Editing David Lloyd George (section)

=== War leader (1916–1918) ===
====Forming a government====
The fall of Asquith as prime minister split the Liberal Party into two factions: those who supported him and those who supported the coalition government. In his ''War Memoirs'', Lloyd George compared himself with Asquith:<ref>{{cite book|last=Lloyd George|first=David|title=War Memoirs of David Lloyd George|edition=New|volume=1 of 2|year=1938|publisher=Odhams Press|location=London|page=602|chapter=XXXVI Some Personal Sketches}}</ref>
<blockquote>There are certain indispensable qualities essential to the Chief Minister of the Crown in a great war.&nbsp;... Such a minister must have courage, composure, and judgment. All this Mr. Asquith possessed in a superlative degree.&nbsp;... But a war minister must also have vision, imagination and initiative—he must show untiring assiduity, must exercise constant oversight and supervision of every sphere of war activity, must possess driving force to energize this activity, must be in continuous consultation with experts, official and unofficial, as to the best means of using the resources of the country in conjunction with the Allies for the achievement of victory. If to this can be added a flair for conducting a great fight, then you have an ideal War Minister.</blockquote>

After December 1916 Lloyd George relied on the support of Conservatives and of the press baron [[Lord Northcliffe]] (who owned both ''[[The Times]]'' and the ''[[Daily Mail]]''). Besides the Prime Minister, the five-member [[War Cabinet]] contained three Conservatives (Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Lords [[Lord Curzon]], Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of Commons [[Bonar Law]], and [[Minister without portfolio (United Kingdom)|Minister without Portfolio]] [[Lord Milner]]) and [[Arthur Henderson]], unofficially representing [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour]]. [[Edward Carson]] was appointed [[First Lord of the Admiralty]], as had been widely touted during the intrigues of the previous month, but excluded from the War Cabinet. Amongst the few Liberal frontbenchers to support Lloyd George were [[Christopher Addison]] (who had played an important role in drumming up some backbench Liberal support for Lloyd George), [[H. A. L. Fisher]], [[Lord Rhondda]] and [[Albert Stanley, 1st Baron Ashfield|Sir Albert Stanley]]. [[Edwin Montagu]] and Churchill joined the government in the summer of 1917.{{sfn|Koss|1985|p=224}}

Lloyd George's Secretariat, popularly known as Downing Street's "[[The Garden Suburb|Garden Suburb]]", assisted him in discharging his responsibilities within the constraints of the war cabinet system. Its function was to maintain contact with the numerous departments of government, to collect information, and to report on matters of special concern. Its leading members were [[William George Stewart Adams|George Adams]] and [[Philip Kerr, 11th Marquess of Lothian|Philip Kerr]], and the other secretaries included [[David Davies, 1st Baron Davies|David Davies]], [[Joseph Davies (British politician)|Joseph Davies]], [[Waldorf Astor]] and, later, [[Cecil Harmsworth]].<ref>Andrew Blick and George Jones, ''A Century of Policy Advice at No.10'', Part I. [https://history.blog.gov.uk/2017/01/05/a-century-of-policy-advice-at-no-10-part-one/ Official UK government history of policy advice] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191013191732/https://history.blog.gov.uk/2017/01/05/a-century-of-policy-advice-at-no-10-part-one/ |date=13 October 2019 }}. See also John Turner, ''Lloyd George's Secretariat'' (Cambridge University Press, 1980).</ref>

Lloyd George wanted to make the destruction of the [[Ottoman Empire]] a major British war aim, and two days after taking office told Robertson that he wanted a major victory, preferably the capture of [[Jerusalem]], to impress British public opinion.{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=119–120}}

At the Rome Conference (5–6 January 1917) Lloyd George was discreetly quiet about plans to take Jerusalem, an object which advanced British interests rather than doing much to win the war. Lloyd George proposed sending heavy guns to Italy with a view to defeating Austria-Hungary, possibly to be balanced by a transfer of Italian troops to Salonika but was unable to obtain the support of the French or Italians, and Robertson talked of resigning.{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=83–85}}

==== Nivelle affair ====
Lloyd George engaged almost constantly in intrigues calculated to reduce the power of the generals, including trying to subordinate British forces in France to the French [[General Nivelle]]. He backed Nivelle because he thought he had "proved himself to be a Man" by his successful counterattacks at [[Battle of Verdun|Verdun]], and because of his promises that he could break the German lines in 48 hours. Nivelle increasingly complained of Haig's dragging his feet rather than cooperating with their plans for the offensive.{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=88–90}}

The plan was to put British forces under Nivelle's direct command for the great 1917 offensive. The British would attack first, thereby tying down the German reserves. Then the French would strike and score an overwhelming victory in two days. It was announced at a War Cabinet meeting on 24 February, to which neither Robertson nor [[Edward Stanley, 17th Earl of Derby|Lord Derby]] (Secretary of State for War) had been invited. Ministers felt that the French generals and staff had shown themselves more skilful than the British in 1916, whilst politically Britain had to give wholehearted support to what would probably be the last major French effort of the war. The Nivelle proposal was then given to Robertson and Haig without warning on 26–27 February at the [[Calais Conference (1917)|Calais Conference]] (minutes from the War Cabinet meeting were not sent to [[George V|the King]] until 28 February, so that he did not have a prior chance to object). Robertson in particular protested vehemently. Finally, a compromise was reached whereby Haig would be under Nivelle's orders but would retain operational control of British forces and keep a right of appeal to London "if he saw good reason". After further argument the ''status quo'', that Haig was an ally of the French but was expected to defer to their wishes, was largely restored in mid-March.{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=90–93}}{{sfn|Hattersley|2010|loc=ch. "Frontal Assaults", pp. [https://archive.org/details/isbn_9781408700976/page/426 426]–433}}{{sfn|Grigg|2003|loc=ch. "Conference at Calais", pp. 35–44}}{{sfn|Grigg|2003|loc=ch. "Nivelle's Nemesis", pp. 82–98}}

The British attack at the [[Battle of Arras (1917)|Battle of Arras]] (9–14 April 1917) was partly successful but with much higher casualties than the Germans suffered. There had been many delays and the Germans, suspecting an attack, had shortened their lines to the strong [[Hindenburg Line]]. The [[Nivelle Offensive|French attack on the Aisne River in mid-April]] gained some tactically important high ground but failed to achieve the promised decisive breakthrough, pushing the French Army to the point of [[French Army Mutinies|mutiny]]. While Haig gained prestige, Lloyd George lost credibility, and the affair further poisoned relations between himself and the "Brasshats".{{sfn|Taylor|1976|pp=80–81, 86}}

==== U-boat war ====
===== Shipping =====
In early 1917 the Germans had resumed [[unrestricted submarine warfare]] in a bid to achieve victory on the [[Western Approaches]]. Lloyd George set up a Ministry of Shipping under [[Joseph Maclay, 1st Baron Maclay|Sir Joseph Maclay]], a Glasgow shipowner who was not, until after he left office, a member of either House of Parliament, and housed in a wooden building in a specially drained lake in [[St James's Park]], within a few minutes' walk from the [[British Admiralty|Admiralty]]. The Junior Minister and House of Commons spokesman was [[Leo Chiozza Money]], with whom Maclay did not get on, but on whose appointment Lloyd George insisted, feeling that their qualities would complement one another. The Civil Service staff was headed by the highly able [[John Anderson, 1st Viscount Waverley|John Anderson]] (then only thirty-four years old) and included [[Arthur Salter, 1st Baron Salter|Arthur Salter]]. A number of shipping magnates were persuaded, like Maclay himself, to work unpaid for the ministry (as had a number of industrialists for the Ministry of Munitions), who were also able to obtain ideas privately from junior naval officers who were reluctant to argue with their superiors in meetings. The ministers heading the Board of Trade, for Munitions ([[Christopher Addison, 1st Viscount Addison|Addison]]) and for Agriculture and Food ([[Lord Rhondda]]), were also expected to co-operate with Maclay.<ref name=GriggCrisisAtSea/>{{rp|45–47, 49}}

In accordance with a pledge Lloyd George had given in December 1916 nearly 90% of Britain's merchant shipping tonnage was soon brought under state control (previously less than half had been controlled by the Admiralty), whilst remaining privately owned (similar measures were in force at the time for the railways). Merchant shipping was concentrated, largely on Chiozza Money's initiative, on the transatlantic route where it could more easily be protected, instead of being spread out all over the globe (this relied on imports coming first into North America). Maclay began the process of increasing ship construction, although he was hampered by shortages of steel and labour, and ships under construction in the United States were confiscated by the Americans when she entered the war. In May 1917 [[Eric Geddes]], based at the Admiralty, was put in charge of shipbuilding, and in July he became [[First Lord of the Admiralty]].<ref name=GriggCrisisAtSea/>{{rp|47–49}} Later the German U-boats were defeated{{how?|date=April 2024}} in 1918.{{citation needed|date=April 2024}}

===== Convoys =====
{{Main|Convoys in World War I}}

Lloyd George had raised the matter of [[convoy]]s at the War Committee in November 1916, only to be told by the admirals present, including [[John Jellicoe, 1st Earl Jellicoe|Jellicoe]], that convoys presented too large a target, and that merchant ship masters lacked the discipline to [[Nautical stationkeeping|keep station]] in a convoy.<ref name=GriggCrisisAtSea/>{{rp|49–50}}

In February 1917 [[Maurice Hankey]], the secretary of the War Cabinet, wrote a memorandum for Lloyd George calling for the introduction of "scientifically organised convoys", almost certainly after being persuaded by Commander [[Reginald Henderson]] and the Shipping Ministry officials with whom he was in contact. After a breakfast meeting (13 February 1917) with Lloyd George, [[Sir Edward Carson]] (First Lord of the Admiralty) and Admirals Jellicoe and [[Alexander Duff (Royal Navy officer)|Duff]] agreed to "conduct experiments"; however, convoys were not in general use until August, by which time the rate of shipping losses was already in decline after peaking in April.<ref name=GriggCrisisAtSea/>{{rp|51, 53}}

Lloyd George later claimed in his ''War Memoirs'' that the delay in introducing convoys was because the Admiralty mishandled an experimental convoy between Britain and Norway and because Jellicoe obtained, behind Maclay's back, an unrepresentative sample of merchant skippers claiming that they lacked the skill to "keep station" in convoy. In fact, Hankey's diary shows that Lloyd George's interest in the matter was intermittent, whilst Frances Stevenson's diaries contain no mention of the topic. He may well have been reluctant, especially at a time when his relations with the generals were so poor, for a showdown with Carson, a weak administrator who was as much the mouthpiece of the admirals as [[Edward Stanley, 17th Earl of Derby|Derby]] was of the generals, but who had played a key role in the fall of Asquith and who led a significant bloc of Conservative and Irish Unionist MPs.<ref name=GriggCrisisAtSea/>{{rp|50, 52}}

The new Commander of the [[Grand Fleet]] Admiral [[David Beatty, 1st Earl Beatty|Beatty]], whom Lloyd George visited at Invergordon on 15 April, was a supporter of convoys, as was the American Admiral [[William Sims|Sims]] (the USA had just entered the war). The War Cabinet on 25 April authorised Lloyd George to look into the anti-submarine campaign, and on 30 April he visited the Admiralty. Duff had already recommended to Jellicoe that the Admiralty adopt convoys after a recent successful convoy from Gibraltar.<ref name=GriggCrisisAtSea/>{{rp|52–53}}

Most of the organisations Lloyd George created during the First World War were replicated with the outbreak of the Second World War. As [[Lord Beaverbrook]] wrote, "There were no road signs on the journey he had to undertake."{{sfn|Lord Beaverbrook|1963|page=301}} The latter's ''personal'' efforts to promote convoys were less consistent than he (and Churchill in ''[[The World Crisis]]'' and Beaverbrook in ''Men and Power'') later claimed; the idea that he, after a hard struggle, sat in the First Lord's chair (on his 30 April visit to the Admiralty) and imposed convoys on a hostile Board is a myth; however, in Grigg's view the credit goes largely to men and institutions which he set in place, and with a freer hand, and making fewer mistakes, than in his dealings with the generals, he and his appointees took decisions which can reasonably be said to have saved the country. "It was a close-run thing&nbsp;... failure would have been catastrophic."<ref name=GriggCrisisAtSea/>{{rp|45, 49, 52–53}}

==== Russian Revolution ====
Lloyd George welcomed the [[February Revolution|Fall of the Tsar]], both in a private letter to his brother and in a message to the new Russian Prime Minister [[Georgy Lvov|Prince Lvov]], not least as the war could now be portrayed as a clash between liberal governments and the autocratic Central Powers. Like many observers, he had been taken by surprise by the exact timing of the revolution (it had not been predicted by [[Lord Milner]] or [[Henry Hughes Wilson|General Wilson]] on their visit to Russia a few weeks earlier) and hoped—albeit with some concerns—that Russia's war effort would be invigorated like that of [[French Revolutionary Wars|France in the early 1790s]].<ref name=GriggCrisisAtSea/>{{rp|58–59}}

Lloyd George gave a cautious welcome to the suggestion (19 March on the western calendar) by the Russian Foreign Minister [[Pavel Milyukov]] that the toppled Tsar and his family be given sanctuary in Britain (although Lloyd George would have preferred that they go to a neutral country). From the very start, the King's adviser [[Arthur Bigge, 1st Baron Stamfordham|Stamfordham]] raised objections, and in April the British government withdrew its consent under Royal pressure. Eventually, the Russian Royal Family were moved to the Urals where they were [[Execution of the Romanov family|executed in 1918]]. Lloyd George was often blamed for the refusal of asylum, and in his ''War Memoirs'' he did not mention [[King George V]]'s role in the matter, which was not explicitly confirmed until [[Kenneth Rose]]'s biography of the King was published in 1983.<ref name=GriggCrisisAtSea/>{{rp|60–61}}

==== Imperial War Cabinet ====
An [[Imperial War Cabinet]], including representatives from Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India, met 14 times from 20 March 1917 to 2 May 1917 (a crisis period of the war) and twice in 1918.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/cabinet-gov/cab23-first-world-war-conclusions.htm#Imperial%20War%20Cabinet%20Minutes |title=Imperial War Cabinet Minutes |access-date=2 August 2020 |archive-date=17 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201017052428/https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/cabinet-gov/cab23-first-world-war-conclusions.htm#Imperial%20War%20Cabinet%20Minutes |url-status=live }}</ref> The idea was not entirely without precedent as there had been [[Imperial Conference]]s in [[First Colonial Conference|1887]], [[1894 Colonial Conference|1894]], [[1897 Colonial Conference|1897]], [[1902 Colonial Conference|1902]], [[1907 Imperial Conference|1907]] and [[1911 Imperial Conference|1911]], whilst the Australian Prime Minister [[Billy Hughes]] had been invited to attend the Cabinet and War Committee on his visit to the UK in the spring of 1916. The South African [[Jan Smuts]] was appointed to the British War Cabinet in the early summer of 1917.<ref name=GriggCrisisAtSea/>{{rp|61–64}}

==== Passchendaele ====
Lloyd George set up a War Policy Committee (himself, Curzon, Milner, Law and Smuts, with [[Maurice Hankey]] as secretary) to discuss strategy, which held 16 meetings over the next six weeks. At the very first meeting (11 June) Lloyd George proposed helping the Italians to capture [[Trieste]],{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=136–138}} explicitly telling the War Policy Committee (21 June 1917) that he wanted Italian soldiers to be killed rather than British.{{sfn|Woodward|1998|p=80}}

Haig believed that a Flanders Offensive had a good chance of clearing the Belgian coast, from which German submarines and destroyers were operating (a popular goal with politicians), and that victory at [[Ypres]] "might quite possibly lead to (German) collapse". Robertson was less optimistic, but preferred Britain to keep her focus on defeating Germany on the Western Front, and had told Haig that the politicians would not "dare" overrule both soldiers if they gave the same advice. Haig promised he had no "intention of entering into a tremendous offensive involving heavy losses" (20 June) whilst Robertson wanted to avoid "disproportionate loss" (23 June).{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=136–140}}

The Flanders Offensive was reluctantly sanctioned by the War Policy Committee on 18 July and the War Cabinet two days later, on condition it did not degenerate into a long drawn-out fight like the Somme. The War Cabinet promised to monitor progress and casualties and, if necessary call a halt, although in the event they made little effort to monitor progress until September. Frustrated at his inability to get his way, Lloyd George talked of resigning and taking his case to the public.{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=139–142}}

The [[Battle of Passchendaele]] began on 31 July, but soon became bogged down in unseasonably early wet weather, which turned much of the battlefield into a barely passable swamp in which men and animals sometimes drowned, whilst the mud and rain severely reduced the accuracy and effectiveness of artillery, the dominant weapon of the time. Lloyd George tried to enlist the King for diverting efforts against Austria-Hungary, telling [[Arthur Bigge, 1st Baron Stamfordham|Stamfordham]] (14 August) that the King and Prime Minister were "joint trustees of the nation" who had to avoid waste of manpower. A [[Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo|new Italian offensive]] began (18 August), but Robertson advised that it was "false strategy" to call off Passchendaele to send reinforcements to Italy, and despite being summoned to [[George Riddell, 1st Baron Riddell|George Riddell]]'s home in Sussex, where he was served apple pudding (his favourite dish), agreed only reluctantly. The Anglo-French leadership agreed in early September to send 100 heavy guns to Italy (50 of them French) rather than the 300 which Lloyd George wanted—Lloyd George talked of ordering a halt to Passchendaele, but in Hankey's words "funked it" (4 September). Had he not done so his government might have fallen, for as soon as the guns reached Italy [[Luigi Cadorna|Cadorna]] called off his offensive (21 September).{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=144–146}}

At a meeting at Boulogne on the 25th of September, Lloyd George broached with [[Paul Painlevé|Painlevé]] the setting up of an Allied Supreme War Council then making [[Foch]] generalissimo.{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=190–191}} Law had written to Lloyd George that ministers must soon decide whether or not the offensive was to continue. Lloyd George and Robertson met Haig in France (26 September) to discuss the recent German peace feelers (which in the end were publicly repudiated by Chancellor [[Georg Michaelis|Michaelis]]){{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=146–148}} and the progress of the offensive. Haig preferred to continue, encouraged by [[Herbert Plumer, 1st Viscount Plumer|Plumer]]'s recent successful attacks in dry weather at [[Menin Road]] (20 September) and [[Battle of Polygon Wood|Polygon Wood]] (26 September), and stating that the Germans were "very worn out". In October the wet weather returned for the final attack towards Passchendaele.{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=148–149}} At the final meeting of the War Policy Committee on 11 October 1917, Lloyd George authorised the offensive to continue, but warning of failure in three weeks' time. [[Maurice Hankey|Hankey]] (21 October) claimed in his diary that Lloyd George had deliberately allowed Passchendaele to continue to discredit Haig and Robertson and make it easier for him to forbid similar offensives in 1918.{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=64–65, 190–191}}

==== Supreme War Council ====
The Italians suffered a disastrous defeat at [[Battle of Caporetto|Caporetto]], requiring British and French reinforcements to be sent. Lloyd George said he "wanted to take advantage of Caporetto to gain "control of the War".{{sfn|Woodward|1998|p=191}} The [[Supreme War Council]] was inaugurated at the [[Rapallo Conference]] (6–7 November 1917). Lloyd George then gave a controversial speech in Paris (12 November) at which he criticised the high casualties of recent Allied "victories" (a word which he used with an element of sarcasm). These events led to an angry Commons debate (19 November), which Lloyd George survived.{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=192–194}}

In reply to Robertson's 19 November memo, which warned (correctly) that the Germans would use the opportunity of [[Treaty of Brest Litovsk|Russia's departure from the war]] to attack in 1918 before the Americans were present in strength, Lloyd George wrote (wrongly) that the Germans would not attack and would fail if they did. That autumn he declared that he was willing "to risk his whole political reputation" to avoid a repetition of the Somme or Passchendaele.{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=173–174, 178}}

In December 1917 Lloyd George remarked to [[C. P. Scott]] that: "If people really knew, the war would be stopped tomorrow. But of course, they don't know, and can't know."<ref name="Glover2012">{{cite book |last=Glover |first=Jonathan |title=Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century, Second Edition |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-6kOKpuWEiQC&pg=PA167 |url-status=live |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |date=11 September 2012 |access-date=18 January 2018 |page=167 |isbn=978-0-300-18640-6|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200731142915/https://books.google.com/books?id=-6kOKpuWEiQC&pg=PA167 |archive-date=31 July 2020}}</ref>

====Manpower crisis and the unions====
A Manpower Committee was set up on 6 December 1917, consisting of the Prime Minister, Curzon, Carson, [[George Nicoll Barnes|George Barnes]] and Smuts with [[Maurice Hankey]] as secretary, and [[Auckland Geddes]] ([[Director of National Service|Minister of National Service]]—in charge of Army recruitment) in regular attendance.<ref name=GriggManpower>{{harvnb|Grigg|2003|loc=ch. "Manpower"}}</ref>{{rp|366}}

The first meeting of the Manpower Committee was on 10 December, and it met twice the next day and again on 15 December. Lloyd George questioned Generals [[Nevil Macready|Macready]] (Adjutant-General) and [[George Macdonogh|Macdonogh]] (Chief of Military Intelligence), who advised that the Allied superiority of numbers on the Western Front would not survive the transfer of German reinforcements from the East now that Russia was dropping out of the war. Deeply concerned about the publicity attracted by the recent [[Lansdowne letter]]'s mention of casualties, he suggested removing Haig and Robertson from office at this time, but this was met by a threat of resignation from Lord Derby. At this stage Lloyd George opposed extending conscription to Ireland—Carson advised that extending conscription to Ulster alone would be impractical.<ref name=GriggManpower/>{{rp|366–369}}

When Hankey's report eventually emerged it reflected Lloyd George's wishes: it gave top priority to shipbuilding and merchant shipping (not least to ship US troops to Europe), and placed Army manpower below both weapons production and civilian industry. The size of the Army in Britain was to be reduced from eight divisions to four, freeing about 40,000 men for service in France.<ref name=GriggManpower/>{{rp|369–370}} In the House of Commons (20 December) Lloyd George also argued that the collapse of Russia and [[Battle of Caporetto|defeat of Italy]] required further "combing-out" of men from industry, in breach of pledges given to the trade unions in 1916. Auckland Geddes was given increased powers to direct labour—a new bill became law, despite the opposition of the [[Amalgamated Society of Engineers]], in February 1918.<ref name=GriggManpower/>{{rp|369–370}}

====War goals====
Lloyd George outlined Allied war aims at a conference at [[Caxton Hall]] on 5 January 1918.<ref>Alan Sharp, "From Caxton Hall to Genoa via Fontainebleau and Cannes: David Lloyd George's Vision of Post-War Europe." in ''Aspects of British Policy and the Treaty of Versailles'' (Routledge, 2020) pp. 121-Plot–142. [https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003014089-7/caxton-hall-genoa-via-fontainebleau-cannes-david-lloyd-george-vision-post-war-europe-alan-sharp online]</ref>  Addressing an audience of trade unionists, he called for Germany to be stripped of her conquests (including her colonies, and Alsace-Lorraine, [[Franco-Prussian War|annexed in 1871]]) and democratised (although he was clear that this was not an Allied war aim, something which would help to ensure the future peace of Europe), and for the liberation of the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. He also hinted at [[World War I reparations|reparations]] (although it was suggested that these would not be on the scale imposed on France after 1871) and [[League of Nations|a new international order]]. Lloyd George explained to critics that he was hoping to detach Austria-Hungary and turn the German people against her rulers; the speech greatly increased his support amongst trade unions and the Labour Party.<ref name=GriggSpeeches>{{harvnb|Grigg|2003|loc=ch. "Speeches"}}</ref>{{rp|380–383}} President Wilson at first considered abandoning his speech outlining US war aims—the "[[Fourteen Points]]", many of which were similar to the aims outlined by Lloyd George—but was persuaded by his adviser [[Colonel House]] to deliver it. Wilson's speech (8 January) overshadowed Lloyd George's and is better remembered by posterity.<ref name=GriggSpeeches/>{{rp|383–385}}

==== Strategic priorities ====
[[File:The Right Hon. David Lloyd George.jpg|thumb|left|upright=.7|Lloyd George c. 1918]]
Lloyd George told [[Edmund Allenby]], who was appointed the new commander in Egypt in June, that his objective was "Jerusalem before Christmas." Amidst months of argument throughout the autumn of 1917 Robertson was able to block Lloyd George's plan to make [[Palestine (region)|Palestine]] the main theatre of operations by having Allenby make the impossible demand that thirteen extra divisions be sent to him.{{sfn|Corrigan|2003|p=323}}{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=155–159}} Allenby captured [[Battle of Jerusalem (1917)|Jerusalem]] in December 1917.

In the winter of 1917–18, Lloyd George secured the resignations of both the service chiefs. Removing the First Sea Lord [[Admiral Jellicoe]] earlier in 1917, as Lloyd George wanted, would have been politically impossible given Conservative anger at the return of [[Churchill]] (still blamed for the Dardanelles) to office as [[Minister of Munitions]] in July, and Lloyd George's preoccupations with Passchendaele, Caporetto and the Supreme War Council from July onward. By December it was clear that Lloyd George would have to sack Jellicoe or lose Eric Geddes (First Lord of the Admiralty), who wanted to return to his previous job in charge of military transport in France. The Christmas holiday, when Parliament was not sitting, provided a good opportunity. Before Jellicoe left for leave on Christmas Eve he received a letter from Geddes demanding his resignation. The other Sea Lords talked of resigning but did not do so, whilst Jellicoe's ally Carson remained a member of the War Cabinet until he resigned in January over Irish Home Rule.<ref name=GriggManpower/>{{rp|371–376}}

Relations with [[William Robertson (British Army officer)|General Robertson]] had worsened further over the creation of the [[Supreme War Council]] at Versailles and he was eventually forced out over his insistence that the British delegate there be subordinate to Robertson as CIGS in London.{{sfn|Grigg|2003|loc=ch. "Robertson Goes", pp. 411–418}}

====Balfour Declaration====
As Prime Minister Lloyd George played a pivotal role in the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. His government issued the [[Balfour Declaration]] in 1917 announcing an official British commitment to support an eventual Jewish homeland in Palestine.  Lloyd George led the war effort against the Ottomans, [[Ottoman Empire|whose empire]] was broken up and taken over in large part by Britain and France. Britain took over Palestine. He presided over the Imperial Cabinet when it endorsed this policy, and he secured the backing of Britain's allies, especially the United States and France. He was also the principal delegate at the San Remo Conference in 1920, where the [[League of Nations]] designed the Mandate for Palestine and conferred it upon Britain.<ref>David Lloyd George, "Mr. Lloyd George Explains Jewish National Home Policy: I Was Prime Minister when Balfour Declaration," (April 13, 1931) [https://www.jta.org/archive/mr-lloyd-george-explains-jewish-national-home-policy-i-was-prime-minister-when-balfour-declaration reprinted]</ref>  Zionist leader [[Chaim Weizmann]] said Lloyd George initiated the Balfour Declaration and followed the development of the Zionist movement and the upbuilding of Palestine with keen interest in every stage.<ref>"David Lloyd George: A Christian Zionist On 10 Downing Street,"  ''Friends of Zion Museum''  [https://fozmuseum.com/blog/david-lloyd-george/  online]</ref><ref>William M. Mathew,  "The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917–1923: British Imperialist Imperatives." ''British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies'' 40.3 (2013): 231–250.</ref>

==== Home front ====
[[File:Order of Merit in Westminster Cathedral (cropped).jpg|thumb|upright=.6|''Order of Merit'']]
The War Cabinet was a very successful innovation. It met almost daily, with [[Maurice Hankey]] as secretary, and made all major political, military, economic and diplomatic decisions. [[Rationing in the United Kingdom|Rationing]] was finally imposed in early 1918 for meat, sugar and fats (butter and margarine)—but not bread; the new system worked smoothly. From 1914 to 1918 trade-union membership doubled, from a little over four million to a little over eight million. Work stoppages and strikes became frequent in 1917–18 as the unions expressed grievances regarding prices, alcohol control, pay disputes, dilution of labour, fatigue from overtime and from Sunday work, and inadequate housing.{{citation needed|date=January 2018}}

The [[Corn Production Act 1917]] bestowed upon the [[Board of Agriculture]] the power to ensure that all land was properly cultivated, appointed a wages board to operate a new minimum wage in agriculture, and guaranteed minimum prices for wheat and oats.{{sfn|Thorpe|2014|p=89}}

[[Conscription]] put into uniform nearly every physically fit man, six million out of ten million eligible. Of these, about 750,000 died and 1.7 million were wounded. Most deaths were of young unmarried men; however, 160,000 wives lost their husbands and 300,000 children lost their fathers.{{sfn|Havighurst|1966|pp=134–135}}

==== Crises of 1918 ====
In rapid succession in spring 1918 came a series of military and political crises.{{sfn|Taylor|1976|pp=100–106}} The Germans, having moved troops from the Eastern front and retrained them in new tactics, now had more soldiers on the Western Front than the Allies. Germany launched the full-scale [[German spring offensive|Spring Offensive]] starting on 21 March against the British and French lines, hoping for victory on the battlefield before the American troops arrived in numbers. The Allied armies fell back 40 miles in confusion, and, facing defeat, London realised it needed more troops to fight a mobile war. Lloyd George found half a million soldiers and rushed them to France, asked American President Woodrow Wilson for immediate help, and agreed to the appointment of French General Foch as commander in chief on the Western Front. He considered taking on the role of War Minister himself, but was dissuaded by the king, and instead appointed [[Lord Milner]].<ref name=GriggExtending>{{harvnb|Grigg|2003|loc=ch. "Extending Conscription"}}</ref>{{rp|478–483}}

Despite strong warnings that it was a bad idea, the War Cabinet [[Conscription Crisis of 1918|decided to impose conscription on Ireland]]. The main reason was that trade unions in Britain demanded it as the price for cutting back on conscription exemptions for certain workers. Labour wanted the principle established that no one was exempt, but it did not demand that conscription actually take place in Ireland. The proposal was enacted but never enforced. The Catholic bishops for the first time entered the fray and called for open resistance to conscription. Many Irish Catholics and nationalists moved into [[Sinn Féin]], a decisive moment marking the dominance of Irish politics by a party committed to leaving the UK altogether.{{sfn|Ward|1974|pp=107–129}}<ref name=GriggExtending/>{{rp|465–488}}

At one point Lloyd George unknowingly misled the House of Commons in claiming that Haig's forces were stronger at the start of 1918 than they had been a year earlier—in fact, the increase was in the number of labourers, most of them [[Chinese Labour Corps|Chinese]], Indians and black South Africans, and Haig had fewer infantry, holding a longer stretch of front.{{sfn|Hart|2008|p=229}} The prime minister had used incorrect information furnished by the War Department office headed by Major-General Sir [[Frederick Maurice (British Army officer, born 1871)|Frederick Maurice]]. Maurice then made the [[Maurice Debate|spectacular public allegation]] that the War Cabinet had deliberately held soldiers back from the Western Front, and both Lloyd George and Law had lied to Parliament about it. Instead of going to the prime minister about the problem Maurice had waited and then broke [[King's Regulations]] by making a public attack. Asquith, still the Liberal Party leader, took up the allegations and called for a Parliamentary Inquiry. While Asquith's presentation was poorly done, Lloyd George vigorously defended his position, treating the debate as a vote of confidence. He won over the House with a powerful refutation of Maurice's allegations. The Liberal Party was openly split for the first time.{{sfn|Gooch|1968|pp=211–228}}{{sfn|Grigg|2003|loc=ch. "The Maurice Affair", pp. 489–512|}}

Meanwhile, the German offensive stalled. By summer the Americans were sending 10,000 fresh men a day to the Western Front, a speedup made possible by leaving their equipment behind and using British and French munitions. The German army had used up its last reserves and was steadily shrinking in numbers, further weakening its resolve. Victory came on 11 November 1918.{{sfn|Taylor|1976|pp=108–111}}

That autumn Lloyd George was one of the many infected during the [[1918 flu pandemic]], but he survived.<ref>{{cite book |last=Rowland |first=Peter |title=Lloyd George |chapter=The Man Who Won the War, 1916–1918 |publisher=Barrie & Jenkins Ltd |location=London |year=1975 |page=451 |isbn=0-214-20049-3}}</ref>