Editing Richard Helms (section)

==Secrets: policy, politics==
During the mid-1970s in the United States, an emerging public attitude against CIA malfeasance had become mainstream. Consequently, politicians no longer deigned to countenance a blanket exception to "what-might-be-questionable" CIA activities. With regard to the application of the Constitution, henceforth all USG agencies were expected to conform explicitly to usual principles of transparency. Earlier, Helms had given testimony about prior covert CIA actions in Chile, at a time when he considered that older, pre-existing, informal understandings concerning the CIA still prevailed in Congress. This testimony was later judged under the new rules, which led to his perjury indictment in a court of law. His advocates thus claimed that Helms was unfairly held to a form of double standard.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 343–344.</ref><ref>Helms (2002) p. 445.</ref>

===Year of intelligence===
[[File:Otis G Pike.jpg|thumb|150px|Rep. [[Otis Pike]]]]

During the 1960s and 1970s, there was a dramatic, fundamental shift in American society generally, which profoundly affected public political behavior. Elected officials were compelled to confront new constituents with new attitudes. In particular, for the Central Intelligence Agency, the societal change altered notions of what was considered 'politically acceptable conduct'.<ref>Cf., Ranelagh (1986) pp. 530–531. The Watergate scandal focused the new attitudes on the accountability of elected government, including oversight of the CIA.</ref> In the early cold war period, the Agency had been somewhat exempt from normal standards of accountability, so that it could employ its special espionage and covert capacities against what was understood as an amoral communist enemy. At times during this period, the CIA operated under a cloak of secrecy, where it met the ideological foe in a gray-and-black world. In that era, normal congressional oversight was informally modified to block unwanted public scrutiny, which might be useful to the enemy.<ref>The congressional seniority system then functioned more effectively, which allowed the committee chair wide discretion. Cf., Colby (1978) p. 309.</ref><ref>Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) pp. 90–92.</ref>

[[File:Sam Ervin.jpg|thumb|150px|left|Senator [[Sam Ervin]], ''Watergate'' chairman.]]
An immediate cause of the surge in congressional oversight activity may be sourced in the American people's loss of confidence in the USG due to the Watergate scandal. Also, the apparent distortions and dishonesty concerning the reported progress of the war in Vietnam gravely eroded the public's previous tendency to put its trust in the word of USG officials. Evidence published in 1971 had demonstrated "systemized abuse of power" by [[J. Edgar Hoover]], the FBI director.<ref>Betty Medsger, ''The Burglary. The discovery of J. Edgar Hoover's secret FBI'' (New York: Knopf 2014). The initial published evidence of Hoover's illegality was obtained by unknown informants who burglarized an FBI office in Media, PA. Book review by James Rosen in the ''Wall Street Journal'', January 31, 2014, p. A11.</ref> The September 1973 overthrow of a democratically elected government in Chile ultimately revealed earlier CIA involvement there.<ref>See above, section "Chile: Allende".</ref> Other factors contributed to the political unease, e.g., the prevalence of conspiracy theories about the Kennedy assassination, and the emergence of whistleblowers. Accordingly, the Central Intelligence Agency, which was tangentially involved in Watergate,<ref>See above, section under Nixon presidency, "RN: Watergate".</ref> and which had been directly engaged in the Vietnam War from the beginning,<ref>See above, sections under Johnson presidency.</ref> became a subject of congressional inquiry and media interest. Helms, of course, had served as head of the CIA, 1965–73. Eventually the process of scrutiny opened a pandora's box of questionable CIA secret activities.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) on the media and official investigations, pp. 571–577, 584–599; re whistleblowers, esp. [[Victor Marchetti]], pp. 536–538; CIA dissenters, e.g., [[Philip Agee]], pp. 471–472.</ref>

First, the Senate, in order to investigate charges of [[Watergate scandal|political malfeasance in the 1972 presidential election]],<ref>See above, section "RN: Watergate".</ref> had created the select [[Watergate Committee]], chaired by Senator Sam Ervin. Later, independent press discovery of the CIA's domestic spying, ([[Operation Chaos]]), created national headlines.<ref>See above, section "Domestic ''Chaos''".</ref> Thereafter, a long list of questionable CIA activities surfaced which caught the public's attention, and were nicknamed the [[Family jewels (Central Intelligence Agency)|family jewels]]. Both the Senate, (January 1975), and the House, (February 1975), created select committees to investigate intelligence matters. Senator [[Frank Church]] headed one, and Representative [[Otis Pike]] headed the other. In an effort to head off such inquiries, President Gerald Ford had created a Commission chaired by Vice President [[Nelson Rockefeller]], whose seminal interest was the CIA's recent foray into collecting intelligence on Americans.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 426–430, 432.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) p. 337.</ref><ref>Turner (2005) 147–148.</ref> 1975 would become known as the "Year of Intelligence".<ref>Prados (2009) 295–296.</ref>

===Before Congress===
Helms testified in appearances before Congress many times during his long career.<ref>E.g., subsection "Soviet forgeries" during Kennedy presidency, in [[Richard Helms, early career]].</ref> After he left the CIA in 1973, however, he entered an extraordinary period in which he was frequently called to testify before congressional committees. While serving as ambassador to Iran (1973–1977), Helms was required to travel from Tehran to Washington sixteen times, thirteen in order to give testimony "before various official bodies of investigation" including the [[United States President's Commission on CIA Activities within the United States|President's ''Rockefeller'' Commission]]. Among the congressional committee hearings where Helms appeared were the [[Senate Watergate Committee|Senate Watergate]], the [[Church Committee|Senate Church]],<ref>Senator Frank Church of Idaho had chaired the ''Multinationals Subcommittee'' in 1972. It had investigated [[ITT Corporation]]'s anti-[[Salvador Allende|Allende]] activities in Chile in 1970, and involved the CIA (p. 263). Sampson, ''The Sovereign State of ITT'' (1973, 1974) pp. 260–266.</ref> the Senate Intelligence, the Senate Foreign Relations, the Senate Armed Services, the [[Pike Committee|House ''Pike'']], the House Armed Services, and the House Foreign Affairs.<ref>Powers (1979) p. 341: testify (quote).</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 610–612, 788.</ref>

[[File:FrankChurch.jpg|thumb|125px|Sen. [[Frank Church]]]]
As a long-time professional practitioner, Helms held strong views concerning the proper functioning of an intelligence agency. Highly valued was the notion of maintaining state security by keeping sensitive state secrets away from an enemy's probing awareness. Secrecy was held to be an essential, utilitarian virtue, of great value to the government. It was necessary in the conduct of both surreptitious information gathering, i.e., espionage, and in covert operations, i.e., the reputed ability to directly intervene by stealth in the course of political events. Consequently, Helms became utterly dismayed at the various investigations of USG intelligence agencies, especially when they resulted in the publication or broadcast of classified information, highly sensitive, that had previously remained secret. For example, among the information divulged were facts that exposed Richard Welch, the CIA station chief in Athens, who subsequently was murdered.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 432–434.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 472 (death of agent Richard Welch in Athens).</ref> At points during the many hours of testimony given by Helms before Congress, his frustration and irritation with the direction of the proceedings are clearly discernible.<ref>Cf., the youtube.com videos of his congressional testimony cited in the Bibliography below.</ref>

In testifying before Congress, both former DCIs [[John McCone]] and Richard Helms were informed beforehand by a CIA officer as to what documents Congress had been given and hence the probable contours of its knowledge. According to author [[Thomas Powers]], both McCone and Helms could thus tailor their testimony so as to limit the scope of discussion to matter already known by the committee. Such stance of institutional loyalty to their agency showed through in their demeanor.

<blockquote>From these characteristic evasions, lapses of memory, hints, and suggestions the [Church] committee and its staff concluded that the men they questioned, including Helms, knew more than they would say. Then why did many of them grow to trust Helms? For the simple reason that he never tried to convince them they knew all there was to know, when they did not.<ref>Powers (1979) p. 342.</ref></blockquote>

Helms' testimony, which made headlines, amounted for the most part to a circumspect, professional defense of the agency.<ref>The testimony before Congress which got Helms into trouble had been made earlier in 1973 concerning Chile. See below, section "Plea, aftermath".</ref> It was rather the testimony of William Colby the current DCI that had more lasting import and created greater controversy. Colby also sparked division within the CIA. Helms parted ways with Colby as a result, and especially regarding Colby's delicate role in the perjury allegations against him.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 614.</ref><ref>Cf., Prados (2009) p. 306.</ref>

===Plea, aftermath===
An especially thorny issue concerned the interpretation of the secrecy which the CIA had previously enjoyed. According to its officers, the CIA's mandate included not only access to state secrets, but also the commission of covert action in furtherance of USG policy, as ordered from time to time by the President. Consequently, the CIA had a primary duty to protect such secrets and to refrain from public discussion of any covert or clandestine activity. An area of conflict arose when this CIA duty of confidentiality to the President came into direct conflict with the Agency's duty to respond honestly to legislative investigations of the executive branch authorized by the Constitution. Up until then, such potential conflict had been negotiated by quiet understandings between Congress and the CIA.<ref>Senate [Church] (1976) ''Book I'', at 31–40.</ref>

For Helms, the potential conflict became manifest with regard to his 1973 testimony about secret CIA activity during 1970 in Chile, ordered by President Nixon. At some point, the recorded facts of Helms's testimony ostensibly moved to territory outside the perimeters of the previously prevailing quiet and confidential understandings with Congress, and entered an arena in which new and different rules applied: those of transparency.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 59–61.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 611–612.</ref>

In late 1972, Nixon had appointed Helms as Ambassador to Iran. During his confirmation hearings before the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]] in February, 1973, Helms was questioned concerning the CIA's earlier role in Chile. Because these past operations were then still effectively a state secret, and because the Senate hearings were public events, Helms, following past congressional understandings with the CIA, in effect, denied that the CIA had, in 1970, aided the Chilean opponents of President-elect Allende.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 413–415. A few days later Helms gave similar testimony about the CIA in Chile to another Senate committee investing multinational corporations: about its 1970 secret dealings with [[International Telephone and Telegraph]] (ITT Corp).</ref><ref>Prados (2009) p. 290.</ref><ref>See above section on Chile, during the Nixon presidency.</ref>

After Nixon's 1974 [[Nixon Resignation|resignation]], information uncovered in 1975 by the Church Committee hearings showed that Helms's February 1973 statements were clearly in error. He had misled Congress. Helms was prosecuted in 1977. Later that year, Helms pled [[nolo contendere]] to two lesser, [[misdemeanor]] charges that he had not "fully, completely and accurately" testified to Congress.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Marro |first=Anthony |date=1977-11-01 |title=HELMS, EX-C.I.A. CHIEF, PLEADS NO CONTEST TO 2 MISDEMEANORS |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1977/11/01/archives/helmsexcia-chief-pleads-no-contest-to-2-misdemeanors-case-tied-to.html |access-date=2022-06-09 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> He received a two-year suspended sentence and a $2,000 fine.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 441–446. Helms retained his government pension.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) pp. 347–353.</ref><ref>Colby (1978) p. 386 (quote re lesser charge).</ref>

[[File:James Jesus Angleton.jpg|thumb|125px|[[James Angleton]], former CIA official]]
After the plea, at sentencing, [[Barrington D. Parker]], the federal Judge, delivered a stern lecture. No citizen has "a license to operate freely outside the dictates of the law. ... Public officials must respect and honor the Constitution ..."

<blockquote>You considered yourself bound to protect the Agency [and so] to dishonor your solemn oath to tell the truth...If public officials embark deliberately on a course to disobey and ignore the laws of our land because of some misguided and ill-conceived notion and belief that there are earlier commitments and considerations which they must observe, the future of our country is in jeopardy.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 351, 352.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 612.</ref></blockquote>

Helms, nonetheless, continued to enjoy the support of many in the CIA, both active officers and retired veterans, including [[James Angleton]].<ref>Theoharis (2005) p. 240. Angleton contributed to Helms' defense fund.</ref> "He was sworn not to disclose the very things that he was being requested by the [Senate] Committee to disclose," [[Edward Bennett Williams]], Helms's defense attorney, told the press. Williams added that Helms would "wear this conviction like a badge of honor, like a banner", a sentiment later seconded by [[James R. Schlesinger]], who had followed Helms as DCI in 1973.<ref>Woodward (1988) p. 26 (Williams "badge" quote), 43 (Schlesinger).</ref><ref>Powers (1979) pp. 352–353 (Williams "disclose" quote).</ref> After his court appearance and sentencing, Helms attended a large gathering of CIA officers in Bethesda, Maryland, where he received a standing ovation. A collection was taken, netting enough to pay his fine.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 445–446.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) p. 353.</ref>

Although Helms, at that time, might have appeared as an emblematic upholder of the Agency's work, for years, the "memory of his no-contest plea still stung. It was a stain in spite of the widespread support he had received." By 1983, however, "the end of the anti-CIA decade"{{Citation needed|date=October 2015}} had arrived. As Helms took the podium to speak, he was given a "returning war hero's welcome" by top USG officials and hundreds of guests at the Grand Ballroom of the Washington Hilton. "I am touched and honored. My reasons can be no mystery to any of you."<ref>Woodward (1988) p. 26 ("memory" quote), p. 280 (Helms quote).</ref><ref>See below, section "Later years".</ref>