Editing Hafez al-Assad (section)

==== Background ====
Assad's pragmatic policies indirectly led to the establishment of a "new class",{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=85}} and he accepted this while it furthered his aims against [[Israel]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=85}} When Assad began pursuing a policy of [[economic liberalization]], the state bureaucracy began using their positions for personal gain.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=85}} The state gave implementation rights to "much of its development program to foreign firms and contractors, fueling a growing linkage between the state and private capital".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=86}} What ensued was a spike in corruption, which led the political class to be "thoroughly [[bourgeoisie|embourgeoised]]".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=86}} The channeling of external money through the state to private enterprises "created growing opportunities for state elites' self-enrichment through corrupt manipulation of state-market interchanges. Besides outright embezzlement, webs of shared interests in commissions and kickbacks grew up between high officials, politicians, and business interests".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=86}} The Alawite military-security establishment got the greatest share of the money;{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|pp=86–89}} the Ba'ath Party and its leaders ruled a new class, defending their interests instead of those of peasants and workers (whom they were supposed to represent).{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|pp=86–89}} This, coupled with growing Sunni disillusionment with what Hinnebusch calls "the regime's mixture of statism, rural and sectarian favouritism, corruption and new inequalities", fueled the growth of the Islamic movement.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=89}} Because of this, the [[Muslim Brotherhood of Syria]] became the vanguard of anti-Ba'athist forces.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}}

The Brotherhood had historically been a vehicle for Islamism during its introduction to the Syrian political scene during the 1960s under the leadership of [[Mustafa al-Siba'i]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} After Siba'i's imprisonment, under [[Isam al-Attar]]'s leadership the Brotherhood developed into the ideological antithesis of Ba'athist rule.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} However, the Ba'ath Party's organizational superiority worked in its favor;{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} with Attar's enforced exile, the Muslim Brotherhood was in disarray.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} It was not until the 1970s that the Muslim Brotherhood established a clear, central collective authority for its organization under Adnan Saad ad-Din, [[Sa'id Hawwa]], [[Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni]] and Husni Abu.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} Because of their organizational capabilities, the [[Muslim Brotherhood]] grew tenfold from 1975 to 1978 (from 500 to 700 in Aleppo); nationwide, by 1978 it had 30,000 followers.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}}