Editing Red Army (section)

===Purges===
{{Further|Case of the Trotskyist Anti-Soviet Military Organization}}
[[File:Tuchaczewski 1920.jpg|thumb|left|120px|Red Army Marshal [[Mikhail Tukhachevsky]], who was executed during the [[Great Purge]] in June 1937. Here in 1920 wearing the [[budenovka]].]]
According to  the new data that emerged on the break of the 21st century,<ref name=zs-vesna>[https://web.archive.org/web/20070927200818/http://www.znanie-sila.ru/online/issue2print_2471.html Операция «Весна»], ''[[Znanie — Sila|Zanie–Sila]]'' magazine, no. 11, 2003</ref> The [[Vesna Case]] (also known as "Operation Vesna") of 1930–1931 was massive [[Soviet political repressions|Soviet repressions]] targeting [[Tsarist officers in the Red Army|former officers and generals of the Russian Imperial Army]] who had served in the Red Army and [[Soviet Navy]], a major purge of the Red Army preceding the Great Purge. According to over 3,000 group cases in Moscow, Leningrad and Ukraine, over 10,000 persons were convicted. In particular, in May 1931, in Leningrad alone over 1,000 persons were executed according to the so-called "Guards Case" ({{langx|ru|Гвардейское дело}}).<ref name=encspb>{{Cite web|url=http://encspb.ru/object/2804021801|title=Энциклопедия Санкт-Петербурга|access-date=5 July 2024|archive-date=3 July 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190703001800/http://encspb.ru/object/2804021801|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>Whitewood, Peter (2015) [https://ray.yorksj.ac.uk/id/eprint/1585/ {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240705181809/https://ray.yorksj.ac.uk/id/eprint/1585/ |date=5 July 2024 }} Subversion in the Red Army and the Military Purge of 1937–1938''. ''Europe-Asia Studies'', 67 (1). pp. 102–122.</ref>

The late 1930s saw purges of the Red Army leadership which occurred concurrently with Stalin's [[Great Purge]] of Soviet society. In 1936 and 1937, at the orders of Stalin, thousands of Red Army senior officers were dismissed from their commands. The purges had the objective of cleansing the Red Army of the "politically unreliable elements," mainly among higher-ranking officers. This inevitably provided a convenient pretext for the settling of personal vendettas or to eliminate competition by officers seeking the same command. Many army, corps, and divisional commanders were sacked: most were imprisoned or sent to labor camps; others were executed. Among the victims was the Red Army's primary military theorist, Marshal [[Mikhail Tukhachevsky]], who was perceived by Stalin as a potential political rival.<ref>{{Cite book|title = Joseph Stalin: A Biographical Companion|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=lsKClpnX8qwC|publisher = ABC-CLIO|date = 1999|isbn = 978-1576070840|language = en|first = Helen|last = Rappaport}}</ref> Officers who remained soon found all of their decisions being closely examined by political officers, even in mundane matters such as record-keeping and field training exercises.{{Sfn | Merridale | 2007 | p = 70}} An atmosphere of fear and unwillingness to take the initiative soon pervaded the Red Army; suicide rates among junior officers rose to record levels.{{Sfn | Merridale | 2007 | p = 70}} The purges significantly impaired the combat capabilities of the Red Army. Hoyt concludes "the Soviet defense system was damaged to the point of incompetence" and stresses "the fear in which high officers lived."<ref>Edwin P. Hoyt. ''199 Days: The Battle for Stalingrad'' (1999) p 20</ref> Clark says, "Stalin not only cut the heart out of the army, he also gave it brain damage."<ref>{{cite book|author=Lloyd Clark|title=The Battle of the Tanks: Kursk, 1943|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Z97QrFfY3vAC&pg=PA55|year=2011|publisher=Grove/Atlantic, Incorporated|page=55|isbn=978-0802195104}}</ref> Lewin identifies three serious results: the loss of experienced and well-trained senior officers; the distrust it caused among potential allies especially France; and the encouragement it gave Germany.<ref>{{cite book|author=Eyal Lewin|title=National Resilience During War: Refining the Decision-making Model|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=z7QRbP_BLFMC&pg=PA259|year=2012|publisher=Lexington Books|pages=259–260|isbn=978-0739174586}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=Ilai Z. Saltzman|title=Securitizing Balance of Power Theory: A Polymorphic Reconceptualization|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LovlchEFqxIC&pg=PA85|year=2012|publisher=Lexington Books|pages=85–86|isbn=978-0739170717}}</ref>

Recently declassified data indicated that in 1937, at the height of the Purges, the Red Army had 114,300 officers, of whom 11,034 were dismissed. In 1938, the Red Army had 179,000 officers, 56% more than in 1937, of whom a further 6,742 were dismissed. In the highest echelons of the Red Army the Purges removed 3 of 5 marshals, 13 of 15 army generals, 8 of 9 admirals, 50 of 57 army corps generals, 154 out of 186 division generals, all 16 army commissars, and 25 of 28 army corps commissars.<ref>{{Citation | first = Alan | last = Bullock | title = Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives | place = New York | publisher = Vintage Books | year = 1993 | page = 489}}.</ref>

The result was that the Red Army officer corps in 1941 had many inexperienced senior officers. While 60% of regimental commanders had two years or more of command experience in June 1941, and almost 80% of rifle division commanders, only 20% of corps commanders, and 5% or fewer army and military district commanders, had the same level of experience.{{Sfn | Glantz | 1998 | p = 58}}

The significant growth of the Red Army during the high point of the purges may have worsened matters. In 1937, the Red Army numbered around 1.3&nbsp;million, increasing to almost three times that number by June 1941. The rapid growth of the army necessitated in turn the rapid promotion of officers regardless of experience or training.{{Sfn | Merridale | 2007 | p = 70}} Junior officers were appointed to fill the ranks of the senior leadership, many of whom lacked broad experience.{{Sfn | Merridale | 2007 | p = 70}} This action in turn resulted in many openings at the lower level of the officer corps, which were filled by new graduates from the service academies. In 1937, the entire junior class of one academy was graduated a year early to fill vacancies in the Red Army.{{Sfn | Merridale | 2007 | p = 70}} Hamstrung by inexperience and fear of reprisals, many of these new officers failed to impress the large numbers of incoming draftees to the ranks; complaints of insubordination rose to the top of offenses punished in 1941,{{Sfn | Merridale | 2007 | p = 70}} and may have exacerbated instances of Red Army soldiers deserting their units during the initial phases of the German offensive of that year.{{Sfn | Merridale | 2007 | p = 70}}

By 1940, Stalin began to relent, restoring approximately one-third of previously dismissed officers to duty.{{Sfn | Merridale | 2007 | p = 70}} However, the effect of the purges would soon manifest itself in the [[Winter War]] of 1940, where Red Army forces generally performed poorly against the much smaller Finnish Army, and later during the [[Operation Barbarossa|German invasion]] of 1941, in which the Germans were able to rout the Soviet defenders partially due to inexperience amongst the Soviet officers.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Middleton|first=Drew|date=1981-06-21|title=Hitler's Russian Blunder |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/21/magazine/hitler-s-russian-blunder.html|url-status=live|journal=New York Times Magazine|pages=6006031|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180125213454/https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/21/magazine/hitler-s-russian-blunder.html|archive-date=2018-01-25}}</ref>