Editing Truth (section)

==Medieval philosophy==
===Avicenna (980–1037)===
In [[early Islamic philosophy]], [[Avicenna]] (Ibn Sina) defined truth in his work ''[[The Book of Healing]]'', Book I, Chapter 8, as:
{{blockquote|What corresponds in the mind to what is outside it.<ref>Osman Amin (2007), "Influence of Muslim Philosophy on the West", ''Monthly Renaissance'' 17 (11).</ref>}}

[[Avicenna]] elaborated on his definition of truth later in Book VIII, Chapter 6:
{{Blockquote|The truth of a thing is the property of the being of each thing which has been established in it.<ref name=Aertsen>Jan A. Aertsen (1988), ''Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought'', p. 152. Brill, 978-90-04-08451-3.</ref>}}

This definition is but a rendering of the [[medieval]] Latin translation of the work by Simone van Riet.<ref>{{cite book
| author = Simone van Riet
| title = Liber de philosophia prima, sive Scientia divina
| page = 413
| language = la}}</ref> A modern translation of the original Arabic text states:

{{blockquote|Truth is also said of the veridical belief in the existence [of something].<ref>{{cite book
| title = Avicenna: The Metaphysics of The Healing |author=Avicenna|author-mask=0
| publisher = Brigham Young University Press
| year = 2005
| page = 284
| others =Introduction and annotation by Michael E. Marmura
|translator-last=Marmura |translator-first=Michael E.
| isbn = 978-0-934893-77-0
}}</ref>}}

===Aquinas (1225–1274)===
Reevaluating Avicenna, and also Augustine and Aristotle, [[Thomas Aquinas]] stated in his ''Disputed Questions on Truth'':

{{blockquote|A natural thing, being placed between two intellects, is called ''true'' insofar as it conforms to either. It is said to be true with respect to its conformity with the divine intellect insofar as it fulfills the end to which it was ordained by the divine intellect{{nbsp}}... With respect to its conformity with a human intellect, a thing is said to be true insofar as it is such as to cause a true estimate about itself.<ref>''Disputed Questions on Truth'', 1, 2, c, reply to Obj. 1. Trans. Mulligan, McGlynn, Schmidt, ''Truth'', vol. I, pp. 10–12.</ref>}}

Thus, for Aquinas, the truth of the human intellect (logical truth) is based on the truth in things (ontological truth).<ref>"Veritas supra ens fundatur" (Truth is founded on being). ''Disputed Questions on Truth'', 10, 2, reply to Obj. 3.</ref> Following this, he wrote an elegant re-statement of Aristotle's view in his [http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1016.htm Summa I.16.1]:
{{blockquote|Veritas est adæquatio intellectus et rei.{{pb}}(Truth is the conformity of the intellect and things.)}} Aquinas also said that real things participate in the act of being of the [[God|Creator God]] who is Subsistent Being, Intelligence, and Truth. Thus, these beings possess the light of intelligibility and are knowable. These things (beings; [[reality]]) are the foundation of the truth that is found in the human mind, when it acquires knowledge of things, first through the [[sense]]s, then through the [[understanding]] and the [[judgement]] done by [[reason]]. For Aquinas, human [[intelligence]] ("intus", within and "legere", to read) has the capability to reach the [[essence]] and [[existence]] of things because it has a non-material, [[Spirituality|spiritual]] element, although some moral, educational, and other elements might interfere with its capability.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Summa Theologicae: How God is known by us (Prima Pars, Q. 12) |url=https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1012.htm |website=www.newadvent.org}}</ref>

===Changing concepts of truth in the Middle Ages===
[[Richard Firth Green]] examined the concept of truth in the later Middle Ages in his ''A Crisis of Truth'', and concludes that roughly during the reign of [[Richard II of England]] the very meaning of the concept changes. The idea of the oath, which was so much part and parcel of for instance [[Romance (heroic literature)|Romance literature]],<ref>{{cite journal|last=Rock|first=Catherine A.|year=2006|title=Forsworn and Fordone: Arcite as Oath-Breaker in the "Knight's Tale"|journal=[[The Chaucer Review]]|volume=40|issue=4|pages=416–432|jstor=25094334|doi=10.1353/cr.2006.0009|s2cid=159853483 }}</ref> changes from a subjective concept to a more objective one (in [[Derek Pearsall]]'s summary).<ref name=pearsall>{{cite journal|last=Pearsall|first=Derek|year=2004|title=Medieval Literature and Historical Enquiry|journal=[[Modern Language Review]]|volume=99|issue=4|pages=xxxi–xlii|jstor=3738608|doi=10.2307/3738608|s2cid=155446847 }}</ref> Whereas truth (the "trouthe" of ''[[Sir Gawain and the Green Knight]]'') was first "an ethical truth in which truth is understood to reside in persons", in Ricardian England it "transforms{{nbsp}}... into a [[political truth]] in which truth is understood to reside in documents".<ref>{{cite journal|last=Fowler|first=Elizabeth|year=2003|title=Rev. of Green, ''A Crisis of Truth''|journal=[[Speculum (journal)|Speculum]]|volume=78|issue=1|pages=179–182|jstor=3301477|doi=10.1017/S0038713400099310}}</ref>