Editing Problem of universals (section)

==Positions<!--'Extreme realism', 'Exaggerated realism' and 'Strong realism' redirect here--> ==
There are many philosophical positions regarding universals.

# [[Platonic realism]] (also called '''extreme realism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->"<ref name="IEP2">MacLeod & Rubenstein (2006), §3.</ref><ref name=":12">Herbert Hochberg, "Nominalism and Idealism," ''Axiomathes'', June 2013, '''23'''(2), pp. 213–234.</ref> or '''exaggerated realism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->)<ref name=Catholic>[[wikisource:Catholic Encyclopedia (1913)/Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism|Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism – ''Catholic Encyclopedia'' (1913)]]</ref><ref>Christian Rode (ed.), ''A Companion to Responses to Ockham'', BRILL, 2016, p. 154.</ref> is the view that universals or [[Platonic forms|forms]] in this sense, are the causal explanation behind the notion of what things exactly are; (the view that universals are real entities existing independent of particulars).
# Aristotelian realism (also called '''strong realism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--><ref name="IEP2" /><ref name=":12" /> or [[moderate realism]])<ref name=Catholic/> is the rejection of extreme realism. This position establishes the view of a universal as being that of the quality within a thing and every other thing individual to it; (the view that universals are real entities, but their existence is dependent on the particulars that exemplify them).
# [[Anti-realism]] is the objection to both positions. Anti-realism is divided into two subcategories; (1) [[Nominalism]] and (2) [[Conceptualism]].

Taking "beauty" as example, each of these positions will state the following:

* Beauty is a property that exists in an ideal form independently of any mind or description.
* Beauty is a property that exists only when beautiful things exist.
* Beauty is a property constructed in the mind, so exists only in descriptions of things.

===Realism<!--Linked from 'Philosophical realism'-->===
{{main|Metaphysical realism}}
The school of realism makes the claim that universals are real and that they exist distinctly, apart from the particulars that instantiate them. Two major forms of metaphysical realism are [[Platonic realism]] (''universalia ante res''), meaning "'universals before things'"<ref name="Stanford Universals" /> and Aristotelian realism (''universalia in rebus''), meaning "'universals in things'".<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|last1=Orilia|first1=Francesco|article=Properties|date=2017|article-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/properties/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2017|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2019-02-26|last2=Swoyer|first2=Chris}}</ref> ''Platonic realism'' is the view that universals are real entities existing independent of particulars. ''Aristotelian realism'', on the other hand, is the view that universals are real entities, but their existence is dependent on the particulars that exemplify them.

Realists tend to argue that universals must be posited as distinct entities in order to account for various phenomena. A common realist argument said to be found in Plato's writings, is that universals are required for certain general words to have meaning and for the sentences in which they occur to be true or false. Take the sentence "[[Djivan Gasparyan]] is a musician" for instance. The realist may claim that this sentence is only meaningful and expresses a truth because there is an individual, Djivan Gasparyan, who possesses a certain quality: musicianship. Therefore, it is assumed that the property is a universal which is distinct from the particular individual who has the property.<ref>(MacLeod & Rubenstein, 2006, §1b)</ref>

===Nominalism<!--Linked from 'Anti-realism'-->===
{{main|Nominalism}}
Nominalists assert that only individuals or particulars exist and deny that universals are real (i.e. that they exist as entities or beings; ''universalia post res''). The term "nominalism" comes from the Latin ''nomen'' ("name"). Four major forms of nominalism are [[predicate nominalism]], [[resemblance nominalism]], [[trope nominalism]], and [[conceptualism]].<ref name="IEP2"/> One with a nominalist view claims that we predicate the same property of/to multiple entities, but argues that the entities only share a name and do not have a real quality in common.

Nominalists often argue this view by claiming that nominalism can account for all the relevant phenomena, and therefore—by [[Occam's razor]], and its principle of simplicity—nominalism is preferable, since it posits fewer entities. Different variants and versions of nominalism have been endorsed or defended by many, including [[Chrysippus]],<ref>John Sellars, ''Stoicism'', Routledge, 2014, pp. 84–85: "[Stoics] have often been presented as the first nominalists, rejecting the existence of universal concepts altogether. ... For Chrysippus there are no universal entities, whether they be conceived as substantial [[Platonic Forms]] or in some other manner.".</ref><ref>{{cite web| url = https://www.iep.utm.edu/chrysipp/| title = Chrysippus (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)}}</ref> [[Ibn Taymiyyah]],<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last=Marzouki|first=Abou Yaareb|title=Isla'h al-'Aql fi al-Falsafah al-'Arabiyyah: Min waqi'iyyat Aflatun wa Aristo Ila Ismiyyat Ibn Taymiyyah wa Ibn Khaldun|publisher=Center for Arab Unity Studies|year=1994|location=Beirut|script-title=ar: إصلاح العقل في الفلسفة العربية: من واقعية أفلاطون وأرسطو إلى اسمية ابن تيمية وابن خلدون|trans-title=Reformation of Reason in Arabic Philosophy: from the Realism of Plato and Aristotle to the Nominalism of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldun|author-link=Mohamed Habib Marzouki}}</ref> [[William of Ockham]], [[Ibn Khaldun]],<ref name=":1" /> [[Rudolf Carnap]],<ref name=":0">{{cite web| url = https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/resemblance-nominalism-a-solution-to-the-problem-of-universals/| title = "Review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, ''Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals''" – ndpr.nd.edu| date = 7 February 2004| last1 = MacBride| first1 = Fraser}}</ref> [[Nelson Goodman]],<ref>{{cite encyclopedia| url = https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goodman/supplement.html| title = "Nelson Goodman: The Calculus of Individuals in its different versions"|encyclopedia= Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> [[David Kellogg Lewis|David Lewis]],<ref name=":0" /> [[H. H. Price]],<ref name=":0" /> and [[D. C. Williams]].<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/williams-dc/|title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|first1=Keith|last1=Campbell|first2=James|last2=Franklin|first3=Douglas|last3=Ehring|chapter=Donald Cary Williams |editor-first1=Edward N.|editor-last1=Zalta|editor-first2=Uri|editor-last2=Nodelman|date=August 26, 2023|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|via=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>

=== Conceptualism ===
[[Conceptualism]] is a position that is meshed between realism and nominalism. Conceptualists believe that universals can indeed be real, but only existing as concepts within the mind.<ref name="universals">"Conceptualism." The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Simon Blackburn. Oxford University Press, 1996. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. 8 April 2008.</ref> Conceptualists argue that the "concept" of universals are not mere "inventions but are reflections of similarities among particular things themselves."<ref>{{Cite book|title="conceptualism." The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed.. . Encyclopedia.com. 12 Mar. 2019 <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.}}</ref> For example, the concept of 'man' ultimately reflects a similarity amongst Socrates and Kant.