Editing Pleasure (section)

=== Cognitive biases ===
A ''[[cognitive bias]]'' is a systematic tendency of thinking and judging in a way that deviates from a normative criterion, especially from the demands of [[rationality]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Litvak |first1=P. |last2=Lerner |first2=J. S. |title=The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences |date=2009 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LITCB |chapter=Cognitive Bias}}</ref> Cognitive biases in regard to ''pleasure'' include the ''[[peak–end rule]]'', the ''[[Daniel Kahneman#Focusing illusion|focusing illusion]]'',  the ''nearness bias'' and the ''future bias''.

The ''peak–end rule'' affects how we remember the pleasantness or unpleasantness of experiences. It states that our overall impression of past events is determined for the most part not by the total pleasure and suffering it contained but by how it felt at its ''peaks'' and at its ''end''.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Do |first1=Amy M. |last2=Rupert |first2=Alexander V. |last3=Wolford |first3=George |title=Evaluations of pleasurable experiences: The peak–end rule |journal=Psychonomic Bulletin & Review |date=1 February 2008 |volume=15 |issue=1 |pages=96–98 |doi=10.3758/PBR.15.1.96 |pmid=18605486 |language=en |issn=1531-5320|doi-access=free }}</ref> For example, the memory of a painful [[colonoscopy]] is improved if the examination is extended by three minutes in which the scope is still inside but not moved anymore, resulting in a moderately uncomfortable sensation. This extended colonoscopy, despite involving more pain overall, is remembered less negatively due to the reduced pain at the end. This even increases the likelihood for the patient to return for subsequent procedures.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Redelmeier |first1=Donald A. |last2=Katz |first2=Joel |last3=Kahneman |first3=Daniel |title=Memories of colonoscopy: a randomized trial |journal=Pain |date=July 2003 |volume=104 |issue=1–2 |pages=187–194 |doi=10.1016/s0304-3959(03)00003-4 |pmid=12855328 |url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12855328/ |issn=0304-3959|hdl=10315/7959 |s2cid=206055276 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> [[Daniel Kahneman]] explains this distortion in terms of the difference between [[Thinking, Fast and Slow#Two selves|two selves]]: the ''experiencing self'', which is aware of pleasure and pain as they are happening, and the ''remembering self'', which shows the aggregate pleasure and pain over an extended period of time. The distortions due to the ''peak–end rule'' happen on the level of the ''remembering self''. Our tendency to rely on the ''remembering self'' can often lead us to pursue courses of action that are not in our best self-interest.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kahneman |first1=Daniel |title=Thinking, Fast and Slow |date=2011 |publisher=New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KAHTFA-2 |chapter=35. Two Selves}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Lazari-Radek |first1=Katarzyna de |last2=Singer |first2=Peter |title=The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics |date=2014 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LAZTPO-7 |page=276}}</ref>

A closely related bias is the ''focusing illusion''. The "illusion" occurs when people consider the impact of one specific factor on their overall happiness. They tend to greatly exaggerate the importance of that factor, while overlooking the numerous other factors that would in most cases have a greater impact.<ref>{{cite journal|author2-link=Daniel Kahneman |last1=Schkade |first1=David A. |last2=Kahneman |first2=Daniel |title=Does Living in California Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction |journal=Psychological Science |date=6 May 2016 |volume=9 |issue=5 |pages=340–346 |doi=10.1111/1467-9280.00066 |s2cid=14091201 |url=http://web.mit.edu/curhan/www/docs/Articles/biases/9_Psychological_Science_340_(Schkade).pdf |language=en |issn=1467-9280}}</ref>

The ''nearness bias'' and the ''future bias'' are two different forms of violating the principle of ''temporal neutrality''. This principle states that the temporal location of a benefit or a harm is not important for its normative significance: a rational agent should care to the same extent about all parts of their life.<ref name="Dorsey">{{cite journal |last1=Dorsey |first1=Dale |title=A Near-Term Bias Reconsidered |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2019 |volume=99 |issue=2 |pages=461–477 |doi=10.1111/phpr.12496 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DORANB}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Brink |first1=David O. |title=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BRIPFT |chapter=Prospects for Temporal Neutrality|year=2011 }}</ref> The ''nearness bias'', also discussed under the labels "[[present bias]]" or "[[Time preference#Temporal discounting|temporal discounting]]", refers to our tendency to violate ''temporal neutrality'' in regards to temporal distance from the present. On the positive side, we prefer pleasurable experiences to be near rather than distant. On the negative side, we prefer painful experiences to be distant rather than near.<ref name="Greene">{{cite journal |last1=Greene |first1=Preston |last2=Sullivan |first2=Meghan |title=Against Time Bias |journal=Ethics |date=2015 |volume=125 |issue=4 |pages=947–970 |doi=10.1086/680910 |hdl=10220/40397 |s2cid=142294499 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GREATB-2|hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Greene2">{{cite journal |last1=Greene |first1=Preston |last2=Holcombe |first2=Alex |last3=Latham |first3=Andrew James |last4=Miller |first4=Kristie |last5=Norton |first5=James |title=The Rationality of Near Bias Toward Both Future and Past Events |journal=Review of Philosophy and Psychology |date=2021 |volume=12 |issue=4 |pages=905–922 |doi=10.1007/s13164-020-00518-1 |s2cid=230797064 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GRETRO-49}}</ref><ref name="Dorsey"/> The ''future bias'' refers to our tendency to violate ''temporal neutrality'' in regards to the direction of time. On the positive side, we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in the future rather than in the past. On the negative side, we prefer painful experiences to be in the past rather than in the future.<ref name="Greene"/><ref name="Greene2"/>