Editing Central bank (section)

==Central bank governance and independence==
[[Image:Alisna and Summers Central Bank Independence vs Inflation.gif|thumb|right|300px|Central bank independence versus inflation. This often cited<ref>{{cite web | url = https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=1093 | title = Modern Macroeconomics in Practice: How Theory Is Shaping Monetary Policy | first1 = Patrick J. | last1 = Kehoe | first2 = V. V. | last2 = Chari | publisher = Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis | date = January 2006 | archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20100521192208/https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=1093 | archivedate = 2010-05-21 }}</ref> research published by Alesina and Summers (1993)<ref name="CBIMP">{{cite journal | url = https://ideas.repec.org/a/mcb/jmoncb/v25y1993i2p151-62.html | title = Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence | year = 1993 | last1 = Alesina | first1 = Alberto | last2 = Summers | first2 = Lawrence H | journal = Journal of Money, Credit and Banking | publisher = Blackwell Publishing | volume = 25 | issue = 2 | pages = 151–162 | doi = 10.2307/2077833 | jstor = 2077833 | access-date = 11 January 2021 | archive-date = 10 November 2021 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211110143557/https://ideas.repec.org/a/mcb/jmoncb/v25y1993i2p151-62.html | url-status = live }}</ref> is used to show why it is important for a nation's central bank (i.e.-monetary authority) to have a high level of independence. This chart shows a clear trend towards a lower inflation rate as the independence of the central bank increases. The generally agreed upon reason independence leads to lower inflation is that politicians have a tendency to create too much money if given the opportunity to do it.<ref name="CBIMP"/> The Federal Reserve System in the United States is generally regarded as one of the more independent central banks.]]{{See also|Central bank independence}}
Numerous governments have opted to make central banks independent. The economic logic behind central bank independence is that when governments delegate monetary policy to an independent central bank (with an anti-inflationary purpose) and away from elected politicians, monetary policy will not reflect the interests of the politicians. When governments control monetary policy, politicians may be tempted to boost economic activity in advance of an election to the detriment of the long-term health of the economy and the country. As a consequence, financial markets may not consider future commitments to low inflation to be credible when monetary policy is in the hands of elected officials, which increases the risk of capital flight. An alternative to central bank independence is to have [[Fixed exchange rate system|fixed exchange rate]] regimes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fernández-Albertos|first=José|date=2015|title=The Politics of Central Bank Independence|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|language=en|volume=18|issue=1|pages=217–237|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-221121|issn=1094-2939|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last1=Haan|first1=Jakob de|last2=Eijffinger|first2=Sylvester|editor1-first=Roger D|editor1-last=Congleton|editor2-first=Bernard|editor2-last=Grofman|editor3-first=Stefan|editor3-last=Voigt|date=2019|title=The Politics of Central Bank Independence|url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190469771-e-23|url-status=live|access-date=2021-08-01|website=The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2|pages=498–519|language=en|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.23|isbn=978-0-19-046977-1|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210801013407/https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190469771-e-23 |archive-date=1 August 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Walsh|first=Carl E.|chapter=Central Bank Independence|date=2010|chapter-url=https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280854_3|title=Monetary Economics|pages=21–26|editor-last=Durlauf|editor-first=Steven N.|series=The New Palgrave Economics Collection|place=London|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK|language=en|doi=10.1057/9780230280854_3|isbn=978-0-230-28085-4|s2cid=156551117 |access-date=2021-06-12|editor2-last=Blume|editor2-first=Lawrence E.|archive-date=1 July 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230701075450/https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230280854_3|url-status=live}}</ref>

Governments generally have some degree of influence over even "independent" central banks; the aim of independence is primarily to prevent short-term interference. In 1951, the {{lang|de|[[Deutsche Bundesbank]]|italic=no}} became the first central bank to be given full independence, leading this form of central bank to be referred to as the "Bundesbank model", as opposed, for instance, to the New Zealand model, which has a goal (i.e. inflation target) set by the government.

Central bank independence is usually guaranteed by legislation and the institutional framework governing the bank's relationship with elected officials, particularly the minister of finance. Central bank legislation will enshrine specific procedures for selecting and appointing the head of the central bank. Often the minister of finance will appoint the governor in consultation with the central bank's board and its incumbent governor. In addition, the legislation will specify banks governor's term of appointment. The most independent central banks enjoy a fixed non-renewable term for the governor in order to eliminate pressure on the governor to please the government in the hope of being re-appointed for a second term.<ref>John Goodman, [https://books.google.com/books?id=xxJUfy5Ud4oC ''Monetary Sovereignty: The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe''], Cornell University Press, 1992</ref> Generally, independent central banks enjoy both goal and instrument independence.<ref>Stanley Fischer, [http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/fischer20151104a.htm "Central Bank Independence"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161012211559/http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/fischer20151104a.htm |date=12 October 2016 }}</ref>

Despite their independence, central banks are usually accountable at some level to government officials, either to the finance ministry or to parliament. For example, the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve are nominated by the [[President of the United States|U.S. president]] and confirmed by the [[United States Senate|Senate]],<ref>[http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12591.htm Who are the members of the Federal Reserve Board, and how are they selected?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120930070846/http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12591.htm |date=30 September 2012 }} U.S. Federal Reserve Board of Governors FAQ, 22 July 2015</ref> publishes verbatim transcripts, and balance sheets are audited by the [[Government Accountability Office]].<ref>[http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12798.htm Is the Federal Reserve accountable to anyone?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140204062605/http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12798.htm |date=4 February 2014 }} U.S. Federal Reserve Board of Governors FAQ 17 June 2011</ref>

In the 1990s there was a trend towards increasing the independence of central banks as a way of improving long-term economic performance.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Rethinking Central-Bank Independence|url=https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/rethinking-central-bank-independence/|website=Journal of Democracy|language=en-US|access-date=2020-05-05|archive-date=3 May 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200503044136/https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/rethinking-central-bank-independence/|url-status=live}}</ref> While a large volume of economic research has been done to define the relationship between central bank independence and economic performance, the results are ambiguous.<ref>Banaian, Burdekin, and Willett, 1998 [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1004942714368 "Reconsidering the principal components of central bank independence: The more the merrier?"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170402081030/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1004942714368 |date=2 April 2017 }}</ref>

The literature on central bank independence has defined a cumulative and complementary number of aspects:<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/ecb_independent.en.html|title=Why is the ECB independent?|website=European Central Bank|date=12 January 2017 |language=en|access-date=2017-11-13|archive-date=7 November 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171107025850/https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/ecb_independent.en.html|url-status=live |last1=Bank |first1=European Central }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://transparency.eu/ecb|title=Transparency International EU – The global coalition against corruption in Brussels|last=EU|first=Transparency International|website=transparency.eu|language=en|access-date=2017-11-13|date=2017-03-28|archive-date=7 November 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171107005539/http://transparency.eu/ecb/|url-status=live}}</ref>
* '''Institutional independence:''' The independence of the central bank is enshrined in law and shields central banks from political interference. In general terms, institutional independence means that politicians should refrain from seeking to influence monetary policy decisions, while symmetrically central banks should also avoid influencing government politics.
* '''Goal independence:''' The central bank has the right to set its own policy goals, whether inflation targeting, control of the money supply, or maintaining a [[fixed exchange rate]]. While this type of independence is more common, many central banks prefer to announce their policy goals in partnership with the appropriate government departments. This increases the transparency of the policy-setting process and thereby increases the credibility of the goals chosen by providing assurance that they will not be changed without notice. In addition, the setting of common goals by the central bank and the government helps to avoid situations where monetary and fiscal policy are in conflict; a policy combination that is clearly sub-optimal.
* '''Functional & operational independence:''' The central bank has the independence to determine the best way of achieving its policy goals, including the types of instruments used and the timing of their use. To achieve its mandate, the central bank has the authority to run its own operations (appointing staff, setting budgets, and so on.) and to organize its internal structures without excessive involvement of the government. This is the most common form of central bank independence. The granting of independence to the Bank of England in 1997 was, in fact, the granting of operational independence; the inflation target continued to be announced in the Chancellor's annual budget speech to Parliament.
* '''Personal independence:''' The other forms of independence are not possible unless central bank heads have a high [[security of tenure]]. In practice, this means that governors should hold long mandates (at least longer than the electoral cycle) and a certain degree of legal immunity.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp4.pdf?581a2ecf674a6554f5af698f5bf54019|title=Privileges and immunities of the European Central Bank|access-date=13 November 2017|archive-date=20 December 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171220100839/http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp4.pdf?581a2ecf674a6554f5af698f5bf54019|url-status=live}}</ref> One of the most common statistical indicators used in the literature{{citation needed|date=November 2017}} as a proxy for central bank independence is the "turn-over-rate" of central bank governors. If a government is in the habit of appointing and replacing the governor frequently, it clearly has the capacity to micro-manage the central bank through its choice of governors.
* '''Financial independence:''' central banks have full autonomy on their budget, and some are even prohibited from financing governments. This is meant to remove incentives from politicians to influence central banks.
* '''Legal independence''' : some central banks have their own legal personality, which allows them to ratify international agreements without the government's approval (like the [[European Central Bank|ECB]]), and to go to court.

There is very strong consensus among economists that an independent central bank can run a more credible monetary policy, making market expectations more responsive to signals from the central bank.<ref>{{cite web| url = http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/fed-appointments| title = Fed Appointments - IGM Forum| access-date = 15 May 2019| archive-date = 15 May 2019| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190515030535/http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/fed-appointments| url-status = live}}</ref> Both the Bank of England (1997) and the European Central Bank have been made independent and follow a set of published [[inflation targeting|inflation targets]] so that markets know what to expect.{{citation needed|date=May 2022}} [[Populism]] can reduce de facto central bank independence.<ref>{{Cite journal |url=https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221139513 |title=Gavin, M., & Manger, M. (2023). Populism and De Facto Central Bank Independence. Comparative Political Studies, 56(8), 1189–1223. |year=2023 |doi=10.1177/00104140221139513 |pmid=37305061 |access-date=10 June 2023 |archive-date=1 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230701075449/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00104140221139513 |url-status=live |last1=Gavin |first1=M. |last2=Manger |first2=M. |journal=Comparative Political Studies |volume=56 |issue=8 |pages=1189–1223 |pmc=10251451 }}</ref>

International organizations such as the [[World Bank]], the [[Bank for International Settlements]] (BIS) and the [[International Monetary Fund]] (IMF) strongly support central bank independence. This results, in part, from a belief in the intrinsic merits of increased independence. The support for independence from the [[international organization]]s also derives partly from the connection between increased independence for the central bank and increased transparency in the policy-making process. The IMF's [[Financial Services Action Plan]] (FSAP) review self-assessment, for example, includes a number of questions about central bank independence in the transparency section. An independent central bank will score higher in the review than one that is not independent.{{citation needed|date=January 2020}}

=== Central bank independence indices ===
Central bank independence indices allow a quantitative analysis of central bank independence for individual countries over time. One central bank independence index is the Garriga CBI,<ref name="Garriga CBI">{{Cite journal|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2016.1188813|title=Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set|first=Ana Carolina|last=Garriga|date=19 October 2016|journal=International Interactions|volume=42|issue=5|pages=849–868|via=Taylor and Francis+NEJM|doi=10.1080/03050629.2016.1188813|s2cid=156704685|access-date=11 December 2022|archive-date=1 July 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230701075449/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2016.1188813|url-status=live}}</ref> where a higher index indicates higher central bank independence, shown below for individual countries.
{| class="wikitable sortable mw-collapsible mw-collapsed"
! Country !! Central bank independence index by Garriga for 2012<ref name="Garriga CBI"/>
|-
| {{flaglist| Afghanistan |2004}} || 0.8076
|-
| {{flaglist| Albania }} || 0.7105
|-
| {{flaglist| Algeria }} || 0.4525
|-
| {{flaglist| Angola }} || 0.5855
|-
| {{flaglist| Antigua & Barbuda }} || 0.6424
|-
| {{flaglist| Argentina }} || 0.7003
|-
| {{flaglist| Armenia }} || 0.8465
|-
| {{flaglist| Australia }} || 0.2511
|-
| {{flaglist| Austria }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Azerbaijan }} || 0.5715
|-
| {{flaglist| Bahamas }} || 0.4038
|-
| {{flaglist| Bahrain }} || 0.4334
|-
| {{flaglist| Bangladesh }} || 0.3276
|-
| {{flaglist| Barbados }} || 0.4133
|-
| {{flaglist| Belarus }} || 0.7487
|-
| {{flaglist| Belgium }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Belize }} || 0.5930
|-
| {{flaglist| Benin }} || 0.8015
|-
| {{flaglist| Bhutan }} || 0.5426
|-
| {{flaglist| Bolivia }} || 0.7970
|-
| {{flaglist| Bosnia-Herzegovina }} || 0.9790
|-
| {{flaglist| Botswana }} || 0.5159
|-
| {{flaglist| Brazil }} || 0.2549
|-
| {{flaglist| Brunei Darussalam }} || 0.6815
|-
| {{flaglist| Bulgaria }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Burkina Faso }} || 0.8015
|-
| {{flaglist| Burundi }} || 0.7232
|-
| {{flaglist| Cambodia }} || 0.6373
|-
| {{flaglist| Cameroon }} || 0.5015
|-
| {{flaglist| Canada }} || 0.4724
|-
| {{flaglist| Cape Verde }} || 0.5180
|-
| {{flaglist| Central African Republic }} || 0.5015
|-
| {{flaglist| Chad }} || 0.5015
|-
| {{flaglist| Chile }} || 0.8190
|-
| {{flaglist| China }} || 0.5535
|-
| {{flaglist| Colombia }} || 0.6933
|-
| {{flaglist| Comoros }} || 0.6824
|-
| {{flaglist| Democratic Republic of the Congo }} || 0.5628
|-
| {{flaglist| Republic of the Congo }} || 0.5015
|-
| {{flaglist| Costa Rica }} || 0.7343
|-
| {{flaglist| Croatia }} || 0.8190
|-
| {{flaglist| Cuba }} || 0.2252
|-
| {{flaglist| Cyprus }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Czech Republic }} || 0.8315
|-
| {{flaglist| Denmark }} || 0.5026
|-
| {{flaglist| Djibouti }} || 0.6984
|-
| {{flaglist| Dominica }} || 0.6424
|-
| {{flaglist| Dominican Republic }} || 0.6483
|-
| {{flaglist| Ecuador }} || 0.4709
|-
| {{flaglist| Egypt }} || 0.4875
|-
| {{flaglist| El Salvador }} || 0.7576
|-
| {{flaglist| Equatorial Guinea }} || 0.5015
|-
| {{flaglist| Eritrea }} || 0.3981
|-
| {{flaglist| Estonia }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Ethiopia }} || 0.2913
|-
| {{flaglist| Fiji }} || 0.4349
|-
| {{flaglist| Finland }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| France }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Gabon }} || 0.5015
|-
| {{flaglist| Gambia }} || 0.5119
|-
| {{flaglist| Georgia }} || 0.7986
|-
| {{flaglist| Germany }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Ghana }} || 0.5607
|-
| {{flaglist| Greece }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Grenada }} || 0.6424
|-
| {{flaglist| Guatemala }} || 0.7825
|-
| {{flaglist| Guinea }} || 0.8665
|-
| {{flaglist| Guinea-Bissau }} || 0.8015
|-
| {{flaglist| Guyana }} || 0.6383
|-
| {{flaglist| Haiti }} || 0.3755
|-
| {{flaglist| Honduras }} || 0.6710
|-
| {{flaglist| Hungary }} || 0.9115
|-
| {{flaglist| Iceland }} || 0.8276
|-
| {{flaglist| India }} || 0.2950
|-
| {{flaglist| Indonesia }} || 0.8461
|-
| {{flaglist| Iran }} || 0.4363
|-
| {{flaglist| Iraq }} || 0.3015
|-
| {{flaglist| Ireland }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Israel }} || 0.6703
|-
| {{flaglist| Italy }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Ivory Coast }} || 0.8015
|-
| {{flaglist| Jamaica }} || 0.3830
|-
| {{flaglist| Japan }} || 0.4360
|-
| {{flaglist| Jordan }} || 0.4826
|-
| {{flaglist| Kazakhstan }} || 0.5574
|-
| {{flaglist| Kenya }} || 0.5074
|-
| {{flaglist| Korea, Republic of }} || 0.5074
|-
| {{flaglist| Kuwait }} || 0.4104
|-
| {{flaglist| Kyrgyzstan }} || 0.5736
|-
| {{flaglist| Laos }} || 0.2411
|-
| {{flaglist| Latvia }} || 0.8865
|-
| {{flaglist| Lebanon }} || 0.4000
|-
| {{flaglist| Lesotho }} || 0.6810
|-
| {{flaglist| Liberia }} || 0.4725
|-
| {{flaglist| Libya }} || 0.3225
|-
| {{flaglist| Lithuania }} || 0.8440
|-
| {{flaglist| Luxembourg }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| North Macedonia |name=Republic of Macedonia}} || 0.6789
|-
| {{flaglist| Madagascar }} || 0.6420
|-
| {{flaglist| Malawi }} || 0.2865
|-
| {{flaglist| Malaysia }} || 0.5765
|-
| {{flaglist| Maldives }} || 0.4282
|-
| {{flaglist| Mali }} || 0.8015
|-
| {{flaglist| Malta }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Mauritania }} || 0.6360
|-
| {{flaglist| Mauritius }} || 0.5609
|-
| {{flaglist| Mexico }} || 0.6383
|-
| {{flaglist| Moldova }} || 0.6943
|-
| {{flaglist| Mongolia }} || 0.5553
|-
| {{flaglist| Montenegro }} || 0.8190
|-
| {{flaglist| Morocco }} || 0.6219
|-
| {{flaglist| Mozambique }} || 0.3663
|-
| {{flaglist| Myanmar }} || 0.3953
|-
| {{flaglist| Namibia }} || 0.5100
|-
| {{flaglist| Nepal }} || 0.6443
|-
| {{flaglist| Netherlands }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| New Zealand }} || 0.7773
|-
| {{flaglist| Nicaragua }} || 0.6910
|-
| {{flaglist| Niger }} || 0.8015
|-
| {{flaglist| Nigeria }} || 0.6263
|-
| {{flaglist| Norway }} || 0.4526
|-
| {{flaglist| Oman }} || 0.4970
|-
| {{flaglist| Pakistan }} || 0.3397
|-
| {{flaglist| Panama }} || 0.2176
|-
| {{flaglist| Papua New Guinea }} || 0.5838
|-
| {{flaglist| Paraguay }} || 0.6171
|-
| {{flaglist| Peru }} || 0.7978
|-
| {{flaglist| Philippines }} || 0.6340
|-
| {{flaglist| Poland }} || 0.8753
|-
| {{flaglist| Portugal }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Qatar }} || 0.5861
|-
| {{flaglist| Romania }} || 0.8462
|-
| {{flaglist| Russian Federation }} || 0.6999
|-
| {{flaglist| Rwanda }} || 0.5988
|-
| {{flaglist| Saint Lucia }} || 0.6424
|-
| {{flaglist| Samoa }} || 0.3311
|-
| {{flaglist| San Marino }} || 0.1854
|-
| {{flaglist| Sao Tome and Principe }} || 0.4820
|-
| {{flaglist| Saudi Arabia }} || 0.5522
|-
| {{flaglist| Senegal }} || 0.8015
|-
| {{flaglist| Serbia }} || 0.8111
|-
| {{flaglist| Serbia and Montenegro }} || 0.6760
|-
| {{flaglist| Seychelles }} || 0.6785
|-
| {{flaglist| Sierra Leone }} || 0.7248
|-
| {{flaglist| Singapore }} || 0.4304
|-
| {{flaglist| Slovakia }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Slovenia }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Solomon Islands }} || 0.7448
|-
| {{flaglist| Somalia }} || 0.6423
|-
| {{flaglist| South Africa }} || 0.3652
|-
| {{flaglist| Spain }} || 0.8565
|-
| {{flaglist| Sri Lanka }} || 0.6055
|-
| {{flaglist| St. Kitts and Nevis }} || 0.6424
|-
| {{flaglist| St. Vincent and the Grenadines }} || 0.6424
|-
| {{flaglist| Sudan }} || 0.3326
|-
| {{flaglist| Suriname }} || 0.5139
|-
| {{flaglist| Swaziland }} || 0.3734
|-
| {{flaglist| Sweden }} || 0.3545
|-
| {{flaglist| Switzerland }} || 0.7399
|-
| {{flaglist| Syria }} || 0.3715
|-
| {{flaglist| Taiwan }} || 0.1940
|-
| {{flaglist| Tajikistan }} || 0.6796
|-
| {{flaglist| Tanzania }} || 0.5873
|-
| {{flaglist| Thailand }} || 0.3815
|-
| {{flaglist| Timor-Leste }} || 0.7765
|-
| {{flaglist| Togo }} || 0.8015
|-
| {{flaglist| Tonga }} || 0.3080
|-
| {{flaglist| Trinidad and Tobago }} || 0.4439
|-
| {{flaglist| Tunisia }} || 0.5916
|-
| {{flaglist| Turkey }} || 0.8990
|-
| {{flaglist| Turkmenistan }} || 0.2067
|-
| {{flaglist| Tuvalu }} || 0.0063
|-
| {{flaglist| Uganda }} || 0.5719
|-
| {{flaglist| Ukraine }} || 0.8993
|-
| {{flaglist| United Arab Emirates }} || 0.4855
|-
| {{flaglist| United Kingdom }} || 0.7012
|-
| {{flaglist| United States of America }} || 0.4804
|-
| {{flaglist| Uruguay }} || 0.6260
|-
| {{flaglist| Uzbekistan }} || 0.5958
|-
| {{flaglist| Vanuatu }} || 0.4979
|-
| {{flaglist| Venezuela }} || 0.4515
|-
| {{flaglist| Vietnam }} || 0.1316
|-
| {{flaglist| Yemen }} || 0.5205
|-
| {{flaglist| Zambia }} || 0.5240
|-
| {{flaglist| Zimbabwe }} || 0.4939
|}