Editing Utilitarianism (section)

=== Preference utilitarianism ===
{{Main|Preference utilitarianism}}
Preference utilitarianism entails promoting actions that fulfil the preferences of those beings involved.<ref>Peter Singer, ''Practical Ethics'', 2011, p. 13</ref> The concept of preference utilitarianism was first proposed in 1977 by [[John Harsanyi]] in ''Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour'',<ref>[[John Harsanyi|Harsanyi, John C.]] 1977. "Morality and the theory of rational behavior." ''[[Social Research (journal)|Social Research]]'' 44 (4):623–56. {{JSTOR|40971169}}.</ref><ref name="Harsanyi">[[John Harsanyi|Harsanyi, John C.]] [1977] 1982. "Morality and the theory of rational behaviour." Pp. 39–62 in ''Utilitarianism and Beyond'', edited by [[Amartya Sen|A. Sen]] and [[Bernard Williams|B. Williams]]. Cambridge: [[Cambridge University Press]]. {{ISBN|978-0-511-61196-4}}.</ref> however the concept is more commonly associated with [[R. M. Hare]],<ref name="Hare 1981 b"/> [[Peter Singer]],<ref>{{cite book |last=Singer |first=Peter |author-link=Peter Singer |title=Practical ethics |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge New York |year=1979 |edition=1st |isbn=978-0-521-29720-2 }}:{{cite book |last=Singer |first=Peter |author-link=Peter Singer |title=Practical ethics |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge/New York |year=1993 |edition=2nd |isbn=978-0-521-43971-8 |url=https://archive.org/details/practicalethics00sing }}</ref> and [[Richard Brandt]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Brandt |first=Richard B. |author-link=Richard Brandt |title=A Theory of the Good and the Right |publisher=Clarendon Press |location=Oxford/New York |year=1979 |isbn=978-0-19-824550-6 |url=https://archive.org/details/theoryofgood00bran }}</ref>

Harsanyi claims that his theory is indebted to:<ref name="Harsanyi"/>{{rp|42}}

* [[Adam Smith]], who equated the moral point of view with that of an impartial but sympathetic observer;
* [[Immanuel Kant]], who insisted on the criterion of [[Universality (philosophy)|universality]], which may also be described as a criterion of [[Reciprocity (social and political philosophy)|reciprocity]];
* the classical utilitarians who made maximizing social utility the basic criterion of morality; and 
* "the modern theory of rational behaviour under risk and uncertainty, usually described as [[Thomas Bayes|Bayesian]] [[decision theory]]."

Harsanyi rejects [[hedonistic utilitarianism]] as being dependent on an outdated psychology saying that it is far from obvious that everything we do is motivated by a desire to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. He also rejects ideal utilitarianism because "it is certainly not true as an empirical observation that people's only purpose in life is to have 'mental states of intrinsic worth'."<ref name="Harsanyi" />{{rp|54}}

According to Harsanyi, "preference utilitarianism is the only form of utilitarianism consistent with the important philosophical principle of preference autonomy. By this I mean the principle that, in deciding what is good and what is bad for a given individual, the ultimate criterion can only be his own wants and his own preferences."<ref name="Harsanyi"/>{{rp|55}}

Harsanyi adds two caveats. Firstly, people sometimes have [[Irrationality|irrational]] preferences. To deal with this, Harsanyi distinguishes between "'''manifest'''" preferences and "'''true'''" preferences. The former are those "manifested by his observed behaviour, including preferences possibly based on erroneous factual beliefs,{{clarify|date=September 2016}} or on careless logical analysis, or on strong emotions that at the moment greatly hinder [[Rational choice theory|rational choice]]"; whereas the latter are "the preferences he would have if he had all the relevant factual information, always reasoned with the greatest possible care, and were in a state of mind most conducive to rational choice."<ref name="Harsanyi"/>{{rp|55}} It is the latter that preference utilitarianism tries to satisfy.

The second caveat is that [[Anti-social behaviour|antisocial]] preferences, such as [[Sadistic personality disorder|sadism]], [[envy]], and [[resentment]], have to be excluded. Harsanyi achieves this by claiming that such preferences partially exclude those people from the moral community:
{{blockquote|Utilitarian ethics makes all of us members of the same moral community. A person displaying ill will toward others does remain a member of this community, but not with his whole personality. That part of his personality that harbours these hostile antisocial feelings must be excluded from membership, and has no claim for a hearing when it comes to defining our concept of social utility.<ref name="Harsanyi"/>{{rp|56}}}}