Editing Burden of proof (law) (section)

=== Civil cases of the U.S. Supreme Court ===
In ''Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1'', the [[United States Supreme Court]] stated: "There are no hard-and-fast standards governing the allocation of the burden of proof in every situation. The issue, rather, 'is merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in the different situations'."<ref name=keyes>{{ussc|413|189|1973}}</ref> For support, the Court cited 9 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940). In ''Keyes'', the Supreme Court held that if "school authorities have been found to have practiced purposeful segregation in part of a school system", the burden of persuasion shifts to the school to prove that it did not engage in such discrimination in other segregated schools in the same system.<ref name=keyes/>

In ''Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries'', the Supreme Court explained that "burden of proof" is ambiguous because it has historically referred to two distinct burdens:  the ''burden of persuasion'', and the ''burden of production''.<ref>{{ussc|512|267|1994}}</ref>

The Supreme Court discussed how courts should allocate the burden of proof (i.e., the burden of persuasion) in ''Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast''.<ref name=schaffer>{{ussc|546|49|2005}}</ref> The Supreme Court explained that if a statute is silent about the burden of persuasion, the court will "begin with the ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims".<ref name=schaffer/> In support of this proposition, the Court cited 2 J. Strong, ''McCormick on Evidence'' § 337, 412 (5th ed. 1999), which states:

{{blockquote|The burdens of pleading and proof with regard to most facts have been and should be assigned to the plaintiff who generally seeks to change the present state of affairs and who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.<ref name=schaffer/>}}

At the same time, the Supreme Court also recognized "The ordinary default rule, of course, admits of exceptions. ... For example, the burden of persuasion as to certain elements of a plaintiff's claim may be shifted to defendants, when such elements can fairly be characterized as affirmative defenses or exemptions. ... Under some circumstances this Court has even placed the burden of persuasion over an entire claim on the defendant. ... [Nonetheless,] [a]bsent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise, therefore, [the Supreme Court] will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief."<ref name=schaffer/>