Editing Hafez al-Assad (section)

=== Islamist uprising ===
{{main|Islamist uprising in Syria}}
[[File:Gaddafi-Boumedienne-Assad-1977-Tripolis.jpg|thumb|200x200px|Assad, Algerian President Houari Boumediene and Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 1977]]
[[File:1979-14-august.-Vizita-in-R.A.-Siriana.-Inmanarea-albumului-orasului-Kuneitra-1024x700.jpg|thumb|Hafez al-Assad alongside [[Socialist Republic of Romania|Romanian]] President [[Nicolae Ceaușescu]] in 1979]]

==== Background ====
Assad's pragmatic policies indirectly led to the establishment of a "new class",{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=85}} and he accepted this while it furthered his aims against [[Israel]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=85}} When Assad began pursuing a policy of [[economic liberalization]], the state bureaucracy began using their positions for personal gain.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=85}} The state gave implementation rights to "much of its development program to foreign firms and contractors, fueling a growing linkage between the state and private capital".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=86}} What ensued was a spike in corruption, which led the political class to be "thoroughly [[bourgeoisie|embourgeoised]]".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=86}} The channeling of external money through the state to private enterprises "created growing opportunities for state elites' self-enrichment through corrupt manipulation of state-market interchanges. Besides outright embezzlement, webs of shared interests in commissions and kickbacks grew up between high officials, politicians, and business interests".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=86}} The Alawite military-security establishment got the greatest share of the money;{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|pp=86–89}} the Ba'ath Party and its leaders ruled a new class, defending their interests instead of those of peasants and workers (whom they were supposed to represent).{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|pp=86–89}} This, coupled with growing Sunni disillusionment with what Hinnebusch calls "the regime's mixture of statism, rural and sectarian favouritism, corruption and new inequalities", fueled the growth of the Islamic movement.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=89}} Because of this, the [[Muslim Brotherhood of Syria]] became the vanguard of anti-Ba'athist forces.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}}

The Brotherhood had historically been a vehicle for Islamism during its introduction to the Syrian political scene during the 1960s under the leadership of [[Mustafa al-Siba'i]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} After Siba'i's imprisonment, under [[Isam al-Attar]]'s leadership the Brotherhood developed into the ideological antithesis of Ba'athist rule.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} However, the Ba'ath Party's organizational superiority worked in its favor;{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} with Attar's enforced exile, the Muslim Brotherhood was in disarray.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} It was not until the 1970s that the Muslim Brotherhood established a clear, central collective authority for its organization under Adnan Saad ad-Din, [[Sa'id Hawwa]], [[Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni]] and Husni Abu.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} Because of their organizational capabilities, the [[Muslim Brotherhood]] grew tenfold from 1975 to 1978 (from 500 to 700 in Aleppo); nationwide, by 1978 it had 30,000 followers.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}}

==== Events ====
[[File:Hafez al Assad portrait.jpg|left|thumb|Assad in early 1980s]]The Islamist uprising began in the mid-to-late 1970s, with attacks on prominent members of the Ba'ath Alawite elite.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=94}} As the conflict worsened, a debate in the party between hard-liners (represented by Rifaat al-Assad) and Ba'ath liberals (represented by [[Mahmoud al-Ayyubi]]) began.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=94}} The Seventh Regional Congress, in 1980, was held in an atmosphere of crisis.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} The party leadership—with the exception of Assad and his proteges—were criticised severely by party delegates, who called for an anti-corruption campaign, a new, clean government, curtailing the powers of the military-security apparatus and political liberalization.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} With Assad's consent, a new government (headed by the presumably clean [[Abdul Rauf al-Kasm]]) was established with new, young technocrats.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} The new government failed to assuage critics, and the Sunni middle class and the radical left (believing that Ba'athist rule could be overthrown with an uprising) began collaborating with the Islamists.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}}
[[File:After Hama Massacre 23.jpg|thumb|Hama devastation after bombardment by the Syrian army.]]

Believing they had the upper hand in the conflict, beginning in 1980 the Islamists began a series of campaigns against government installations in Aleppo;{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} the attacks became urban [[guerrilla warfare]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} The government began to lose control in the city and, inspired by events, similar disturbances spread to Hama, Homs, Idlib, Latakia, Deir ez-Zor, Maaret-en-Namen and Jisr esh-Shagour.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} Those affected by Ba'athist repression began to rally behind the insurgents; Ba'ath Party co-founder Bitar supported the uprising, rallying the old, anti-military Ba'athists.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} The increasing threat to the government's survival strengthened the hard-liners, who favored repression over concessions.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} Security forces began to purge all state, party and social institutions in Syria, and were sent to the northern provinces to quell the uprising.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} When this failed, the hard-liners began accusing the United States of fomenting the uprising and called for the reinstatement of "revolutionary vigilance".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} The hard-liners won the debate after a failed attempt on Assad's life in June 1980,{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} and began responding to the uprising with [[state terrorism]] later that year.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} Under Rifaat al-Assad, Islamic prisoners at the Tadmur prison were massacred, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood became a capital offence and the government sent a [[death squad]] to kill Bitar and Attar's former wife.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} The military court began condemning captured prisoners, which "sometimes degenerated into indiscriminate killings".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} Little care was taken to distinguish Muslim Brotherhood hard-liners from their passive supporters,{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} and violence was met with violence.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}}
[[File:After Hama Massacre 18.jpg|thumb|Destruction in Hama in 1982. The inscription left by Syrian forces reads: "There is no god but the Motherland, there is no messenger but Ba'ath".]]
Ultimately this culminated in the [[1982 Hama massacre]]{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} when the government crushed the uprising.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=97}} Helicopter gunships, bulldozers, and artillery bombardment razed the city, killing thousands of people.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=97}} The Ba'ath government withstood the uprising, not because of popular support, but because the opposition was disorganised and had little urban support.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=97}} Throughout the uprising, the Sunni middle class continued to support the Ba'ath Party because of its dislike of political Islam.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=97}} After the uprising the government resumed its version of militaristic Leninism, reverting the liberalization introduced when Assad came to power.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=98}} The Ba'ath Party was weakened by the uprising; democratic elections for delegates to the Regional and National Congresses were halted, and open discussion within the party ended.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=98}} The uprising made Syria more totalitarian than ever, and strengthened Assad's position as undisputed leader of Syria.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=98}}