Editing George Armstrong Custer (section)

====Debate over tactics====

{{quote box|width=23em|When writing about Custer, neutral ground is elusive. What should Custer have done at any of the critical junctures that rapidly presented themselves, each now the subject of endless speculation and rumination? There will always be a variety of opinions based upon what Custer knew, what he did not know, and what he could not have known...|—from ''Touched by Fire: The Life, Death, and Mythic Afterlife of George Armstrong Custer'' by [[Louise Barnett]].<ref name="b540"/>}}

The controversy over blame for the disaster at Little Bighorn continues to this day. Major [[Marcus Reno]]'s failure to press his attack on the south end of the Lakota/Cheyenne village and his flight to the timber along the river after a single casualty have been cited as a factor in the destruction of Custer's battalion, as has Captain [[Frederick Benteen]]'s allegedly tardy arrival on the field and the failure of the two officers' combined forces to move toward the relief of Custer.<ref>Nelson Appleton Miles, Personal recollections and observations of General Nelson A. Miles embracing a brief view of the Civil War, or, From New England to the Golden Gate : and the story of his Indian campaigns, with comments on the exploration, development and progress of our great western empire. (Chicago: Werner, 1896). Chapter XXII, pp. 289–290.</ref> Some of Custer's critics have asserted tactical errors.<ref name=":0" />
* While camped at Powder River, Custer refused the support offered by General Terry on June 21 of an additional four companies of the Second Cavalry. Custer stated that he "could whip any Indian village on the Plains"{{Citation needed|date=May 2023}} with his own regiment and that extra troops would simply be a burden.
* At the same time, he left behind at the steamer ''Far West'' on the Yellowstone and a battery of [[Gatling guns]], although he knew he was facing superior numbers. Before leaving the camp, all the troops, including the officers, also boxed their sabers and sent them back with the wagons.<ref>[http://www.astonisher.com/archives/museum/wm_slaper_little_big_horn.html "William Slaper's Story of the Battle"], Personal account by a trooper in M company 7th Cavalry.</ref>
* On the day of the battle, Custer divided his 600-man command, despite being faced with vastly superior numbers of Sioux and Cheyenne.
* The refusal of an extra battalion reduced the size of his force by at least a sixth, and rejecting the firepower offered by the Gatling guns played into the events of June 25 to the disadvantage of his regiment.<ref>Goodrich, ''Scalp Dance'', 1997, pp. 233–234.</ref>

Custer's defenders, however, including historian Charles K. Hofling, have asserted that Gatling guns would have been slow and cumbersome as the troops crossed the rough country between the Yellowstone and the Little Bighorn.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=354YOkSKZXcC&q=nelson+miles+on+little+bighorn&pg=PA27 |title=Custer and the Little Big Horn: A ... – Google Books |date= June 1985|access-date=November 4, 2010|isbn=978-0-8143-1814-0|last1=Hofling |first1=Charles K |publisher=Wayne State University Press }}</ref> Custer rated speed in gaining the battlefield as essential and more important. Supporters of Custer claim that splitting the forces was a standard tactic, so as to demoralize the enemy with the appearance of the cavalry in different places all at once, especially when a contingent threatened the line of retreat.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.stevenwkohlhagen.com/custer-luck-runs-out-or-what-really-did-happen-at-the-little-bighorn/|title=Supporters|publisher=stevenwkohlhagen.com|access-date=June 22, 2018}}</ref>