Editing Economy of North Korea (section)

===Food===
====Agriculture====
{{Main|Agriculture in North Korea}}

[[File: DPRK rice.jpg|thumb|Crops growing in North Korea]]

North Korea's sparse agricultural resources limit agricultural production. Climate, terrain, and soil conditions are not particularly favorable for farming,<ref name="Savada1994"/> with a relatively short cropping season. Only about 17% of the total landmass, or approximately {{convert|2000000|ha|km2|disp=output only}}, is arable, of which {{convert|1400000|ha|km2|disp=output only}} is well suited for cereal cultivation;<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/> the major portion of the country is rugged mountain terrain.<ref name="Savada1994"/>

The weather varies markedly according to elevation, and lack of precipitation, along with infertile soil, makes land at elevations higher than 400 meters unsuitable for purposes other than grazing. Precipitation is geographically and seasonally irregular, and in most parts of the country as much as half the annual rainfall occurs in the three summer months. This pattern favors the cultivation of paddy rice in warmer regions that are outfitted with irrigation and flood control networks.<ref name="Savada1994"/> Rice yields are 5.3 tonnes per hectare, close to international norms.<ref name="38north-20131218"/> In 2005, North Korea was ranked by the [[FAO]] as an estimated 10th in the production of fresh fruit<ref name="FAO-2005-619">{{cite web |url=http://www.fao.org/es/ess/top/commodity.html?lang=en&item=619&year=2005 |title=Major Food and Agricultural Commodities and Producer: Countries by commodity |year=2005 |publisher=[[Food and Agriculture Organization|Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations]] |access-date=April 8, 2022 |url-status=unfit |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090805235547/http://www.fao.org/es/ess/top/commodity.html?lang=en&item=619&year=2005 |archive-date=August 5, 2009 }}</ref> and as an estimated 19th in the production of [[apple]]s.<ref name="FAO-2005-515">{{cite web |url=http://www.fao.org/es/ess/top/commodity.html?item=515&lang=en&year=2005 |title=Major Food and Agricultural Commodities and Producer: Countries by commodity |year=2005 |publisher=[[Food and Agriculture Organization|Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations]] |access-date=April 8, 2022 |url-status=unfit |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090313171151/http://www.fao.org/es/ess/top/commodity.html?item=515&lang=en&year=2005 |archive-date=March 13, 2009 }}</ref>

Farming is concentrated in the flatlands of the four west coast provinces, where a longer growing season, level land, adequate rainfall, and good irrigated soil permit the most intensive cultivation of crops. A narrow strip of similarly fertile land runs through the eastern seaboard [[Hamgyŏng]] provinces and [[Kangwon Province (North Korea)|Kangwŏn]] Province, but the interior provinces of [[Chagang]] and [[Ryanggang]] are too mountainous, cold, and dry to allow much farming. The mountains contain the bulk of North Korea's forest reserves while the foothills within and between the major agricultural regions provide lands for livestock grazing and fruit tree cultivation.<ref name="Savada1994"/>

Since self-sufficiency remains an important pillar of North Korean ideology, self-sufficiency in food production is deemed a worthy goal. Another aim of government policies—to reduce the gap between urban and rural living standards—requires continued investment in the agricultural sector. The stability of the country depends on steady, if not rapid, increases in the availability of food items at reasonable prices. In the early 1990s, there were severe food shortages.<ref name="Savada1994"/><ref name="undp.org">United Nations Development Program, Millennium Development Goals and the DPRK, retrieved October 21, 21, 2011, {{cite web|url=http://www.undp.org/dprk/mdgs.shtml |title=Millennium Development Goals and the DPRK |access-date=May 15, 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111201032637/http://www.undp.org/dprk/mdgs.shtml |archive-date=December 1, 2011 }}</ref><ref>{{cite report |last1=Woo-Cumings |first1=Meredith |title=The Political Ecology of Famine: The North Korean Catastrophe and Its Lessons |date=2002 |hdl=10419/111123 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

[[File:North Korea tractor.jpg|left|thumb|A tractor in North Korea]]
The most far-reaching statement on agricultural policy is embodied in Kim Il Sung's 1964 ''[[Theses on the Socialist Agrarian Question in Our Country]]'', which underscores the government's concern for agricultural development.<ref>{{cite book|last=Josephson |first=Paul R. |title=Would Trotsky Wear a Bluetooth?: Technological Utopianism under Socialism, 1917–1989 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rOvHOUziXSAC&pg=PA143 |date=December 25, 2009 |publisher=The Johns Hopkins University Press |location=Baltimore |isbn=978-0-8018-9841-9 |page=143 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170225095658/https://books.google.com/books?id=rOvHOUziXSAC&pg=PA143 |archive-date=February 25, 2017 }}</ref> Kim emphasized technological and educational progress in the countryside as well as collective forms of ownership and management. As industrialization progressed, the share of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in the total national output declined from 63.5% and 31.4%, respectively, in 1945 and 1946, to a low of 26.8% in 1990. Their share in the labor force also declined from 57.6% in 1960 to 34.4% in 1989.<ref name="Savada1994"/>

In the 1990s, the decreasing ability to carry out mechanized operations (including the pumping of water for irrigation), as well as lack of chemical inputs, was clearly contributing to reduced yields and increased harvesting and post-harvest losses.<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/>

Incremental improvements in agricultural production have been made since the late 1990s, bringing North Korea close to self-sufficiency in [[staple food]]s by 2013. In particular, rice yields have steadily improved, though yields on other crops have generally not improved. The production of protein foods remains inadequate. Access to chemical fertilizer has declined, but the use of compost and other organic fertilizer has been encouraged.<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013">{{cite report|url=http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/aq118e/aq118e.pdf |title=FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea |publisher=Food and Agriculture Organization/World Food Programme |year=2013 |access-date=January 7, 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140107145549/http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/aq118e/aq118e.pdf |archive-date=January 7, 2014 }}</ref><ref name="38north-20131218">{{cite news|url=http://38north.org/2013/12/rireson121813/ |title=The State of North Korean Farming: New Information from the UN Crop Assessment Report |author=Randall Ireson |publisher=U.S.–Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies |work=[[38 North]] |date=December 18, 2013 |access-date=January 7, 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140710015244/http://38north.org/2013/12/rireson121813/ |archive-date=July 10, 2014 }}</ref>

====Fisheries====
{{Main|Fishing industry in North Korea}}
North Korean fisheries export seafood, primarily [[crab]], to [[Dandong, Liaoning]], illicitly.<ref name="SCMPFISH">{{cite news |newspaper=[[South China Morning Post]] |title=The fishy side of China's ban on North Korean imports |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2109193/fishy-side-chinas-ban-north-korean-imports |date=August 31, 2017 |first=Choi |last=Chi-yuk |access-date=August 31, 2017 |archive-date=August 31, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170831141328/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2109193/fishy-side-chinas-ban-north-korean-imports |url-status=live }}</ref> Crabs, clams and conches from the [[Yellow Sea]] waters of North Korea are popular in China, possibly because the less salty water improves taste.<ref name="SCMPFISH"/>

====Food distribution system====
Since the 1950s, a majority of North Koreans have received their food through the [[public distribution system (North Korea)|public distribution system]] (PDS). The PDS requires farmers in agricultural regions to hand over a portion of their production to the government and then reallocates the surplus to urban regions, which cannot grow their own foods. About 70% of the [[Demographics of North Korea|North Korean population]], including the entire [[urban population]], receives food through this government-run system.<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/>

Before the floods, recipients were generally allotted 600–700&nbsp;grams per day while high officials, military men, heavy laborers, and public security personnel were allotted slightly larger portions of 700–800&nbsp;grams per day.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Goodkind|first1=Daniel|last2=West|first2=Loraine|title=The North Korean Famine and Its Impact Demographic|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2695207|journal=Population Council|jstor=2695207|access-date=March 8, 2021|archive-date=March 8, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308114755/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2695207|url-status=live}}</ref> As of 2013, the target average distribution was 573 grams of cereal equivalent per person per day, but varied according to age, occupation, and whether rations are received elsewhere (such as school meals).<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/> However, as of 2019, this number has been reduced to 312 grams per day according to an investigation conducted by the [[United Nations]] between March 29 and April 12.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/north-korea-food-insecurity-food-aid/|title=North Korea Cuts Food Rations to Just 11 Ounces per Day|date=May 3, 2019 |access-date=December 19, 2019|archive-date=December 19, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191219010000/https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/north-korea-food-insecurity-food-aid/|url-status=live}}</ref>

Decreases in production affected the quantity of food available through the public distribution system. Shortages were compounded when the North Korean government imposed further restrictions on collective farmers. When farmers, who had never been covered by the PDS, were mandated by the government to reduce their own food allotments from 167 kilograms to 107 kilograms of grain per person each year, they responded by withholding portions of the required amount of grain. By 2008, the system had significantly recovered, and, from 2009 to 2013, daily per person rations averaged at 400 grams per day for much of the year, though in 2011 it dropped to 200 grams per day from May to September.<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/>

It is estimated that in the early 2000s, the average North Korean family drew some 80% of its income from small businesses that were technically illegal (though unenforced) in North Korea. In 2002 and in 2010, [[Jangmadang|private markets]] were progressively legalized.<ref name="atimes-20110923">{{cite news|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MI23Dg02.html |title=It's not all doom and gloom in Pyongyang |publisher=Asia Times |date=September 23, 2011 |access-date=October 9, 2011 |url-status=unfit |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110924095232/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MI23Dg02.html |archive-date=September 24, 2011 }}</ref> As of 2013, urban and farmer markets were held every 10 days, and most urban residents lived within 2&nbsp;km of a market, with markets having an increasing role in obtaining food.<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/>

In recent years the government policy shifted towards a more controlled commercial networks, by restricting local markets and pushing sales in State-Owned Stores.<ref name="rfa.org">{{cite web |last1=Ahn |first1=Chang Gyu |title=Illegal nighttime markets pop up in North Korea |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/markets-02282024155938.html |website=RFA |access-date=9 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240425153144/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/markets-02282024155938.html |archive-date=25 April 2024}}</ref><ref name="North Korea Restricts Local Markets">{{cite web |last1=Jeong |first1=Yon Park |title=North Korea Restricts Local Markets, Pushing Sales in State-Owned Stores |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/markets-06032021152857.html |website=RFA |access-date=9 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240224134223/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/markets-06032021152857.html |archive-date=24 February 2024}}</ref>

====Crisis and famine====
{{Main|North Korean famine}}
From 1994 to 1998, North Korea suffered a famine. Since North Korea is a closed country, the number of specific deaths in the incident is difficult to know. According to different literature, the starved or malnourished death toll is estimated to be between 240,000 and 480,000. Since 1998 there has been a gradual recovery in agriculture production, which by 2013 brought North Korea back close to self-sufficiency in [[staple food]]s. However, as of 2013, most households have borderline or poor food consumption, and consumption of protein remains inadequate.<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/>

In the 1990s, the North Korean economy saw stagnation turning into crisis. Economic assistance received from the Soviet Union and China was an important factor of its economic growth. Upon its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union withdrew its support and demanded payment in hard currency for imports. China stepped in to provide some assistance and supplied food and oil, most of it reportedly at concessionary prices.{{Citation needed|date=January 2008}} The North Korean economy was undermined and its industrial output began to decline in 1990. Deprived of industrial inputs, including fertilizers, pesticides, and electricity for irrigation, agricultural output also started to decrease even before North Korea had a series of natural disasters in the mid-1990s. This evolution, combined with a series of natural disasters including record floods in 1995, caused one of the worst economic crises in North Korea's history. Other causes of this crisis were high defense spending (about 25% of GDP) and bad governance.

In December 1991, North Korea established a "zone of free economy and trade" to include the northeastern port cities of Unggi ([[Sonbong|Sŏnbong]]), Ch'ŏngjin, and Najin. The establishment of this zone also had ramifications on the questions of how far North Korea would go in opening its economy to the West and to South Korea, the future of the development scheme for the [[Tumen River]] area, and, more important, how much North Korea would reform its economic system.<ref name="Savada1994"/>

North Korea announced in December 1993 a three-year transitional economic policy placing primary emphasis on agriculture, light industry, and foreign trade. However, lack of fertilizer, natural disasters, and poor storage and transportation practices have left the country more than a million tons per year short of grain self-sufficiency.<ref name="Bloomberg2016">{{cite web|last1=McFerron|first1=Whitney|title=North Korea Food Supply Imperiled by Drought, UN Says|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-27/north-korea-s-food-supply-imperiled-by-water-shortages-un-says|website=Bloomberg.com|access-date=February 23, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160710111621/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-27/north-korea-s-food-supply-imperiled-by-water-shortages-un-says|archive-date=July 10, 2016|date=April 27, 2016|quote=North Korea's already-low food supplies are about to get worse after poor rainfall in the past year slashed the nation's critical rice crop, the United Nations said.  At least 70% of North Korea's population, or about 18 million people, already rely on the government as their main source of food grain and for months has received well below the targeted daily ration, UN's Food & Agriculture Organization said in a report Wednesday. The country will need to import almost 700,000 metric tons of grain to meet its needs this year, but government purchases are only expected to reach 300,000 tons, the report said.}}</ref><ref name="UPI2016">{{cite web|last1=Shim|first1=Elizabeth|title=North Korea's food shortage grows but elites remain unaffected, Seoul says|url=http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/09/27/North-Koreas-food-shortage-grows-but-elites-remain-unaffected-Seoul-says/4001474997303/|website=UPI.com|access-date=February 23, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170120044413/http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/09/27/North-Koreas-food-shortage-grows-but-elites-remain-unaffected-Seoul-says/4001474997303/|archive-date=January 20, 2017|date=September 27, 2016|quote=In 2014, North Korea's food shortage was estimated to be 340,000 tons and 407,000 tons in 2015. In 2015, North Korea's grain production was hit heavily by a drought. A lack of fertilizer and other resources could have also contributed to the deficit, according to the report.}}</ref> Moreover, lack of foreign exchange to purchase spare parts and oil for electricity generation left many factories idle.<ref name="RandPark2010Dissertation">{{cite web|last1=Park|first1=Ki-Tae|title=Analyzing North Korea's Decision-Making Process on its Nuclear Weapons Programs with the Rational Choice and Cognitive Choice Models|url=http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2010/RAND_RGSD268.pdf|website=Rand.org|publisher=Pardee Rand Graduate School|access-date=February 23, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130310231533/http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2010/RAND_RGSD268.pdf|archive-date=March 10, 2013|date=2010|quote=This severe shortage of oil imports and coal production provided the first phase of vicious cycle of economic recession by getting industrial factories idle in the first place. Pyongyang, in return, could have not produced export merchandize enough to earn foreign reserve due to the low operation rates of its factories and lack of raw materials, thereby significantly reducing its foreign reserve acquisition. The lack of foreign exchange reserves again caused the shortage of oil import and then the oil shortage made its amount of agricultural product diminish sharply due to the inability to use its machinery and artificial fertilizers, most of which are highly dependent on oil and coal consumption in their production.}}</ref>

The 1990s famine paralyzed many of the Stalinist economic institutions. The government pursued Kim Jong Il's ''[[Songun]]'' policy, under which the military is deployed to direct production and infrastructure projects. As a consequence of the government's policy of establishing economic self-sufficiency, the North Korean economy has become increasingly isolated from that of the rest of the world, and its industrial development and structure do not reflect its international competitiveness. Domestic firms are shielded from international as well as domestic competition; the result is chronic inefficiency, poor quality, limited product diversity, and underutilization of plants.{{Citation needed|date=January 2008}} This [[protectionism]] also limits the size of the market for North Korean producers,<ref name="Savada1994"/> which prevents taking advantage of [[Economy of scale|economies of scale]].

North Korea, led by Kim Jong Un, declined external aid for flood recovery, relocating 15,400 displaced people to Pyongyang while emphasizing self-reliance. Despite offers from Russia, China, and others, the North has chosen to manage the crisis independently.<ref>{{cite news |title=Thousands of flood victims will be brought to capital for temporary care, North Korean leader says |date=10 August 2024 |url=https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/aug/10/thousands-of-flood-victims-will-be-brought-to-capi/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240811204147/https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/aug/10/thousands-of-flood-victims-will-be-brought-to-capi/ |archive-date=August 11, 2024 |access-date=12 August 2024 |url-status=live }}</ref>


The food shortage was primarily precipitated by the loss of fuel and other raw materials imports from China and the Soviet Union which had been essential to support an energy intensive and energy inefficient farming system. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former concessional trade relationships which benefited the North Korea were not available. The three flood and drought years between 1994 and 1996 only served to complete the collapse of the agriculture sector.<ref name="undp.org"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Ireson |first1=Randall |title=Food Security in North Korea: Designing Realistic Possibilities |url=http://fsi-media.stanford.edu/evnts/4140/Ireson_FoodSecurity_2006.pdf |publisher=Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University |access-date=June 15, 2007 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150904004856/http://fsi-media.stanford.edu/evnts/4140/Ireson_FoodSecurity_2006.pdf |archive-date=September 4, 2015 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=CIA World Fact Book |date=November 24, 2021 |url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-north/ |access-date=January 24, 2021 |archive-date=August 12, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150812052526/https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html |url-status=live }}</ref>
In 2004, more than half (57%) of the population did not have enough food to stay healthy. 37% of children had their growth stunted and {{frac|1|3}} of mothers severely lacked nutrition.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Central Bureau of Statistics |title=DPRK 2004 Nutrition Assessment Report of Survey Results |url=http://www.unicef.org/dprk/dprk_national_nutrition_assessment_2004_final_report_07_03_05.pdf |access-date=June 15, 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304092506/http://www.unicef.org/dprk/dprk_national_nutrition_assessment_2004_final_report_07_03_05.pdf |archive-date=March 4, 2016 }}</ref>

In 2006, the World Food Program (WFP) and FAO estimated a requirement of 5.3 to 6.5 million tons of grain when domestic production fulfilled only 3.825 million tons.<ref>{{cite journal|journal=[[Human Rights Watch]] |title=A matter of survival: the North Korean government's control of food and the risk of hunger |year=2006 |volume=18 |issue=3 |url=http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/matter-survival-north-korean-governments-control-food-and |url-status=live |access-date=December 14, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131215011748/http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/matter-survival-north-korean-governments-control-food-and |archive-date=December 15, 2013 }}</ref> The country also faces [[land degradation]] after forests stripped for agriculture resulted in soil erosion.<ref>{{cite web |title=CIA&nbsp;— The World Factbook |date=November 24, 2021 |url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-north/ |publisher=Central Intelligence Agency |access-date=January 24, 2021 |archive-date=August 12, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150812052526/https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2008, a decade after the worst years of the famine, total production was 3.34 million tons (grain equivalent) compared with a need of 5.98 million tons. Thirty seven percent of the population was deemed to be insecure in food access.<ref>{{cite web|title=FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 8 December 2008 |url=http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/emergencies/docs/FAO-WFP_Crop_and_Food_Supply_Assessment_Mission_Report.pdf |website=fao.org |access-date=January 15, 2009 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150904004856/http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/emergencies/docs/FAO-WFP_Crop_and_Food_Supply_Assessment_Mission_Report.pdf |archive-date=September 4, 2015 }}</ref> Weather continued to pose challenges every year, but overall food production grew gradually, and by 2013, production had increased to the highest level since the crisis, to 5.03 million tons cereal equivalent, against a minimum requirement of 5.37 MMT.<ref>{{cite web|title=FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 28 November 2013 |url=http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/aq118e/aq118e.pdf |website=fao.org |access-date=January 15, 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150306030926/http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/aq118e/aq118e.pdf |archive-date=March 6, 2015 }}</ref>

In 2014, North Korea had an exceptionally good harvest, 5.08 million tonnes of cereal equivalent, almost sufficient to feed the entire population.<ref name="aljazeera-20140327">{{cite news|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/n-korea-myth-starvation-2014319124439924471.html |title=N Korea and the myth of starvation |author=Andrei Lankov |publisher=Al Jazeera |date=March 27, 2014 |access-date=November 8, 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141121211528/http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/n-korea-myth-starvation-2014319124439924471.html |archive-date=November 21, 2014 }}</ref> While food production had recovered significantly since the hardest years of 1996 and 1997, the recovery was fragile, subject to adverse weather and year to year economic shortages. Distribution was uneven, with the Public Distribution System being largely ineffective. North Korea now has in most years lower malnutrition levels than in some richer Asian countries.<ref name=ap-20190322>{{cite news |url=https://apnews.com/fe394eef5f7848f5be284d21a4b7624a |title=North Korea, seeking food aid, links sanctions to shortages |last=Talmadge |first=Eric |publisher=Associated Press |date=March 22, 2019 |access-date=April 2, 2019 |archive-date=May 8, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190508232655/https://apnews.com/fe394eef5f7848f5be284d21a4b7624a |url-status=live }}</ref> However, in 2019 North Korea had the worst harvest in over a decade, which the United Nations described as a "hunger crisis".<ref>{{Cite web|date=May 3, 2019|title=North Korean families facing deep 'hunger crisis' after worst harvest in 10 years, UN food assessment shows|url=https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1037831|access-date=October 20, 2021|website=UN News|language=en|archive-date=October 20, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211020073325/https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1037831|url-status=live}}</ref>