.<ref name="Oberdorfer"/> It ended acrimoniously, with Shultz stating: "Foreign Minister Gromyko's response to me today was even more unsatisfactory than the response he gave in public yesterday. I find it totally unacceptable."<ref name="Oberdorfer"/> Reagan ordered the [[Federal Aviation Administration]] (FAA) on September 15, 1983, to revoke the license of [[Aeroflot|Aeroflot Soviet Airlines]] to operate flights to and from the United States. Aeroflot flights to North America were consequently available only through Canadian and Mexican cities, forcing the Soviet foreign minister to cancel his scheduled trip to the UN. Aeroflot service to the U.S. was not restored until April 29, 1986.<ref>''The Current Digest of the Soviet Press''.</ref>

An emergency session of the [[International Civil Aviation Organization|ICAO]] was held in [[Montreal]], Canada.<ref>{{cite press release |url=http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/91783a.htm |first=Ronald |last=Reagan |author-link=Ronald Reagan |title=Radio Address to the Nation on the Soviet Attack on a Korean Civilian Airliner |date=September 17, 1983 |access-date=January 11, 2009 |publisher=U Texas; [[United States Government]] |archive-date=July 18, 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080718110341/http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/91783a.htm |url-status=dead}}</ref> On September 12, 1983, the Soviet Union used its [[United Nations Security Council veto power|veto]] to block a [[United Nations Security Council resolution|United Nations resolution]] condemning it for shooting down the aircraft.<ref name="Time1983-09-26"/>

[[File:67º Período de Sesiones de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas (8020913157).jpg|thumb|The [[United Nations Headquarters]] in New York]]

Shortly after the Soviet Union shot down KAL&nbsp;007, the [[Port Authority of New York and New Jersey]], operating the commercial airports around New York City, denied Soviet aircraft landing rights, in violation of the [[United Nations Charter]] that required the host nation to allow all member countries access to the UN. In reaction, TASS and some at the UN raised the question of whether the UN should move its [[United Nations Headquarters|headquarters]] from the United States. [[Charles Lichenstein]], acting U.S. permanent representative to the UN under Ambassador Kirkpatrick, responded, "We will put no impediment in your way. The members of the U.S. mission to the United Nations will be down at the dockside waving you a fond farewell as you sail off into the sunset." Administration officials were quick to announce that Lichenstein was speaking only for himself.<ref>Luck, ''Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919–1999'', p. 64</ref>

In the Cold War context of Operation [[RYAN]], the [[Strategic Defence Initiative]], [[Pershing II]] missile deployment in Europe, and the upcoming [[Able Archer 83|Exercise Able Archer]], the Soviet Government perceived the incident with the South Korean airliner to be a portent of war.<ref name="Pry" /> The Soviet hierarchy took the official line that KAL Flight 007 was on a spy mission, as it "flew deep into Soviet territory for several hundred kilometres [miles], without responding to signals and disobeying the orders of interceptor fighter planes".<ref name="Sputnik" /> They claimed its purpose was to probe the air defences of highly sensitive Soviet military sites in the Kamchatka Peninsula and [[Sakhalin Island]].<ref name="Sputnik" /> The Soviet government expressed regret over the loss of life, but offered no apology and did not respond to demands for compensation.<ref name="Johnson-110">Johnson, p. 110</ref> Instead, the Soviet Union blamed the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] for this "criminal, provocative act".<ref name="Sputnik">Sputnik, ''The Truth and Lies about the South Korean Airliner''</ref>

In a comparative study of the two tragedies published in 1991, political scientist [[Robert Entman]] points out that with KAL 007, "the angle taken by the US media emphasised the moral bankruptcy and guilt of the perpetrating nation. With [[Iran Air 655]], the frame de-emphasised guilt and focused on the complex problems of operating military high technology".<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://mondediplo.com/2019/08/02us-iran |title=US and Iran, short memories |date=August 2019}}</ref>