Editing Ion Antonescu (section)

===Antonescu and the Final Solution projects===
Ion Antonescu and his subordinates were for long divided on the issue of the [[Final Solution]], as applied in territories under direct Nazi control from 1941. At an early stage, German attempts to impose the [[RSHA]]'s direct control over Old Kingdom Jews drew some objections from Mihai Antonescu, but the two sides agreed to a common policy with reference to Soviet Jews.<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 63–65, 126–127</ref> In various of his early 1940s statements, Antonescu favourably mentions the Axis goal of eliminating the Jewish presence in the event of victory.<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 133–134; Deletant, pp. 116, 118, 128, 151</ref> The unrestrained character of some Romanian actions toward Jews alarmed Nazi officials, who demanded a methodical form of extermination.<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 66, 133, 134, 383; Browning, pp. 276–277; Deletant, pp. 146, 150–151, 177; Ioanid, p. 235; Oldson, pp. 2, 10; Penkower, p. 149</ref> When confronted with German decisions to push back Jews he had expelled before the occupation of Transnistria, Antonescu protested, arguing that he had conformed with Hitler's decisions regarding "eastern Jews".<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 66, 136; Deletant, pp. 128, 151</ref> In August 1941, in preparation for the Final Solution's universal application, Hitler remarked: "As for the Jewish question, today in any case one could say that a man like Antonescu, for example, proceeds much more radically in this manner than we have done until now. But I will not rest or be idle until we too have gone all the way with the Jews."<ref>Browning, p. 320. Partly rendered in ''Final Report'', p. 140.</ref>

By summer 1942, German representatives in Romania obtained Antonescu's approval to deport the remaining Jewish population to [[extermination camp]]s in [[Occupation of Poland (1939–1945)|occupied Poland]].<ref name=r2/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 66–69, 167–172, 243, 249, 286, 383; Deletant, pp. 205–215, 334–336; Ioanid, p. 234; Weber, p. 150</ref> Among those involved on the German side were mass murderer [[Adolf Eichmann]] and his aide [[Gustav Richter]],<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 66–69, 172; Deletant, pp. 205, 209, 212, 334–335; Ioanid, pp. 234, 235; Penkower, p. 152</ref> while the Romanian side was represented by Jewish Affairs Commissioner Lecca (reporting to Antonescu himself).<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 67–69; Deletant, pp. 208–211; Penkower, pp. 152–153</ref> Richter directed Lecca in setting up the Central Jewish Office, which he assumed would function as a ''[[Judenrat]]'' to streamline extermination policies.<ref>''Final Report'', p. 67; Deletant, pp. 121–122, 124</ref> According to such plans, only some 17,000 Jews, labeled useful to Romania's economy, were to be exempt.<ref name=r2/><ref>''Final Report'', p. 171</ref> The transports had already been announced to the [[Căile Ferate Române|Romanian Railways]] by autumn 1942, but the government eventually decided to postpone these measures indefinitely as was done with most other deportations to Transnistria.<ref name=r2/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 69, 171–172, 243, 249, 383; Deletant, pp. 127, 208–215, 334–336; Penkower, pp. 152–153</ref> Antonescu's new orders on the matter were brought up in his conversations with Hitler at [[Schloss Klessheim]], where both leaders show themselves aware of the fate awaiting Jewish deportees to Poland.<ref>Deletant, pp. 1, 214–215</ref> By then, German authorities charged with applying the Final Solution in [[Eastern Europe]] completely abandoned their plans with respect to Romania.<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 69, 253; Weinberg, pp. 239–240</ref> In August 1942, Antonescu had worked out plans with the SS for deporting all of the Jews of the ''Regat'' or the "Old Kingdom" to the German-run death camps in Poland, but then cancelled the deportation.<ref>Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from ''The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined'' edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 pp. 475–476.</ref> The principal reasons for his change of mind were signs of disapproval from court circles, a warning from the American government passed on by the Swiss ambassador that he would prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity after the Allies had won if the deportation went ahead, and most importantly because Hitler would not undo the Second Vienna Award and return northern Transylvania to Romania.<ref name="ReferenceE">Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from ''The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined'' edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 p. 476.</ref> Antonescu saw the deportation of the Jews of the ''Regat'' as the ''pro quid quo'' for the return of Transylvania and unable to obtain satisfactory promises from the German Ambassador Baron [[Manfred Freiherr von Killinger|Manfred von Killinger]] that Romania would be rewarded with the return of Transylvania in exchange for handing over its Jews, Antonescu cancelled the deportation until the Germans would make him a better offer.<ref name="ReferenceE"/>

According to Oldson, by the final stage of the war Romania rejected "all extreme measures against Jews who could not be proven to be communists."<ref>Oldson, p. 7</ref> The planned transports to Palestine, the prospect of which irritated Nazi German observers, implied a hope that the Allies' focus would shift away from the regime's previous guilt and, at the same time, looked forward to payments to be made in exchange for each person saved.<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 68–69, 168–172, 252–253, 384; Deletant, pp. 211, 213–219; Oldson, p. 7; Weinberg, pp. 239–240. In February 1943, Romanian officials announced to the world that they were going to allow "70,000 Jews" to depart from Transnistria to Palestine on ships with [[Holy See|Vatican]] insignia, in exchange for payments. The project was sabotaged by the Nazis, reportedly upon the request of [[Mohammad Amin al-Husayni]], the fugitive [[Grand Mufti of Jerusalem]]. Antonescu later approached the [[Red Cross]] for similar transfer efforts, including the ill-fated ship {{MV|Mefküre||2}}. (Penkower, pp. 148, 153–155, 157; Deletant, pp. 213–218).</ref> The contrary implications of Romanian nationalism, manifested as reluctance to obey German commands and discomfort with drastic change in general, are occasionally offered as further explanations of the phenomenon.<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 69, 171–172, 383; Deletant, pp. 121–122, 210; Oldson, pp. 4, 8–11, 161–163. According to Penkower (p. 153), [[Radu Lecca]] changed orders for the deportation into [[Occupation of Poland (1939–1945)|occupied Poland]] immediately after being "snubbed" by [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]]'s employees.</ref> While reflecting upon the issue of emigration to Palestine, Antonescu also yielded to pleas of Jewish community leaders, and allowed safe passage through Romania for various Northern Transylvanian Jews fleeing the [[Holocaust in Hungary]].<ref>Deletant, pp. 216, 218, 225–229, 340–341; Penkower, pp. 169–170; Weber, p. 150</ref> He was doing the same for certain Northern Transylvanian Romani communities who had escaped southwards.<ref>''Final Report'', p. 237; Achim, pp. 170, 185</ref> In that context, Nazi German ideologues began objecting to Antonescu's supposed leniency.<ref>Achim, pp. 183–184; Deletant, pp. 228–229</ref> Antonescu nevertheless alternated tolerance of illegal immigration with drastic measures. In early 1944, he issued an order to shoot illegal immigrants, which was probably never enforced by the [[Romanian Border Police|Border Police]]<ref>''Final Report'', p. 201; Deletant, pp. 226–228, 253</ref> (who occasionally turned in Jewish refugees to the German authorities).<ref>Deletant, p. 228</ref> The Antonescu regime allowed the extermination of the Romanian Jewish diaspora in other parts of Europe,<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 173–175; Deletant, p. 229; Ioanid, pp. 244–245; Penkower, p. 152</ref> formally opposing their deportation in some cases where it appeared Germany was impinging upon Romania's sovereignty.<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 173–175, 250–251; Deletant, pp. 229, 340; Ioanid, pp. 244–245</ref>