Editing Oliver Cromwell (section)

===Military assessment===
{{Main article|New Model Army}}
Cromwell has been credited for the formation of the New Model Army. As a member of Parliament, he contributed significantly to the reforms contained in the [[Self-Denying Ordinance]], passed by Parliament in early 1645. The ordinance was enacted partly in response to the failure to capitalise on victory at Marston Moor. It decreed that the army be "remodeled" on a national basis, replacing the old county associations. It also forced members of the [[House of Commons of England|House of Commons]] and the [[House of Lords|Lords]], such as Manchester, to choose between civil office and military command. All of them except Cromwell chose to renounce their military positions. In contrast, Cromwell's commission was given continued extensions and he was allowed to remain in Parliament.<ref name="bcw">{{Cite web |title=Oliver Cromwell |url=http://bcw-project.org/biography/oliver-cromwell |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170809124158/http://bcw-project.org/biography/oliver-cromwell |archive-date=9 August 2017 |access-date=6 August 2017 |publisher=British Civil Wars Project}}</ref>

In April 1645 the New Model Army finally took to the field, with [[Thomas Fairfax]] in command and Cromwell as Lieutenant-General of cavalry and second-in-command.<ref name=bcw/> Some authorities maintain that the army's organisation and the thorough training of its men were accomplished by Fairfax, not Cromwell.<ref>{{Cite web |title=New Model Army |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/New-Model-Army |access-date=7 January 2025 |publisher=Encyclopaedia Britannica}}</ref> In contrast to Fairfax, Cromwell had no formal training in military tactics. However, he is generally accepted to have been a capable military leader, particularly as a battlefield commander.<ref name="Ashley">{{Cite web |last1=Ashley |first1=Maurice |author-link1=Maurice Ashley (historian) |last2=Morrill |first2=John S. |author-link2=John Morrill (historian) |title=Oliver Cromwell: Military and Political Leader |url=https://www.britannica.com/biography/Oliver-Cromwell/Military-and-political-leader |access-date=7 January 2025 |website=Britannica}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Oliver Cromwell: Lord Protector |url=https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/oliver-cromwell-lord-protector#:~:text=Lieutenant%2DGeneral%20Oliver%20Cromwell%20was,campaigns%20in%20Ireland%20and%20Scotland. |access-date=7 January 2025 |website=National Army Museum |publisher=Royal Hospital, London, SW3}}</ref>

In recruiting, he sought loyal and well-behaved men regardless of their religion or social status. He required good treatment and reliable pay for his soldiers, but also enforced strict discipline.<ref name=Ashley/>

As a battlefield commander, Cromwell followed the common practice of ranging his [[cavalry]] in three ranks and pressing forward, relying on impact rather than firepower. His strengths were an instinctive ability to lead and train his men, and his [[moral authority]]. In a war fought mostly by amateurs, these strengths were significant and most likely contributed to the discipline of his cavalry.{{Sfn|Woolrych|1990|pages=117–118}} Cromwell introduced close-order cavalry formations, with troopers riding knee to knee; this was an innovation in England at the time and a major factor in his success. He kept his troops close together after skirmishes where they had gained superiority, rather than allowing them to chase opponents off the battlefield. This facilitated further engagements in short order, which allowed greater intensity and quick reaction to battle developments. This style of command was decisive at both Marston Moor and Naseby.{{Sfn|Fraser|1973|pages=154–161}}

[[Alan Marshall (historian)|Alan Marshall]] was critical for Cromwell's approach to warfare i.e. the "[[War of annihilation]]" style which usually brought swift victory but also contained high risk.<ref name="Peter Gaunt 2006 222–223">{{Harvtxt|Gaunt|2006|pp=222–223}}</ref> Marshall notes Cromwell's shortcomings in Ireland, highlighting his defeat at Clonmel and condemning his act at Drogheda as "an appalling atrocity, even by seventeenth-century standards".<ref name="Peter Gaunt 2006 222–223"/> Marshall and other historians saw Cromwell as less proficient in the field of manoeuvre, attrition warfare and at [[siege warfare]].<ref name="Peter Gaunt 2006 222–223"/> Marshall also argues that Cromwell was not truly revolutionary in his war strategies.<ref name="Peter Gaunt 2006 222–223"/> Instead, he observes Cromwell as a courageous and energetic commander, with an eye for discipline and logistics.<ref name="Peter Gaunt 2006 222–223"/> However, Marshall also suggests that Cromwell's military proficiency had improved significantly by 1644–1645—and that he operated efficiently during the operations of those years.<ref name="Peter Gaunt 2006 222–223"/> Marshall also points out that Cromwell's political career was shapen by his military career advance.<ref name="Peter Gaunt 2006 222–223"/>

Cromwell's conquest left no significant legacy of bitterness in Scotland. The rule of the Commonwealth and Protectorate was largely peaceful, apart from the Highlands. Moreover, there were no wholesale confiscations of land or property. Three out of every four Justices of the Peace in Commonwealth Scotland were Scots and the country was governed jointly by the English military authorities and a Scottish Council of State.{{Sfn|Kenyon|Ohlmeyer|2000|p=320}}