Editing West Bank (section)

==Economy==
{{Main|Economy of the Palestinian territories}}
As of the early-21st century, the economy of the Palestinian territories is chronically depressed, with [[unemployment]] rates constantly over 20% since 2000. The unemployment rate was 19% in the West Bank in first half of 2013.<ref name=AUS2922p2a>{{harvnb|World Bank|2013|p=2}}. "Consequently, unemployment rates have remained very high in the Palestinian territories...After initial post-Oslo rates of about 9 percent in the mid-1990s, unemployment rose to 28 percent of the labor force in 2000 with the onset of the second intifada and the imposition of severe movement and access restrictions; it has remained high ever since and is currently about 22 percent. What is more, almost 24 percent of the workforce is employed by the PA, an uncommonly high proportion that reflects the lack of dynamism in the private sector."</ref>

===Transportation and communications===
====Road system====
[[File:Road 5066 A.JPG|thumb|upright=1.15|A road in the West Bank]]
{{main|Palestinian freedom of movement#Restriction of movement in the West Bank}}
In 2010, the West Bank and Gaza Strip together had {{cvt|4686|km|mi|-0}} of roadways.<ref name=CIA/>

It has been said that for "Jewish settlers, roads ''connect''; for Palestinians, they ''separate''."{{sfn|Kamrava|2016|p=86}} Between 1994 and 1997, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) built {{cvt|290|km|mi|-0}} of bypass roads in the territories, on appropriated land because they ran close to Palestinian villages.{{sfn|Efrat|2006|p=85}} The given aim was said to be to afford protection to settlers from Palestinian sniping, bombing, and drive-by shootings.{{sfn|Galchinsky|2004|p=117}} For [[Tel Aviv University|TAU]] emeritus professor of geography Elisha Efrat, they ignored the historical topography, road systems and environmental characteristics of the West Bank, and simply formed an apartheid network of "octopus arms which hold a grip on Palestinian population centres".{{efn|"This imposed network of roads could be characterized by lack of consideration for the existing historical road network in the region; by inappropriateness of topography; by construction in marginal areas for a small population; by land confiscation of Arab villages; by lack of a logical hierarchy of roads with defined traffic functions; and above all by the development of a new road system as a means of territorial dominance of the region."{{sfn|Efrat|2006|p=85}}}}

A large number of embankments, concrete slabs and barriers impeded movement on primary and secondary roads. The result was to [[Canton (country subdivision)|cantonize]] and fragment Palestinian townships, and cause endless obstacles to Palestinians going to work, schools, markets and relatives.{{efn|" With Palestinian traffic banned from all the main and secondary roads, clusters of yellow group taxis gather at each such barrier, and groups of people trying to get to work, school, clinics, universities, relatives houses, or markets clamber up and down sand embankments or across ditches to circumvent concrete slabs and soldiers, who sometimes shoot at them."{{sfn|Hass|2002|p=6}}}} Ramallah was cut off from all of its feeder villages in 2000.{{sfn|Hass|2002|p=6}}

Though prohibited by law, confiscation of Palestinian identity cards at checkpoints is a daily occurrence. At best drivers must wait for several hours for them to be returned, when, as can happen, the IDs themselves are lost as soldiers change shifts, in which case Palestinians are directed to some regional office the next day, and more checkpoints to get there.{{sfn|Efrat|2006|p=85}} Even before the Al Aqsa Intifada, [[United Nations Population Fund|UNFPA]] estimated that 20% of pregnant West Bank women were unable to access [[prenatal care]] because of the difficulties and delays caused by crossing checkpoints, and dozens were forced to deliver their children on the roadside.{{sfn|Aswad|2007}}

Constant uncertainty and the inability to plan are the results for Palestinians of the Israeli military rules governing their movements. The [[World Bank]] noted that additional costs arising from longer travelling caused by restrictions on movement through three major routes in the West Bank alone ran to (2013) USD 185&nbsp;million a year, adding that other, earlier calculations (2007) suggest restrictions on the Palestinian labour market cost the West Bank approximately US$229&nbsp;million per annum. It concluded that such imposed restrictions had a major negative impact on the local economy, hindering stability and growth.{{sfn|World Bank|2013|p=30}} In 2007, official Israeli statistics indicated that there were 180,000 Palestinians on Israel's secret travel ban list. 561 roadblocks and checkpoints were in place (October), the number of Palestinians licensed to drive private cars was 46,166 and the annual cost of permits was $454.{{sfn|Makdisi|2010|pp=63–64}}

These checkpoints, together with the separation wall and the restricted networks restructure the West Bank into "land cells", freezing the flow of normal everyday Palestinian lives.{{sfn|Handel|2010|pp=259,261}} Israel sets up [[Random checkpoint|flying checkpoints]] without notice.  In 2017, 2,941 flying checkpoints were set up along West Bank roads, around 327 a month.  There were 476 unstaffed physical obstacles (dirt mounds, concrete blocks, gates and fenced sections) on roads.  Of the gates erected at village entrances, 59 were always closed.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Restrictions on Movement |publisher=[[B'Tselem]] |date=11 November 2017 |url=https://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement |access-date=2 February 2019 |archive-date=5 June 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605022611/http://www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Closure.asp |url-status=live }}</ref>

The checkpoint system did not ease up after the Oslo Accords, but was strengthened after them, which has been interpreted as suggesting their function is to assert control over Palestinians, and as a sign of an unwillingness to yield ground in the West Bank.{{sfn|Efrat|2006|p=86}} According to [[Health Minister of the Palestinian National Authority|PA Health Ministry statistics]] relating to the period from 2000 to 2006, of 68 Palestinian women who gave birth to their children while held up at checkpoints, 35 miscarried and 5 died while delivering their child there.<ref>{{cite news |title=Israeli jailed over baby tragedy |publisher=[[BBC News]] |date=12 September 2008 |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7612887.stm |access-date=2 February 2019 |archive-date=29 September 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180929132407/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7612887.stm |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Machsom Watch]] accumulated over a mere five years (2001–2006) some 10,000 eyewitness reports and testimonies regarding the difficulties faced by Palestinians trying to negotiate West Bank checkpoints.{{sfn|Keshet|2013|p=viii}}

Transportation infrastructure is particularly problematic as Palestinian use of roads in Area C is highly restricted, and travel times can be inordinate; the Palestinian Authority has also been unable to develop roads, airports or railways in or through Area C,<ref>{{harvnb|World Bank|2013|p={{page needed|date=January 2021}}}}. "UNOCHA analysis suggests that less than one percent of the land in Area C is currently available to Palestinians for construction; permit data also shows that it is almost impossible to obtain permission to build in Area C. Less than 6 percent of all requests made between 2000 and 2007 secured approval. This situation applies not only to housing but to public economic infrastructure (roads, water reservoirs, waste treatment plants) and industrial plant, and to the access roads and utility lines needed to connect Areas A and B across Area C. [...] The outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000 interrupted this trend, bringing increased violence and uncertainty – and most significantly, the intensification by Israel of a complex set of security-related restrictions that impeded the movement of people and goods and fragmented the Palestinian territories into small enclaves lacking economic cohesion. [...] Transportation infrastructure is particularly problematic as Palestinian use of roads in Area C is highly restricted, and travel times can be inordinate; the Palestinian Authority has also been unable to develop roads, airports or railways in or through Area C."</ref> while many other roads were restricted only to public transportation and to Palestinians who have special permits from Israeli authorities.<ref name="humanitarianinfo2">{{cite web |url=http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt/docs/UN/OCHA/OCHAoPt_ClosureAnalysis0106_En.pdf |title=Westbank closure count and analysis, January 2006 |access-date=22 May 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090326181004/http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt/docs/UN/OCHA/OCHAoPt_ClosureAnalysis0106_En.pdf |archive-date=26 March 2009}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e000493b8c/5189f43f72a68a2785256c61005a58ea!OpenDocument |title=A/57/366 of 29 August 2002 |publisher=United Nations |access-date=9 October 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071013101725/http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e000493b8c/5189f43f72a68a2785256c61005a58ea%21OpenDocument |archive-date=13 October 2007 |url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=A/57/366/Add.1 of 16 September 2002 |publisher=United Nations |url=http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/a39191b210be1d6085256da90053dee5/43fc268b1bf484fd85256c610065c63a!OpenDocument |access-date=9 October 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071013101735/http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/a39191b210be1d6085256da90053dee5/43fc268b1bf484fd85256c610065c63a%21OpenDocument |archive-date=13 October 2007 |url-status=dead}}</ref>

At certain times, Israel maintained more than 600 checkpoints or roadblocks in the region.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/23/60minutes/main4749723.shtml |title=60 Minutes &#124; Middle East |publisher=CBS News |date=25 January 2009 |access-date=29 January 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20090129154058/http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/23/60minutes/main4749723.shtml |archive-date=29 January 2009}}</ref>
Movement restrictions on main roads between cities were still (as of 2005) blamed for poverty and economic depression in the West Bank.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/WBN102.pdf |title=Protection of Civilians – Weekly Briefing Notes |date=20–26 April 2005 |publisher=OCHA |access-date=4 February 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20120204071859/http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/WBN102.pdf |archive-date=4 February 2012}}</ref> Underpasses and bridges, 28 of which have been constructed and 16 of which are planned, link Palestinian areas separated from each other by Israeli settlements and bypass roads"<ref name="humanitarianinfo1">{{cite web |url=http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt/docs/UN/OCHA/ochaHU0805_En.pdf |title=Closure Count and Analysis |publisher=OCHA |date=August 2005 |access-date=3 March 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090326181017/http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt/docs/UN/OCHA/ochaHU0805_En.pdf |archive-date=26 March 2009 |url-status=dead}}</ref>
[[File:Jericho checkpoint 2005.jpg|thumb|upright=1.15|A checkpoint before entering [[Jericho]], 2005]]

Israeli restrictions were tightened in 2007.<ref>{{harvnb|World Bank|2013|p={{page needed|date=January 2021}}}}. "Exports from Gaza to the West Bank and Israeli markets, traditionally Gaza's main export destinations, are prohibited (according to Gisha, an Israeli non-profit organization founded in 2005 to protect the freedom of movement of Palestinians, especially Gaza residents, 85 percent of Gaza products were exported to Israel and the West Bank prior to 2007, at which point Israeli restrictions were tightened)."</ref>

[[Route 4370]], which has a concrete wall dividing the two sides, one designated for Israeli vehicles, the other for Palestinian. The wall is designed to allow Palestinians to pass north–south through Israeli-held land and facilitate the building of additional Jewish settlements in the Jerusalem neighborhood.<ref>Erlanger, Steven. [https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/11/world/middleeast/11road.html A Segregated Road in an Already Divided Land] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170701100132/http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/11/world/middleeast/11road.html |date=1 July 2017 }}, ''[[The New York Times]]'', (11 August 2007) Retrieved 11 August 2007</ref>

====Rail====
{{As of|2012|2}}, a plan for 475-kilometer rail network, establishing 11 new rail lines in West Bank, was confirmed by Israeli Transportation Ministry. The West Bank network would include one line running through Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Ma'aleh Adumim, Bethlehem and Hebron. Another would provide service along the Jordanian border from Eilat to the Dead Sea, Jericho and Beit She'an and from there toward Haifa in the west and in also in a northeasterly direction. The proposed scheme also calls for shorter routes, such as between Nablus and Tul Karm in the West Bank, and from Ramallah to the Allenby Bridge crossing into Jordan.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-draws-plan-for-475-kilometer-rail-network-in-west-bank-1.414976 |title=Israel draws plan for 475-kilometer rail network in West Bank |publisher=haaretz |date=February 2012 |access-date=23 December 2012 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121103102753/http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-draws-plan-for-475-kilometer-rail-network-in-west-bank-1.414976 |archive-date=3 November 2012}}</ref>

====Airports====
The only airport in the West Bank is the [[Atarot Airport]] near [[Ramallah]], but it has been closed since 2001.

====Crossing points to Jordan and Egypt====
[[Allenby Bridge]], or 'King Hussein Bridge', is the main port for the Palestinians in the West Bank to cross the Jordanian borders. This crossing point is controlled by Israel since 1967. It was inaugurated on 11 December 2011 under the military order "175" entitled 'An order concerning transition station'. Later, Order '446' was issued which annexed the [[Damia Bridge]] crossing point to the Allenby Bridge as a commercial crossing point only. Goods were exported to Jordan, while the import was banned for security purposes.<ref name="Euro-Mid">{{cite web |url=http://www.euromid.org/uploads/reports/Restricted_Hopes.pdf |title=Restricted Hopes: On The Breach of West Bank Palestinians' Right To Travel By Israeli Authorities |date=December 2011 |publisher=Euro-Mediterranean Observer for Human Rights |access-date=16 December 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304102018/http://www.euromid.org/uploads/reports/Restricted_Hopes.pdf |archive-date=4 March 2016}}</ref>

In 1993, the Palestinian National Authority, according to Oslo Accord assigned by PLO and the Israeli government, became a partial supervisor over the [[Rafah Border Crossing]] to Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Authority was responsible for issuing passports to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel remained the major responsible party for this crossing point. According to the agreement, Israel has the right to independently inspect luggage and to maintain security. In addition, it can prevent anyone from using the crossing.<ref name="Euro-Mid"/><ref>{{Cite journal |title=معبر الكرامة – نبذة تاريخية |last=المرصد الأورومتوسطي لحقوق الإنسان |date=15 December 2015 |journal=آمال مقيدة |language=ar}} [{{cite journal |author=Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor |date=15 December 2015 |title=Dignity Crossing – A Brief History |journal=Tied Hopes |language=ar}}]</ref>

====Telecommunication====
{{Main|Communications in the State of Palestine}}
The Palestinian [[Paltel]] telecommunication companies provide communication services such as [[landline]], [[cellular network]] and Internet in the West Bank and [[Gaza Strip]]. Dialling code [[+970]] is used in the West Bank and all over the Palestinian territories. Until 2007, the Palestinian mobile market was monopolized by [[Jawwal]]. A new [[mobile operator]] for the territories launched in 2009 under the name of [[Wataniya Telecom]]. The number of Internet users increased from 35,000 in 2000 to 356,000 in 2010.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.internetworldstats.com/me/ps.htm |title=Palestine Internet Usage and Telecommunications Report |publisher=Internetworldstats.com |access-date=4 February 2012 |url-status=live |archive-url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20120204035341/http://www.internetworldstats.com/me/ps.htm |archive-date=4 February 2012}}</ref>

===Consequences of occupation===
====Economic consequences====
According to a 2013 World Bank report, Israeli restrictions hinder Palestinian economic development in Area C of the West Bank.<ref name=AUS2922p2b>{{harvnb|World Bank|2013|p=2}}. "While internal Palestinian political divisions have contributed to investor aversion to the Palestinian territories, Israeli restrictions on trade, movement and access are clearly the binding constraint to investment: these restrictions substantially increase the cost of trade and make it impossible to import many production inputs into the Palestinian territories, as illustrated, for instance, on the example of the telecommunications sector. For Gaza, the restrictions on import and export are in particular severe. In addition to the restrictions on labor movement between the Palestinian territories, the restrictions on movement of labor within the West Bank have been shown to have a strong impact on employability, wages, and economic growth. Israeli restrictions render much economic activity very difficult or impossible to conduct on about 61 percent of the West Bank territory, called Area C. Restrictions on movement and access, and the stunted potential of Area C."</ref> A 2013 [[World Bank]] report calculates that, if the [[Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip|Interim Agreement]] was respected and restrictions lifted, a few key industries alone would produce US$2.2&nbsp;billion per annum more (or 23% of 2011 Palestinian GDP) and reduce by some US$800&nbsp;million (50%) the Palestinian Authority's deficit; the employment would increase by 35%.<ref name=AUS2922pviii>{{harvnb|World Bank|2013|p=viii}}. "[...] assumed that the various physical, legal, regulatory and bureaucratic constraints that currently prevent investors from obtaining construction permits, and accessing land and water resources are lifted, as envisaged under the Interim Agreement. [...] It is understood that realizing the full potential of such investments requires other changes as well – first, the rolling back of the movement and access restrictions in force outside Area C, which prevent the easy export of Palestinian products and inhibit tourists and investors from accessing Area C; and second, further reforms by the Palestinian Authority to better enable potential investors to register businesses, enforce contracts, and acquire finance. [...] Neglecting indirect positive effects, we estimate that the potential additional output from the sectors evaluated in this report alone would amount to at least USD 2.2 billion per annum in valued added terms – a sum equivalent to 23 percent of 2011 Palestinian GDP. The bulk of this would come from agriculture and Dead Sea minerals exploitation. [...] x. Tapping this potential output could dramatically improve the PA's fiscal position. Even without any improvements in the efficiency of tax collection, at the current rate of tax/GDP of 20 percent the additional tax revenues associated with such an increase in GDP would amount to some USD 800 million. Assuming that expenditures remain at the same level, this extra resource would notionally cut the fiscal deficit by half – significantly reducing the need for donor recurrent budget support. This major improvement in fiscal sustainability would in turn generate significant positive reputational benefits for the PA and would considerably enhance investor confidence. xi. The impact on Palestinian livelihoods would be impressive. An increase in GDP equivalent to 35 percent would be expected to create substantial employment, sufficient to put a significant dent in the currently high rate of unemployment. If an earlier estimated one-to-one relationship between growth and employment was to hold, this increase in GDP would lead to a 35 percent increase in employment. This level of growth in employment would also put a large dent in poverty, as recent estimates show that unemployed Palestinians are twice as likely to be poor as their employed counterparts."</ref>

====Water supply====
{{main|Water supply and sanitation in the State of Palestine}}
Amnesty International has criticized the way that the Israeli state is dealing with the regional water resources:

{{blockquote|Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) do not have access to adequate, safe water supplies&nbsp;... Discriminatory Israeli policies in the OPT are the root cause of the striking disparity in access to water between Palestinians and Israelis&nbsp;... The inequality is even more pronounced between Palestinian communities and unlawful Israeli settlements, established in the OPT in violation of international law. Swimming pools, well-watered lawns and large irrigated farms in Israeli settlements in the OPT stand in stark contrast next to Palestinian villages whose inhabitants struggle even to meet their essential domestic water needs. In parts of the West Bank, Israeli settlers use up to 20 times more water per capita than neighbouring Palestinian communities, who survive on barely 20 litres of water per capita a day—the minimum amount recommended by the WHO for emergency situations response.<ref>{{cite report |url=http://www.amnesty.eu/static/Water_report_digest.pdf |access-date=2017-03-15 |title=Thirsting for Justice – Palestinian Access to Water Restricted |publisher=Amnesty International |page=2 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160706031401/http://www.amnesty.eu/static/Water_report_digest.pdf |archive-date=2016-07-06}}</ref>}}

Israeli settlers in the West Bank have seized dozens of [[well]]s from Palestinians. The wells are privately owned by Palestinians and the settlers forcibly took them, gave them Hebrew names and, with the assistance of the Israeli military, prevent Arab people, including the wells' owners, from using the wells and the pools the wells feed.<ref>{{cite news |author1=[[Gideon Levy]] |author2=Alex Levac |date=30 August 2019 |url=https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-this-place-is-only-for-jews-the-west-bank-s-apartheid-springs-1.7767344 |url-access=subscription |title='This Place Is Only for Jews': The West Bank's Apartheid Springs |work=Haaretz |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20190830111204/https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-this-place-is-only-for-jews-the-west-bank-s-apartheid-springs-1.7767344 |archive-date=2019-08-30}}</ref>

====Israeli garbage disposal====
Israel ratified the international [[Basel Convention]] treaty on Israel on 14 December 1994, according to which, any transfer of waste must be performed with an awareness of the dangers posed to the disempowered occupied people. It forbids the creation among them of "environmental [[sacrifice zone]]s."{{sfn|Aloni|2017|p=16}} Israel, it is argued, uses the West Bank as a "sacrifice" zone by placing 15 waste treatment plants, which are there under less stringent rules that those required in Israel because a different legal system{{Which|date=February 2024}} has been organized regarding hazardous materials that can be noxious to local people and the environment. The military authorities do not make public the details of these operations. These materials include sewage sludge, infectious medical waste, used oils, solvents, metals, [[electronic waste]] and batteries.{{sfn|Aloni|2017|pp=5–6}}

In 2007 it was estimated that 38% (35 mcm a year) of all wastewater flowing into the West Bank derived from settlements and Jerusalem.{{sfn|Hareuveni|2009|p=7}} Of the 121 settlements surveyed, 81 had wastewater treatment plant, much of it inadequate or subject to breakdown, with much sewage flowing into lowland streams and terrain where Palestinian villages are located. Only 4 of 53 indictments for waste pollution were made over the years from 2000 to 2008,{{Clarify|date=February 2024}} whereas in Israel the laws are strictly applied and, in 2006 alone, 230 enforcements for the same abuse were enforced.{{sfn|Hareuveni|2009|pp=8–12}}  At the same time 90–95% of Palestinian wastewater was not treated, with only 1 of 4 Israeli plants built in the 1970s to that purpose functioning, and the neglect to improve the infrastructure is attributed to Israeli budgetary problems.{{sfn|Hareuveni|2009|pp=19–21}}

After the Oslo Accords, the global community earmarked $250,000,000 for West Bank wastewater infrastructure. Israel at times insisted its approval was conditional on linking the grid to Israeli settlements, which neither the donors nor Palestinians accepted. Most of the infrastructure was subsequently destroyed by IDF military operations.{{sfn|Weizman|2012|p=273,n.11}} The PA raised funds from Germany for 15 plants, but only managed to build one, at [[al-Bireh]], within Area B, though even there Israel insisted the plant process waste from the settlement of [[Psagot]], though refusing to pay fees for the treatment.{{sfn|Hareuveni|2009|pp=19–21}} Palestinian town [[Salfit]] has been deeply affected by sewage overflow channelled past the town from the settlement of Ariel.{{sfn|Ashly|2017}}{{sfn|Weizman|2012|p=273,n.14}}

Unlike the data available for sewage treatment within Israel, the Israeli Water Commission refuses to provide public reports on 15&nbsp;million cubic metres of sewage flowing from Israeli settlements in the West Bank. It claims 75% is treated adequately but independent Israeli studies (2000) suggest that only 6% met Israeli treatment standards, while 48% was either not treated adequastely or discharged raw. Since then some improvements have been implemented.{{sfn|Tagar|Keinen|Bromberg|2007|pp=419–420}}

The landfill near [[Al-Jiftlik]] in the [[Jericho Governorate]], built on [[Israeli land and property laws|absentee Palestinian property]] without planning or an environment impact analysis, is for the exclusive use of waste, 1,000 tons per day, produced by Israeli settlements and cities within Israel.<ref name="HRW 2016"/> Palestinians are restricted to 3 landfills, and permits for more have been denied unless the sites can be used to dump settlement garbage. Even if a permit is given without this agreement, settler waste under military escort is still dumped there.<ref name="HRW 2016"/>

Israel has been accused of engaging in 'warfare ecology' in the West Bank.<ref>{{cite book |author=M. Mason |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qKfyCAAAQBAJ |chapter=The Application of Warfare Ecoloogy to Belligerent Occupations |editor1=Gary E. Machlis |editor2=Thor Hanson |editor3=Zdravko Špirić |editor4=Jean McKendry |title=Warfare Ecology: A New Synthesis for Peace and Security |publisher=Springer |year=2011 |isbn=978-94-007-1214-0 |page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=qKfyCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA164 164] |access-date=24 January 2021 |archive-date=3 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230303182250/https://books.google.com/books?id=qKfyCAAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref> In response to [[NIMBY|local opposition]] in Israel to waste treatment plants and the high cost of meeting stringent environment laws in that country. It has been argued that Israel had used the area of the West Bank as a 'sacrifice zone' where its waste can be dumped."{{Efn|'sacrifice zone is a geographic area that has become irrevocably impaired by environmental damage or economic neglect.'{{sfn|Aloni|2017|p=17}}}}

Many [[waste treatment]] facilities in the West Bank were built for processing waste generated inside Israeli sovereign territory, according to [[B'Tselem]], Israel's leading [[human rights organization]] for monitoring the West Bank.<ref name="auto">{{cite web |publisher=Al Jazeera|author=Jaclynn Ashly |date=5 December 2017 |title=Israel Turns West Bank into a 'Garbage Dump' |url=http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/israel-turns-west-bank-garbage-dump-171205052610633.html |access-date=2018-02-15 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180215144124/http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/israel-turns-west-bank-garbage-dump-171205052610633.html |archive-date=15 February 2018}}</ref><ref name="auto1">{{cite web |magazine=[[+972 Magazine]] |author=Joshua Leifer |date=5 December 2017 |title=How Israel turned the West Bank into its garbage dump |url=https://972mag.com/how-israel-turned-the-west-bank-into-its-garbage-dump/131206/ |access-date=2018-02-15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180216025315/https://972mag.com/how-israel-turned-the-west-bank-into-its-garbage-dump/131206/ |archive-date=16 February 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref>{{sfn|Aloni|2017|p={{page needed|date=January 2021}}}}

The Israel government requires no reporting by these West Bank facilities of the amount of waste they process or the risks they pose to the local population, and applies less rigorous regulatory standards to these facilities than it does to [[solid waste]] treatment facilities in Israel.{{citation needed|date=December 2018}} B'Tselem has said that "any transfer of waste to the West Bank is a breach of [[international law]] which Israel is dutybound to uphold" because according to international law "an occupied territory or its resources may not be used for the benefit of the [[occupying power]]'s own needs."{{sfn|Aloni|2017|p={{page needed|date=January 2021}}}}{{sfn|Efrat|2006|p=8}}{{sfn|Weizman|2012|p=20}} Experts have also warned that some of these facilities are garbage dumps that endanger the purity of the mountain [[aquifer]], which is one of the largest sources of water in the region.{{sfn|Efrat|2006|p=8}}

====Palestinian water and sewage====
{{main|Water supply and sanitation in the State of Palestine}}
In 1995, the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) was established by a presidential decree. One year later, its functions, objectives and responsibilities were defined through a by-law, giving the PWA the mandate to manage water resources and execute the water policy.<ref name="husseini">{{cite book |last1=Husseini |first1=Hiba |title=The Palestinian Water Authority: Developments and Challenges involving the Legal Framework and the Capacity of the PWA |pages=301–308 |date=n.d. |doi=10.1007/978-3-540-69509-7_31 |chapter=Palestinian Water Authority: Developments and Challenges – Legal Framework and Capacity |isbn=978-3-540-69508-0}}</ref>

About 90% of the Palestinians in the Territories had access to [[improved sanitation]] in 2008.<ref name="JMP">[http://www.wssinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/resources/Arab-States-Six-pager-Final.pdf ''A Snapshot of Drinking-water and Sanitation in the Arab States – 2010 Update''] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150513035105/http://www.wssinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/resources/Arab-States-Six-pager-Final.pdf |date=13 May 2015 }}, p. 5. WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and Sanitation, November 2011. On [http://www.wssinfo.org/documents-links/documents/?tx_displaycontroller wssinfo.org, Joint Monitoring Programme (see: Regional snapshots)] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140225205449/http://www.wssinfo.org/documents-links/documents/?tx_displaycontroller |date=25 February 2014 }}</ref> [[Cesspit]]s were used by 39% of households, while access to the sewer network increased to 55% in 2011, up from 39% in 1999.<ref name="PCBS 11">[http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1813.pdf Household Environmental Survey, 2011—Main Findings] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201112023926/http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1813.pdf |date=12 November 2020 }}, p. [13] (English section). Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, December 2011</ref> In the West Bank, only 13,000 out of 85,000 m<sup>3</sup> of wastewater were treated in five municipal wastewater treatment plants in [[Hebron]], [[Jenin]], [[Ramallah]], [[Tulkarem]] and [[Al-Bireh]].<ref name="Fatta">{{cite journal |title=Urban Wastewater Treatment and Reclamation for Agricultural Irrigation: The situation in Morocco and Palestine. |journal=The Environmentalist |volume=24 |issue=4 |pages=227–236 |date=December 2004 |url=http://springerlink.metapress.com/content/h51600557n0j5380/?p=80dd2b999c8c44ff9f3d62e91a02db3b&pi=2 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130129012511/http://springerlink.metapress.com/content/h51600557n0j5380/?p=80dd2b999c8c44ff9f3d62e91a02db3b&pi=2 |url-status=dead |archive-date=29 January 2013 |doi=10.1007/s10669-005-0998-x |access-date=2008-02-15 |last1=Fatta |first1=D. |last2=Salem |first2=Z. |last3=Mountadar |first3=M. |last4=Assobhei |first4=O. |last5=Loizidou |first5=M. |bibcode=2004ThEnv..24..227F |s2cid=85346288}}</ref> The Al Bireh plant was constructed in 2000 with funding by the [[Germany|German]] [[aid agency]] [[KfW]].<ref>[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WaterRestrictionsReportJuly2009.pdf ''Assessment of Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190529012034/https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WaterRestrictionsReportJuly2009.pdf |date=29 May 2019 }}, p. 113. World Bank, April 2009.</ref> According to the World Bank report, the other four plants perform poorly concerning efficiency and quality.<ref>[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WaterRestrictionsReportJuly2009.pdf ''Assessment of Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190529012034/https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WaterRestrictionsReportJuly2009.pdf |date=29 May 2019 }}, p. 20. World Bank, April 2009.</ref>

====Resource extraction====
Based on the number of quarries per km<sup>2</sup> in Areas A and B, it is calculated that, were Israel to lift restrictions, a further 275 quarries could be opened in Area C. The World Bank estimates that Israel's virtual ban on issuing Palestinians permits for quarries there costs the Palestinian economy at least US$241&nbsp;million per year.{{sfn|Niksic|Eddin|Cali|2014|p=58}}
In international law drawing on the [[Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907|Hague Conventions]] (Article 55), it is established that an occupying power may reap some value from the resources of the country occupied but not deplete its assets, and that the [[usufruct]] must benefit the people under occupation. The Oslo Accords agreed to hand over mining rights to the Palestinian Authority. Israel licenses eleven settlement quarries in the West Bank and they sell 94% of their material to Israel, which arguably constitutes "depletion" and pays royalties to its West Bank military government and settlement municipalities.<ref name="HRW 2016"/>

Thus the German [[HeidelbergCement|cement firm quarrying at Nahal Raba]] paid out €430,000 ($479,000) in taxes to the [[Samaria Regional Council]] in 2014 alone.<ref name="HRW 2016"/> The Israeli High Court rejected a petition that such quarrying was a violation by stating that after four decades Israeli law must adapt to "the realities on the ground". The state did undertake not to open more quarries.{{sfn|Gross|2011}}

A Human Rights Watch report contrasts the difference between a Palestinian-owned quarry company in [[Beit Fajar]] and that of a European one working on what Israeli considers its state land. The European company obtained a concession and license to harvest stone, whereas Israel refuses permits for most of the roughly 40 Beit Fajar quarries, or nearly any other Palestinian-owned quarry in the West Bank under Israeli administration.<ref name="HRW 2016"/>

Israel had denied Palestinians permits to process minerals in that area of the West Bank.{{sfn|Niksic|Eddin|Cali|2014|p=58}} The products of the Israeli cosmetics firm [[Ahava]], established in 1988, were developed in laboratories at the West Bank [[Dead Sea]] settlements of [[Mitzpe Shalem]] and [[Kalya]]. 60% of their production is sold in the EU market.{{sfn|Nicoletti|Hearne|2012|pp=21–22}} In 2018 The UN, stating that the violations were both "pervasive and devastating" to the local Palestinian population, identified some 206 companies which do business with Israeli settlements in the West Bank.{{sfn|Nebehay|2018}}

Roughly 73 percent of global [[bromine]] production comes from Israeli and Jordanian exploitation of the Dead Sea. The potential incremental value that could accrue to the Palestinian economy from the production and sales of [[potash]], bromine and magnesium has been conservatively estimated at US$918&nbsp;million per annum, or 9 percent of GDP.{{sfn|World Bank|2013|pp=12–13}}{{sfn|Beckouche|2017|p=156}} The lost earnings from not being allowed to process Dead Sea minerals such as potash, and for making bromide-based flame retardants, based on calculations of comparable use by Israel and Jordan, suggest a figure of $642&nbsp;million.{{sfn|Niksic|Eddin|Cali|2014|pp=58–60}}

====Loss of cultural property====
Albert Glock argued that Israel is responsible for the disappearance of significant parts of the Palestinian cultural patrimony, by confiscating Arab cultural resources. In 1967 it appropriated the Palestine Archaeological Museum{{efn|"The one center of archaeological activity that might have provided a base for Palestinian archaeologists was the Palestine Archaeological Museum in Jerusalem, which was under the control not of Jordan but of trustees made up of the directors of the several foreign schools of archaeology in the city. It is therefore not clear why persons like [[Dimitri Baramki]] did not continue their work as archaeologists employed by the Palestine Museum. In any event, Jordan nationalized the museum only months before the June 1967 war, enabling the Israelis to claim it as theirs by right of conquest,"{{sfn|Glock|1994|p=77}}}} and its library in East Jerusalem.{{efn|"Fourth, the disappearance of the Palestinian patrimony (material evidence) through the deliberate confiscation of Arab cultural resources by Israelis (such as the large library of Dr. [[Tawfiq Canaan]] in 1948, the [[Rockefeller Museum|Palestine Archaeological Museum]] and its library in Jerusalem in 1967, and the library of the Palestine Research Center in Beirut in 1982), as well as the destruction of cultural property in the form of entire villages in 1948–49. This last is particularly crucial, since the Palestinians' link to their past is largely through the villages, few towns, and fewer cities that predominated in their land during the last thirteen centuries."{{sfn|Glock|1994|p=71}}}} Often these losses are personal, as when homes are ransacked and looted of their valuables. The journalist Hamdi Faraj, jailed for endangering public order, had his 500-volume library confiscated, including copies of the Bible and Qur'an and, when he applied for their restitution, was told all the books had been accidentally burnt.{{sfn|Friedman|1983|p=96}}
The Israeli occupation has wrought a profound change in Palestinian identity, which clings to a sense of a "paradise lost" before the changes brought out by the 1967 conquest.{{sfn|Kamrava|2016|p=116}}{{efn|Israeli settlers forced to evacuate their settlements have also called their prior state as one of a "lost paradise".{{sfn|Perugini|2014|p=55}}}}

====Tourism====
{{main|Tourism in the State of Palestine}}
The Palestinian territories contain several of the most significant sites for Muslims, Christians and Jews, and are endowed with a world-class heritage highly attractive to tourists and pilgrims.{{sfn|World Bank|2013|p=20}} The West Bank Palestinians themselves have difficulties in accessing the territory for recreation.

Based on 1967 figures, the Palestinian [[Dead Sea]] Coastline is roughly 40&nbsp;km in length, of which 15% (6&nbsp;kilometres) could lend itself to the same tourist infrastructure developed by Jordan and Israel in their respective areas. Were Israel to permit a parallel development of this Palestinian sector, the World Bank estimates that 2,900 jobs would be added, allowing the Palestinian economy a potential value-added input of something like $126&nbsp;million annually.{{sfn|Niksic|Eddin|Cali|2014|pp=65–66}} It is also the only maritime recreational outlet for West Bankers, but according to an [[Association for Civil Rights in Israel|Acri]] complaint to the Israeli Supreme Court in 2008 Palestinians are often barred or turned away from the beaches at their only access point, the [[Beit HaArava|Beit Ha'arava checkpoint]] on [[Highway 90 (Israel–Palestine)|Route 90]]. Acri claimed the ban responds to fears by settlers who operate tourist concessions in this West Bank area that they will lose Jewish customers if there are too many West Bank Palestinians on the beaches.{{efn|'The ban came to light after the testimony of two Israeli army reservists who said that at the beginning of their tour of duty in May they were told that the purpose of the checkpoint was to "prevent Palestinians coming from the Jordan Valley to the Dead Sea beaches". One of the reservists, Doron Karbel, testified that as a "side note", the Jordan Valley Brigade Commander, Colonel Yigal Slovik, had said the reason for the checkpoint was that "when Jews and Palestinian vacationers were sitting on the beaches side by side it hurt the business of the surrounding [[yishuv]]im (Jewish communities)."{{sfn|Macintyre|2008}} }}

The key Palestinian towns in the West Bank for tourism are East Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Jericho. All access points are controlled by Israel and the road system, checkpoints and obstacles in place for visitors desiring to visit Palestinian towns leaves their hotels half-empty.{{sfn|Isaac|2013|p=147}} From 92 to 94 cents in every dollar of the tourist trade goes to Israel.{{sfn|Isaac|2013|p=144}} The general itineraries under Israeli management focus predominantly on Jewish history. Obstacles placed in the way of Palestinian-managed tourism down to 1995 included withholding licenses from tour guides, and hotels, for construction or renovation, and control of airports and highways, enabling Israel to develop a virtual monopoly on tourism.{{sfn|Isaac|2013|p=144}}