Editing Suez Crisis (section)

=== British response ===
The nationalisation surprised Britain and its [[British Commonwealth|Commonwealth]]. There had been no discussion of the canal at the [[Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference]] in London in late June and early July.<ref name="eayrs1964">{{Cite book |last=Eayrs |first=James |title=The Commonwealth and Suez: A Documentary Survey |date=1964 |publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref>{{Rp|7–8}} Egypt's action, however, threatened British economic and military interests in the region. Prime Minister Eden was under immense domestic pressure from Conservative MPs who drew direct comparisons between the events of 1956 and those of the [[Munich Agreement]] in 1938. Since the U.S. government did not support the British protests, the British government decided in favour of military intervention against Egypt to keep the oil supply flowing<ref name="Thorpe"/> and avoid the complete collapse of British influence in the region.<ref>{{Citation |last=Verbeek |first=Bertjan |title=The 1956 Suez Crisis as a Perfect Case for Crisis Research |date=2020-09-28 |encyclopedia=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics |url=https://oxfordre.com/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1619 |access-date=2024-12-14 |language=en |doi= |isbn=978-0-19-022863-7}}</ref>

Eden was hosting a dinner for King [[Feisal II]] of Iraq and his Prime Minister, [[Nuri es-Said]], when he learned the canal had been nationalised. They both unequivocally advised Eden to "hit Nasser hard, hit him soon, and hit him by yourself" – a stance shared by the vast majority of the British people in subsequent weeks. "There is a lot of humbug about Suez," [[Guy Millard]], one of Eden's private secretaries, later recorded. "People forget that the policy at the time was extremely popular." Leader of the Opposition [[Hugh Gaitskell]] was also at the dinner. He immediately agreed that military action might be inevitable, but warned Eden would have to keep the Americans closely informed.<ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|p=181}}</ref> After a session of the House of Commons expressed anger against the Egyptian action on 27 July, Eden justifiably believed that Parliament would support him; Gaitskell spoke for his party when he called the nationalisation a "high-handed and totally unjustifiable step".{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|8–9}} When Eden made a ministerial broadcast on the nationalisation, Labour declined its right to reply.<ref name="goodwin2005">{{Cite journal |last=Goodwin |first=Peter |date=2005 |title=Low Conspiracy? — Government interference in the BBC |journal=Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=96–118 |doi=10.16997/wpcc.10 |issn=1744-6708 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

However, in the days that followed, Gaitskell's support became more cautious. On 2 August he said of Nasser's behaviour, "It is all very familiar. It is exactly the same that we encountered from Mussolini and Hitler in those years before the war". He cautioned Eden, however, that "[w]e must not, therefore, allow ourselves to get into a position where we might be denounced in the [[United Nations Security Council|Security Council]] as aggressors, or where the majority of the [[United Nations General Assembly|Assembly]] was against us". He had earlier warned Eden that Labour might not support Britain acting alone against Egypt.{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|8–9}} In two letters to Eden sent on 3 and 10 August 1956, Gaitskell condemned Nasser but again warned that he would not support any action that violated the [[United Nations Charter]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|pp=231–232}}</ref> In his letter of 10 August, Gaitskell wrote:
{{Blockquote|Lest there should be any doubt in your mind about my personal attitude, let me say that I could not regard an armed attack on Egypt by ourselves and the French as justified by anything which Nasser has done so far or as consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Nor, in my opinion, would such an attack be justified in order to impose a system of international control over the Canal-desirable though this is. If, of course, the whole matter were to be taken to the United Nations and if Egypt were to be condemned by them as aggressors, then, of course, the position would be different. And if further action which amounted to obvious aggression by Egypt were taken by Nasser, then again it would be different. So far what Nasser has done amounts to a threat, a grave threat to us and to others, which certainly cannot be ignored; but it is only a threat, not in my opinion justifying retaliation by war.<ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|p=232}}</ref>}}

Two dozen Labour MPs issued a statement on 8 August stating that forcing Nasser to denationalise the canal against Egypt's wishes would violate the UN charter. Other opposition politicians were less conditional in their support. Former Labour Foreign Minister [[Herbert Morrison]] hinted that he would support unilateral action by the government.{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|9–10}} [[Jo Grimond]], who became [[Leader of the Liberal Party (UK)|Leader of the Liberal Party]] that November, thought if Nasser went unchallenged the whole Middle East would go his way.<ref name="Thorpe"/>

In Britain, the nationalisation was perceived as a direct threat to British interests. In a letter to the British Ambassador on 10 September 1956, [[Ivone Kirkpatrick]], the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office wrote: {{Blockquote|If we sit back while Nasser consolidates his position and gradually acquires control of the oil-bearing countries, he can and is, according to our information, resolved to wreck us. If Middle Eastern oil is denied to us for a year or two, our [[gold reserves]] will disappear. If our gold reserves disappear, the [[sterling area]] disintegrates. If the sterling area disintegrates and we have no reserves, we shall not be able to maintain a [[British Army of the Rhine|force in Germany]], or indeed, anywhere else. I doubt whether we shall be able to pay for the bare minimum necessary for our defence. And a country that cannot provide for its defence is finished.<ref>{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|pp=225–226}}</ref>}}

Direct military intervention, however, ran the risk of angering Washington and damaging Anglo-Arab relations.{{fact|date=July 2024}} As a result, the British government concluded a secret military pact with France and Israel that was aimed at regaining control over the Suez Canal.{{fact|date=July 2024}}