Editing Rationality (section)

===Max Weber===
[[File:MaxWeber1919FotoLeifGeiges.jpg|thumb|right|[[Germany|German]] scholar [[Max Weber]] notably articulated a theory of rationality that divided human capacity to think through things in four ways.<ref name=kalberg>{{cite journal|url=https://www.bu.edu/sociology/files/2010/03/Weberstypes.pdf|jstor=2778894|last1=Kalberg|first1=Stephen|title=Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History|journal=American Journal of Sociology|year=1980|volume=85|issue=5|pages=1145–1179|doi=10.1086/227128|s2cid=16388036|access-date=2020-04-08|archive-date=2020-11-14|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201114000510/http://www.bu.edu/sociology/files/2010/03/Weberstypes.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>]]

The German scholar [[Max Weber]] proposed an interpretation of [[Social actions|social action]] that distinguished between four different [[ideal type|idealized types]] of rationality.<ref name=kalberg/>

The first, which he called ''Zweckrational'' or purposive/[[instrumental rationality]], is related to the expectations about the behavior of other human beings or objects in the environment. These expectations serve as means for a particular actor to attain ends, ends which Weber noted were "rationally pursued and calculated."{{cite quote|date=June 2021}} The second type, Weber called ''Wertrational'' or value/belief-oriented. Here the action is undertaken for what one might call reasons intrinsic to the actor: some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other motives, independent of whether it will lead to success. The third type was affectual, determined by an actor's specific affect, feeling, or emotion—to which Weber himself said that this was a kind of rationality that was on the borderline of what he considered "meaningfully oriented." The fourth was traditional or conventional, determined by ingrained habituation. Weber emphasized that it was very unusual to find only one of these orientations: combinations were the norm. His usage also makes clear that he considered the first two as more significant than the others, and it is arguable that the third and fourth are subtypes of the first two.

The advantage in Weber's interpretation of rationality is that it avoids a value-laden assessment, say, that certain kinds of beliefs are irrational. Instead, Weber suggests that ground or motive can be given—for religious or affect reasons, for example—that may meet the criterion of explanation or justification even if it is not an explanation that fits the ''Zweckrational'' orientation of means and ends. The opposite is therefore also true: some means-ends explanations will not satisfy those whose grounds for action are ''Wertrational''.

Weber's constructions of rationality have been critiqued both from a [[Jürgen Habermas|Habermasian]] (1984) perspective (as devoid of social context and under-theorised in terms of social power)<ref>[[Jürgen Habermas]] (1984) ''The Theory of Communicative Action Volume&nbsp;1; Reason and the Rationalization of Society'', Cambridge: Polity Press.</ref> and also from a [[feminist]] perspective (Eagleton, 2003) whereby Weber's rationality constructs are viewed as imbued with masculine values and oriented toward the maintenance of male power.<ref>Eagleton, M. (ed) (2003) ''A Concise Companion to Feminist Theory'', Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.{{page needed|date=July 2019}}</ref> An alternative position on rationality (which includes both [[bounded rationality]],<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hawkins |first1=David |last2=Simon |first2=Herbert A. |title=Note: Some Conditions of Macroeconomic Stability |journal=Econometrica |date=July 1949 |volume=17 |issue=3/4 |pages=245–8 |doi=10.2307/1905526 |jstor=1905526 }}</ref> as well as the affective and value-based arguments of Weber) can be found in the critique of Etzioni (1988),<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Etzioni |first1=Amitai |title=Normative-affective factors: Toward a new decision-making model |journal=Journal of Economic Psychology |date=June 1988 |volume=9 |issue=2 |pages=125–150 |doi=10.1016/0167-4870(88)90048-7 |s2cid=17871420 }} Republished in: {{cite book |doi=10.1007/978-3-662-03900-7_5 |chapter=Normative-Affective Factors: Toward a New Decision-Making Model |title=Essays in Socio-Economics |pages=91–119 |series=Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy |year=1999 |last1=Etzioni |first1=Amitai |isbn=978-3-642-08415-7 }}</ref> who reframes thought on decision-making to argue for a reversal of the position put forward by Weber. Etzioni illustrates how purposive/instrumental reasoning is subordinated by normative considerations (ideas on how people 'ought' to behave) and affective considerations (as a support system for the development of human relationships).