Editing Strategic voting (section)

== Pre-election influence ==
Strategic voting requires voters to be informed, as they can only gauge who is in the leading and who may not be a viable candidate through the information they are supplied.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Aldrich |first1=John |url=https://www.fulcrum.org/concern/monographs/c534fp904 |title=The Many Faces of Strategic Voting: Tactical Behavior in Electoral Systems Around the World |last2=Blais |first2=André |last3=Stephenson |first3=Laura |date=2018 |publisher=University of Michigan Press |isbn=978-0-472-13102-0 |location=Ann Arbor|page=106 |language=en |doi=10.3998/mpub.9946117}}</ref> Because strategic voting relies heavily on voters' perception of how other voters intend to vote, campaigns in electoral methods that promote compromise frequently focus on affecting voters' perception of campaign viability. Most campaigns craft refined media strategies to shape the way voters see their candidacy. During this phase, there can be an analogous effect where campaign donors and activists may decide whether or not to support candidates tactically with their money and time.

In [[Rolling election|rolling elections]], where some voters have information about previous voters' preferences (e.g. presidential [[Partisan primary|primaries]] in the United States), candidates put disproportionate resources into competing strongly in the first few stages, because those stages affect the reaction of later stages.

Perceived influence on other voters also interacts with strategic voting. In a study of the Israeli voting system, presumed media influence was found to be a variable in the case of why voters partake in strategic voting.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Cohen |first1=Jonathan |last2=Tsfati |first2=Yariv |date=2009-06-01 |title=The Influence of Presumed Media Influence on Strategic Voting |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0093650209333026 |journal=Communication Research |language=en |volume=36 |issue=3 |pages=359–378 |doi=10.1177/0093650209333026 |issn=0093-6502}}</ref> Because the Israeli electoral system is complex, with many parties, and parliamentary, this perceived media influence effect may have a larger and more observable effect on simpler systems such as the one in the United States. 

[[Game theory]] has been used to search for some kind of "minimally manipulable" ([[incentive compatibility]]) voting schemes. Game theory can also be used to analyze the pros and cons of different methods. For instance, when electors vote for their own preferences rather than tactically, [[Condorcet method]]-like methods tend to settle on compromise candidates, while [[instant-runoff voting]] favors those candidates with strong core support but otherwise narrower appeal due to holding more uncompromising positions. Thus, [[Condorcet methods]] incentivize candidates to position themselves closer to the [[median voter]] and appeal to a wider section of the electorate than [[instant-runoff voting]] does.<ref name="k899">{{cite journal | last=Robinette | first=Robbie | title=Implications of strategic position choices by candidates | journal=[[Constitutional Political Economy]] | volume=34 | issue=3 | date=2023 | issn=1043-4062 | doi=10.1007/s10602-022-09378-6 | doi-access=free | pages=445–457}}</ref><ref name="r517">{{cite journal | last=Ogren | first=Marcus | title=Candidate incentive distributions: How voting methods shape electoral incentives | journal=[[Electoral Studies]] | publisher=Elsevier BV | volume=90 | year=2024 | issn=0261-3794 | doi=10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102799 | arxiv=2306.07147 | page=102799}}</ref>{{rp|Fig 4.1}}