Editing Hamas (section)

==Organization==

===Leadership and structure===
{{main|List of leaders of Hamas}}
[[File:Hamasleadership.png|thumb|Map of key Hamas leadership nodes. 2010.{{Clear}}]]
Hamas inherited from its predecessor a tripartite structure that consisted in the provision of social services, of religious training and military operations under a Shura Council. Traditionally it had four distinct functions: (a) a charitable social welfare division (''dawah''); (b) a military division for procuring weapons and undertaking operations (''al-Mujahideen al Filastinun''); (c) a security service (''Jehaz Aman''); and (d) a media branch (''A'alam'').{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=10–11}} Hamas has both an internal leadership within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and an external leadership, split between a Gaza group directed by [[Mousa Abu Marzook]] from his exile first in Damascus and then in Egypt, and a Kuwaiti group (''Kuwaidia'') under [[Khaled Mashal]].{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=11–12}}{{update inline|date=September 2024}} The Kuwaiti group of Palestinian exiles began to receive extensive funding from the [[Arab states of the Persian Gulf|Gulf States]] after its leader Mashal broke with [[Yasser Arafat]]'s decision to side with [[Saddam Hussein]] in the [[Invasion of Kuwait]], with Mashal insisting that Iraq withdraw.{{sfn|Roy|2013|p=30}} On 6 May 2017, [[Majlis al-Shura|Hamas' Shura Council]] chose [[Ismail Haniyeh]] to become the new leader, to replace Mashal.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/06/middleeast/hamas-leadership-ismail-haniya/index.html|title=Ismail Haniya elected new Hamas leader|author=Andrew Carey and Joe Sterling|publisher=CNN|date=6 May 2017|access-date=20 March 2024|archive-date=20 October 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231020134958/https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/06/middleeast/hamas-leadership-ismail-haniya/index.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

The exact structure of the organization is unclear as it is shrouded in a veil of secrecy in order to conceal operational activities. Formally, Hamas maintains the wings are separate and independent, but this has been questioned. It has been argued that its wings are both separate and combined for reasons of internal and external political necessity. Communication between the political and military wings of Hamas is made difficult by the thoroughness of Israeli intelligence surveillance and the existence of an extensive base of informants. After the assassination of [[Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi]] the political direction of the militant wing was diminished and field commanders were given wider discretional autonomy over operations.{{sfn|Davis|2016|pp=44–45}}

==== Shura Council and Political Bureau ====
Hamas's overarching governing body is the [[Majlis al-Shura]] (Shura Council), based on the [[Quran]]ic concept of consultation and popular assembly ({{transliteration|ar|[[shura]]}}), which Hamas leaders argue provides for democracy within an Islamic framework.<ref>A. Hovdenak, "Hamas in Transition:The Failure of Sanctions", in Michelle Pace, Peter Seeberg (eds.), [https://books.google.com/books?id=RgLcAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA64 ''The European Union's Democratization Agenda in the Mediterranean''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320154331/https://books.google.com/books?id=RgLcAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA64#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, Routledge, 2013 pp. 50–79 [64].</ref> As the organization grew more complex and Israeli pressure increased, the Shura Council was renamed the General Consultative Council, with members elected from local council groups. The council elects the 15-member Political Bureau (''al-Maktab al-Siyasi'')<ref name="Mandaville">Peter Mandaville,[https://books.google.com/books?id=2bvcAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA282 ''Islam and Politics''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320154524/https://books.google.com/books?id=2bvcAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA282#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, Routledge, 2014 Rev.ed, p. 282.</ref> that makes decisions for Hamas. Representatives come from Gaza, the West Bank, leaders in exile and [[Palestinian prisoners in Israel#Administrative detention|Israeli prisons]].<ref name="Berti" >Benedetta Berti, [https://books.google.com/books?id=EUcDAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA88 ''Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320154536/https://books.google.com/books?id=EUcDAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA88#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, JHU Press, 2013 p. 88.</ref> The Political Bureau was based in [[Damascus]] until January 2012, when Hamas's support for the [[Syrian opposition to Bashar al-Assad]] during the [[Syrian civil war]] led to the office's relocation to [[Qatar]].<ref name="Berti" /><ref>Mohammed Ayoob, [https://books.google.com/books?id=ph6eAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT47 ''Will the Middle East Implode?''], John Wiley & Sons, 2014 p. 47.</ref>

===Finances and funding===
{{see also|Blockade of the Gaza Strip|Zaher Jabarin|Israeli support for Hamas|Taxation in the State of Palestine|Fatah–Hamas reconciliation process}}
Hamas, like its predecessor the Muslim Brotherhood, assumed the administration of Gaza's {{transliteration|ar|[[waqf]]}} properties, endowments which extend over 10% of all real estate in the Gaza Strip, with 2,000 acres of agricultural land held in religious trusts, together with numerous shops, rentable apartments and public buildings.{{sfn|Abu-Amr|1993|p=8}}

In the first five years of the 1st Intifada, the Gaza economy, 50% of which depended on external sources of income, plummeted by 30–50% as Israel closed its labour market and remittances from the [[Palestinian diaspora|Palestinian expatriates]] in the Gulf countries dried up following the 1991–1992 [[Gulf War]].{{sfn|Roy|1993|p=21}} At the 1993 Philadelphia conference, Hamas leaders' statements indicated that they read [[George H. W. Bush]]'s outline of a [[New world order (politics)|New World Order]] as embodying a [[New World Order (conspiracy theory)|tacit aim]] to destroy Islam, and that therefore funding should focus on enhancing the Islamic roots of Palestinian society and promoting jihad, which also means zeal for social justice, in the occupied territories.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|p=148}} Hamas became particularly fastidious about maintaining separate resourcing for its respective branches of activity—military, political and social services.{{sfn|Vittori|2011|p=72}} It has had a holding company in East Jerusalem (''Beit al-Mal''), a 20% stake in Al Aqsa International Bank which served as its financial arm, the Sunuqrut Global Group and al-Ajouli money-changing firm.{{sfn|Vittori|2011|p=73}}

By 2011, Hamas's budget, calculated to be roughly US$70&nbsp;million, derived even more substantially (85%) from foreign, rather than internal Palestinian, sources.{{sfn|Vittori|2011|p=73}} Only two Israeli-Palestinian sources figure in a list seized in 2004, while the other contributors were donor bodies located in Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Britain, Germany, the United States, United Arab Emirates, Italy and France. Much of the money raised comes from sources that direct their assistance to what Hamas describes as its charitable work for Palestinians, but investments in support of its ideological position are also relevant, with Persian Gulf States and Saudi Arabia prominent in the latter. Matthew Levitt claims that Hamas also taps money from corporations, criminal organizations and financial networks that support terror.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=143–44}} It is also alleged that it engages in cigarette and drug smuggling, multimedia copyright infringement and credit card fraud.{{sfn|Vittori|2011|p=73}} The United States, Israel and the EU have shut down many charities and organs that channel money to Hamas, such as the [[Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development|Holy Land Foundation for Relief]].{{sfn|Clarke|2015|p=97}} Between 1992 and 2001, this group is said to have provided $6.8&nbsp;million to Palestinian charities of the $57&nbsp;million collected. By 2001, it was alleged to have given Hamas $13&nbsp;million, and was shut down shortly afterwards.<ref>Interpal and Development and the Al-Aqsa Charitable Foundation Fund. pp.&nbsp;146, 154–59.</ref>

About half of Hamas's funding came from states in the Persian Gulf down to the mid-2000s. Saudi Arabia supplied half of the Hamas budget of $50&nbsp;million in the early 2000s,<ref name="Burfeindt">Marsh E. Burfeindt, 'Rapprochement with Iran', in Thomas A. Johnson (ed.), [https://books.google.com/books?id=tu5m8_0iUSoC&pg=PA198 ''Power, National Security, and Transformational Global Events: Challenges Confronting America, China, and Iran''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155024/https://books.google.com/books?id=tu5m8_0iUSoC&pg=PA198#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}. CRC Press. 2012. pp. 185–235 [198].</ref> but, under US pressure, began to cut its funding by cracking down on Islamic charities and private donor transfers to Hamas in 2004,<ref name="Vittori">Jodi Vittori, [https://books.google.com/books?id=ra_GAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA193 ''Terrorist Financing and Resourcing''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155054/https://books.google.com/books?id=ra_GAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA193#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 pp. 72–74, 193 notes 50, 51.</ref> which by 2006 drastically reduced the flow of money from that area. Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Hamas's 2006 electoral victory, stepped in to fill the shortfall.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|p=173}}{{sfn|Gleis|Berti|2012|p=156}} Saudi funding, negotiated with third parties including Egypt, remained supportive of Hamas as a Sunni group but chose to provide more assistance to the PNA, the electoral loser, when the EU responded to the outcome by suspending its monetary aid.<ref>Robert Mason, [https://books.google.com/books?id=ZaIcBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA48 ''Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155031/https://books.google.com/books?id=ZaIcBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA48 |date=20 March 2024 }}, [[I.B. Tauris]], 2015 pp. 48–49</ref> During the 1980s, Iran began to provide 10% of Hamas's funding, which it increased annually until by the 1990s it supplied $30&nbsp;million.<ref name =Burfeindt/> It accounted for $22&nbsp;million, over a quarter of Hamas's budget, by the late 2000s.<ref name="Vittori"/> According to Matthew Levitt, Iran preferred direct financing to operative groups rather than charities, requiring video proof of attacks.<ref name =Vittori/>{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=172–74}} Much of the Iran funding is said to be channeled through [[Hezbollah]].<ref name="Vittori"/> After 2006, Iran's willingness to take over the burden of the shortfall created by the drying up of Saudi funding also reflected the geopolitical tensions between the two, since, though Shiite, Iran was supporting a Sunni group traditionally closely linked with the Saudi kingdom.<ref>Lawrence Rubin, [https://books.google.com/books?id=TzeOAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA104 ''Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155102/https://books.google.com/books?id=TzeOAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA104#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}. Stanford University Press, 2014 p. 104</ref> The US imposed sanctions on Iran's Bank Saderat, alleging it had funneled hundreds of millions to Hamas.<ref>Jalil Roshandel, Alethia H. Cook, [https://books.google.com/books?id=0c_IAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA104 ''The United States and Iran: Policy Challenges and Opportunities''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155043/https://books.google.com/books?id=0c_IAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA104#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. p. 104.</ref> The US has expressed concerns that Hamas obtains funds through Palestinian and Lebanese sympathizers of Arab descent in the [[Foz do Iguaçu]] area of the tri-border region of Latin America, an area long associated with arms trading, drug trafficking, contraband, the manufacture of counterfeit goods, money-laundering and currency fraud. The State Department adds that confirmatory information of a Hamas operational presence there is lacking.<ref>Mark P. Sullivan, [https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128377.pdf 'Latin America: Terrorism Issues'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181121061624/https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128377.pdf |date=21 November 2018 }}. Congressional Research Service. 14 July 2009. p. 4.</ref>

After 2009, [[sanctions on Iran]] made funding difficult, forcing Hamas to rely on religious donations by individuals in the West Bank, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Funds amounting to tens of millions of dollars raised in the Gulf states were transferred through the [[Rafah Border Crossing]]. These were not sufficient to cover the costs of governing the Strip and running the al Qassam Brigades, and when tensions arose with Iran over support of President Assad in Syria, Iran dropped its financial assistance to the government, restricting its funding to the military wing, which meant a drop from $150&nbsp;million in 2012 to $60&nbsp;million the following year. A further drop occurred in 2015 when Hamas expressed its criticisms of Iran's role in the [[Yemeni Civil War (2015–present)|Yemeni Civil War]].<ref>Davis, [https://books.google.com/books?id=kGWFCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA173 p. 173] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155043/https://books.google.com/books?id=kGWFCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA173#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}.</ref>

In 2017, the PA government imposed its own sanctions against Gaza, including, among other things, cutting off salaries to thousands of PA employees, as well as financial assistance to hundreds of families in the Gaza Strip. The PA initially said it would stop paying for the electricity and fuel that Israel supplies to the Gaza Strip, but after a year partially backtracked.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/palestinian-authority-rejects-israeli-us-ideas-to-help-gaza-560921|title=Palestinian Authority rejects Israeli, U.S. ideas to help Gaza|website=The Jerusalem Post|access-date=20 March 2024|archive-date=20 October 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231020135417/https://www.jpost.com//arab-israeli-conflict/palestinian-authority-rejects-israeli-us-ideas-to-help-gaza-560921|url-status=live}}</ref> The Israeli government has allowed millions of dollars from Qatar to be funneled on a regular basis through Israel to Hamas, to replace the millions of dollars the PA had stopped transferring to Hamas. Israeli Prime Minister [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] explained that letting the money go through Israel meant that it could not be used for terrorism, saying: "Now that we are supervising, we know it's going to humanitarian causes."<ref>[[The Jerusalem Post]], 12 March 2019, [https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Netanyahu-Money-to-Hamas-part-of-strategy-to-keep-Palestinians-divided-583082 "Netanyahu: Money to Hamas Part of Strategy to Keep Palestinians Divided"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231030230739/https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Netanyahu-Money-to-Hamas-part-of-strategy-to-keep-Palestinians-divided-583082 |date=30 October 2023 }}</ref>

According to U.S. officials, as of 2023 Hamas has an investment portfolio that is worth anywhere from 500 million to US$1 billion, including assets in Sudan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and the United Arab Emirates.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Stein |first=Jeff |date=4 November 2023 |title=Far from war in Gaza, Hamas chief oversees vast financial network |language=en-US |newspaper=Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/11/02/hamas-funding-ismail-haniyeh-us-sanctions/ |access-date=15 December 2023 |issn=0190-8286 |archive-date=17 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231217194737/http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/11/02/hamas-funding-ismail-haniyeh-us-sanctions/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Hamas has denied such allegations.<ref>{{cite news|title=US sanctions Hamas official, finance network|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/5/24/us-sanctions-hamas-official-finance-network|publisher=[[Al-Jazeera English]]|access-date=15 December 2023|archive-date=15 December 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231215173652/https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/5/24/us-sanctions-hamas-official-finance-network|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2024, financial activity in Gaza is mainly carried out via money changers in order to bypass the international financial authorities.<ref>[https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-11-14/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/by-allowing-suitcases-of-cash-into-gaza-israel-harmed-the-global-fight-against-hamas/00000193-2b39-d0a3-a5d3-bfb998bd0000 Targeting a shadow economy], [[Haaretz]]</ref> Also in 2024, the [[European Council]] added six people to its sanctions list for helping fund Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, including a senior official from the [[Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps]]. Three businesses were also added, including companies in Spain and Sudan that functioned as front companies.<ref>[https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20240628-new-eu-sanctions-list-for-hamas-financiers-includes-front-companies-based-in-spain-sudan New EU sanctions list for Hamas financiers includes front companies based in Spain, Sudan], [[France 24]]</ref><ref>[https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-sanctions-6-people-3-firms-hamas-finance-crackdown-2024-06-28/ EU sanctions 6 people and 3 firms in Hamas finance crackdown], [[Reuters]]</ref>

===Social services wing===
Hamas developed its social welfare programme by replicating the model established by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. For Hamas, charity and the development of one's community are both prescribed by religion and to be understood as forms of resistance.{{sfn|Dunning|2016|p=136}} In Islamic tradition, {{transliteration|ar|dawah}} ({{translation|literal=yes|"the call to God"}}) obliges the faithful to reach out to others by both proselytising and by charitable works, and typically the latter centre on the mosques which make use of both {{transliteration|ar|[[waqf]]}} endowment resources and charitable donations ({{transliteration|ar|[[zakat]]}}, one of the five pillars of Islam) to fund grassroots services such as nurseries, schools, orphanages, soup kitchens, women's activities, library services and even sporting clubs within a larger context of preaching and political discussions.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=16–23}} In the 1990s, some 85% of its budget was allocated to the provision of social services.{{sfn|Phillips|2011|p=78}} Hamas has been called perhaps the most significant social services actor in Palestine. By 2000, Hamas or its affiliated charities ran roughly 40% of the social institutions in the West Bank and Gaza and, with other Islamic charities, by 2005, was supporting 120,000 individuals with monthly financial support in Gaza.{{sfn|Shitrit|2015|p=71}} Part of the appeal of these institutions is that they fill a vacuum in the administration by the PLO of the Palestinian territories, which had failed to cater to the demand for jobs and broad social services, and is widely viewed as corrupt.{{sfn|Phillips|2011|p=75}} As late as 2005, the budget of Hamas, drawing on global charity contributions, was mostly tied up in covering running expenses for its social programmes, which extended from the supply of housing, food and water for the needy to more general functions such as financial aid, medical assistance, educational development and religious instruction. A certain accounting flexibility allowed these funds to cover both charitable causes and military operations, permitting transfer from one to the other.{{sfn|Davis|2016|pp=47ff}}

The {{transliteration|ar|dawah}} infrastructure itself was understood, within the Palestinian context, as providing the soil from which a militant opposition to the occupation would flower.{{efn|'In a 1995 lecture, Sheikh Jamil Hamami, a party to the foundation of Hamas and a senior member of its West Bank leadership, expounded the importance of Hamas' {{transliteration|ar|dawa}} infrastructure as the soil from which militancy would flower.'{{sfn|Levitt|2006|p=23}}}} In this regard it differs from the rival [[Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine|Palestinian Islamic Jihad]] which lacks any social welfare network, and relies on spectacular terrorist attacks to recruit adherents.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=25–26}} In 2007, through funding from Iran, Hamas managed to allocate at a cost of $60&nbsp;million, monthly stipends of $100 for 100,000 workers, and a similar sum for 3,000 fishermen [[Blockade of the Gaza Strip#Effect on the fishing industry|laid idle by Israel's imposition of restrictions]] on fishing offshore, plus grants totalling $45&nbsp;million to detainees and their families.<ref>Mohsen Saleh, [https://books.google.com/books?id=LGVkCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA198 ''The Palestinian Strategic Report 2006''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320154908/https://books.google.com/books?id=LGVkCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA198 |date=20 March 2024 }}, Al Manhal, 2007 p. 198.</ref> [[Matthew Levitt]] argues that Hamas grants to people are subject to a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of how beneficiaries will support Hamas, with those linked to terrorist activities receiving more than others.<ref>James J.F. Forrest, "Conclusion", in James Dingley, [https://books.google.com/books?id=CVJ_AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA290 ''Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland''], Routledge, 2008 pp. 280–300 [290].</ref> Israel holds the families of suicide bombers accountable and bulldozes their homes, whereas the families of Hamas activists who have been killed or wounded during militant operations are given an initial, one-time grant varying between $500–$5,000, together with a $100 monthly allowance. Rent assistance is also given to families whose homes have been destroyed by Israeli bombing though families unaffiliated with Hamas are said to receive less.{{sfn|Phillips|2011|p=81}}{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=122–23}}

Until 2007, these activities extended to the West Bank, but, after a PLO crackdown, now continue exclusively in the Gaza Strip.{{sfn|Davis|2016|p=48}} After the [[2013 Egyptian coup d'état]] deposed the elected Muslim Brotherhood government of [[Mohamed Morsi]] in 2013, Hamas found itself in a financial straitjacket and has since endeavoured to throw the burden of responsibility for public works infrastructure in the Gaza Strip back onto the Palestinian National Authority, but without success.{{sfn|Davis|2016|pp=48–49}}

===Media===
{{see also|Media coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict|Public diplomacy of Israel|Palestinian propaganda}}

==== Al-Aqsa TV ====
{{main|Al-Aqsa TV}}{{see also|Shehab News Agency}}
[[Al-Aqsa TV]] is a television channel founded by Hamas.<ref>{{Cite news|date=1 January 2009|title=Hamas leader killed in air strike|publisher=BBC News|location=London|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7807124.stm|access-date=1 January 2009|archive-date=4 January 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090104073652/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7807124.stm|url-status=live}}</ref> The station began broadcasting in the Gaza Strip on 9 January 2006,<ref name="news24_alaqsa_tv">{{cite news|title=Hamas TV station shut down|url=http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-1462_1867389,00.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071009220331/http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0%2C%2C2-10-1462_1867389%2C00.html|archive-date=9 October 2007|access-date=9 October 2007}}, news24.com, 22 January 2006</ref><ref name="adl_al_aqsa_tv">{{cite web|title=Terrorism: Al Aqsa TV|url=http://www.adl.org/terrorism/profiles/al_aqsa_tv.asp|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130120114454/http://www.adl.org/terrorism/profiles/al_aqsa_tv.asp|archive-date=20 January 2013|publisher=[[Anti-Defamation League|ADL]]}}</ref> less than three weeks before the [[2006 Palestinian legislative election|Palestinian legislative elections]]. It has shown television programs, including some children's television, which deliver antisemitic messages.<ref>{{cite news|date=16 May 2008|title=Anti-Semitic Hate Speech in the Name of Islam|publisher=Spiegel Online International|url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,553724,00.html |first1=Matthias |last1=Küntzel |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231025065729/https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/wipe-out-the-jews-anti-semitic-hate-speech-in-the-name-of-islam-a-553724.html |archive-date= 25 October 2023 }}</ref> Hamas has stated that the television station is "an independent media institution that often does not express the views of the Palestinian government headed by Ismail Haniyeh or of the Hamas movement", and that Hamas does not hold antisemitic views.<ref name="Hamas Condemns the Holocaust">{{Cite news |date=12 May 2008 |title=Hamas condemns the Holocaust |language=en-GB |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/may/12/hamascondemnstheholocaust |issn=0261-3077 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231015101630/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/may/12/hamascondemnstheholocaust |archive-date= 15 October 2023 }}</ref> The programming includes ideologically tinged children's shows, news talk, and religiously inspired entertainment.<ref name="npr_al_aqsa_tv">{{cite news |title=Hamas Launches Television Network |publisher=[[NPR]] |url=https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5186883 |date=3 February 2006 |first1=Eric |last1=Westervelt |access-date=3 February 2006 |archive-date=27 April 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060427063105/http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5186883 |url-status=live }}</ref> According to the [[Anti-Defamation League]], the station promotes terrorist activity and incites hatred of Jews and Israelis.<ref name="adl_al_aqsa_tv" /> Al-Aqsa TV is headed by the controversial [[Fathi Ahmad Hammad]], chairman of al-Ribat Communications and Artistic Productions—a Hamas-run company that also produces Hamas's radio station, ''Voice of al-Aqsa'', and its biweekly newspaper, ''The Message''.<ref name="guardian_johnson">{{cite news|last=Johnson|first=Alan|date=15 May 2008|title=Hamas and antisemitism|newspaper=The Guardian|location=London|url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/may/15/hamasandantisemitism|access-date=11 December 2016|archive-date=19 January 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170119091754/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/may/15/hamasandantisemitism|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Fathi Hamad|Hamad]] has made a number of controversial comments, including a speech in which he reportedly stated: 'you have Jews everywhere and we must attack every Jew on the globe by way of slaughtering and killing' <ref>{{Cite news |last=Cohen |first=Danny |date=2 February 2024 |title=The blinkered BBC shamefully ignores Hamas's genocidal aims |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/02/the-blinkered-bbc-shamefully-ignores-hamass-genocidal-aims/ |access-date=18 March 2024 |work=The Telegraph |language=en-GB |issn=0307-1235 |archive-date=18 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240318180950/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/02/the-blinkered-bbc-shamefully-ignores-hamass-genocidal-aims/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Al-Fateh magazine ====
{{distinguish|Hamaas}}
{{main|Al-Fateh}}
{{disputed section|date=October 2023}}
''Al-Fateh'' ("the conqueror") is the Hamas children's magazine, published biweekly in London, and also posted in an online website. It began publication in September 2002, and its 108th issue was released in mid-September 2007. The magazine features stories, poems, riddles, and puzzles, and states it is for "the young builders of the future".<ref name="OnlineTerrorists">{{cite web |url=http://globalpolitician.com/24252-terror |title=Online Terrorists Prey on the Vulnerable |publisher=Globalpolitician.com |access-date=1 August 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110720001052/http://globalpolitician.com/24252-terror |archive-date=20 July 2011}}</ref> According to the [[Anti-Defamation League]], al-Fateh promotes violence and antisemitism, with praise for and encouragement to become suicide bombers, and that it "regularly includes photos of children it claims have been detained, injured or killed by Israeli police, images of children firing slingshots or throwing rocks at Israelis and children holding automatic weapons and firebombs".<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/al_fateh_hamas.htm |title=Hamas Magazine for Kids Promotes Martyrdom and Hatred |publisher=Anti-Defamation League |access-date=1 August 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110804222805/http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/al_fateh_hamas.htm |archive-date=4 August 2011}}</ref>

====Social media====
Hamas has traditionally presented itself as a voice of suffering of the Palestinian people. According to [[Time (magazine)|Time magazine]], a new social media strategy was employed in the wake of the 7 October attack: Hamas asserted itself as the dominant resistance force in the Middle East by recording and [[broadcasting]] the brutality of their attacks.<ref>{{cite news |title=The Oct. 7 Massacre Revealed a New Hamas Social Media Strategy |url=https://time.com/6330005/the-oct-7-massacre-revealed-a-new-hamas-social-media-strategy/ |access-date=29 November 2023 |publisher=Time |date=31 October 2023 |archive-date=28 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231128173944/https://time.com/6330005/the-oct-7-massacre-revealed-a-new-hamas-social-media-strategy/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

According to Dr. Harel Horev, historian and researcher of Palestinian affairs at Tel Aviv University, Hamas has used social media to dehumanize Israelis/Jews. According to his research, Hamas took over the most popular accounts on Palestinian networks in a covert manner that did not reveal its involvement. This control gave it the ability to significantly influence the Palestinian discourse online through content that denies the humanity and right to life of Israelis. These included posters, songs and videos glorifying threats; computer games that encourage the murder of Jews; training videos for carrying out effective and indiscriminate stabbing and shooting attacks; and anti-Semitic cartoons as a central means of dehumanizing the Israeli/Jew in the Palestinian online discourse.<ref>{{cite news |title=מה ידענו ומדוע סירבנו להפנים את הכוונות הרצחניות של חמאס? |url=https://www.maariv.co.il/journalists/opinions/Article-1050383 |access-date=19 November 2023 |publisher=Maariv |date=7 November 2023 |language=he |archive-date=18 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231118000716/https://www.maariv.co.il/journalists/opinions/Article-1050383 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=קולקטיבינדואליזם: הדור הפלסטיני הצעיר בין אינדיבידואליזם לקולקטיביזם והאתגר לחמאס |url=https://dayan.org/he/content/5212 |website=Tel Aviv University. The Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African studies |access-date=19 November 2023 |language=he |archive-date=18 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231118013737/https://dayan.org/he/content/5212 |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Internal security ===
{{see also|Ministry of Interior (State of Palestine)}}

The General Security Service, formally part of the Hamas political party, operates akin to a governmental body within Gaza. Under the direct oversight of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, it conducts extensive surveillance on Palestinians, compiling files on various individuals including journalists and government critics. This secret police force relies on a network of informants and employs tactics such as censorship and surveillance to maintain control. Before the conflict with Israel, the unit reportedly had a monthly budget of $120,000 and consisted of 856 personnel, including more than 160 individuals paid to spread Hamas propaganda and conduct online attacks against opponents.<ref name="NYTimes20240513">{{Cite news |last1=Rasgon |first1=Adam |last2=Bergman |first2=Ronen |date=13 May 2024 |title=Secret Hamas Files Show How It Spied on Everyday Palestinians |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/13/world/europe/secret-hamas-files-palestinians.html |access-date=13 May 2024 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

Other powerful internal security bodies in Gaza include Military Intelligence, which focuses on Israel, and the Internal Security Service, an arm of the [[Ministry of Interior (State of Palestine)|Interior Ministry]].<ref name="NYTimes20240513" />

==== Civilian crisis management ====

During the [[COVID-19 pandemic in Palestine]] Gaza's [[Ministry of Interior (State of Palestine)|Ministry of the Interior]] formed a crisis management team, headed by Hamas police officer [[Faiq Al-Mabhouh]].<ref name="SA - prominent leaders" >{{cite news| url= https://ara.tv/b2xtn | title = Since 7 October: these are the most prominent Hamas leaders who have been assassinated by Israel | date= 19 March 2024 | work= www.alarabiya.net | language=ar }}</ref><ref name="Lockdown option" >{{cite news | title= Al-Mahouh: "Lockdown" is an option among procedures evaluated by the competent authorities according to the epidemic situation | url= https://felesteen.news/post/79065/ | work= Palestine Online | date= 5 December 2020 }}</ref><ref name="sama" >{{cite news| title = He sent a message to citizens: Head of the Crisis Management Team in Gaza: We will conduct an evaluation of all the measures taken by this date | url = https://samanews.ps/ar/post/448555/%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B0%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF | work= Sama News | date= 30 December 2020 }}</ref> Mabhouh played a prominent role in communicating with the public about the changing situation. He appeared in video announcements on [[Al-Aqsa TV]] and social media channels, and gave interviews to local media to explain changes in restrictions. The Gaza Strip restrictions took the "[[flattening the curve]]" approach.<ref name="sama"/> The restrictions imposed were similar to most western countries, and more relaxed than the [[zero COVID]] policy implemented by [[COVID-19 pandemic in China|China]] and [[World Health Organization#Regional offices|their neighbors]].<ref name="Lockdown option" /> The Gaza Strip's starter was to avoid total [[lockdowns]] using partial measures like weekend lockdowns and curfews. The weekend lockdowns included mosques being closed for Friday prayers. But during times while the mosques were open, one creative measure initiated by [[Gaza's Ministry of Health]] was to replace the mosque preachers with doctors who gave health information seminars.<ref name="mosque medics" >{{cite web | url= http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-03/21/c_138900288.htm | title= Roundup: Gaza replaces mosque preachers with doctors for sermon amid COVID-19 - Xinhua - English.news.cn | date= 21 March 2020 | access-date= 22 May 2024 }}</ref><ref name="Lockdown option" /><ref name="sama"/>