Editing First Opium War (section)

=== Technology and tactics ===

==== British ====
The British military superiority during the conflict drew heavily on the strength of the Royal Navy.<ref name="victorianweb-1839" />

British warships carried more guns than their Chinese opponents and were manoeuvrable enough to evade Chinese boarding actions. Steam ships such as the ''[[Nemesis (1839)|Nemesis]]'' were able to move against winds and tides in Chinese rivers, and were armed with heavy guns and [[Congreve rocket]]s.<ref name="victorianweb-1839">{{Cite web |title=The Nemesis – Great Britain's Secret Weapon in the Opium Wars, 1839–60 |url=http://www.victorianweb.org/history/empire/opiumwars/nemesis.html |access-date=30 May 2017 |website=www.victorianweb.org}}</ref> Several of the larger British warships in China (notably the third-rates HMS ''Cornwallis'', [[HMS Wellesley (1815)|HMS ''Wellesley'']], and [[HMS Melville (1817)|HMS ''Melville'']]) carried more guns than entire fleets of Chinese junks.<ref name="Hall-1846" />{{Primary source inline|date=November 2022}} British naval superiority allowed the Royal Navy to attack Chinese forts with very little risk to themselves, as British naval cannons out-ranged the vast majority of the Qing artillery.<ref name="Hall-1846" />{{Primary source inline|date=November 2022}}

British soldiers in China were equipped with [[Brunswick rifle]]s and [[Brown Bess musket|rifle-modified Brown Bess muskets]], both of which possessed an effective firing range of 200–300&nbsp;metres.<ref name="Opiumwar blog-2014">{{Cite web |date=22 November 2014 |title=Warfare technology in the Opium War |url=https://opiumwarexhibition.wordpress.com/2014/11/22/warfare-technology-in-the-opium-war/ |access-date=30 May 2017 |website=The Opium War, 1839–1842}}</ref>{{better source needed|reason=this is a wordpress blog that uses total war center, a forum dedicated to a strategy video game, as a source|date=November 2021}} British marines were equipped with [[percussion cap]]s that greatly reduced weapon misfires and allowed firearms to be used in damp environments. In terms of gunpowder, the British formula was better manufactured and contained more sulphur than the Chinese mixture.<ref name="Opiumwar blog-2014" />{{better source needed|reason=this is a wordpress blog that uses total war center, a forum dedicated to a strategy video game, as a source|date=November 2021}} This granted British weapons an advantage in terms of range, accuracy and projectile velocity. British artillery was lighter (owing to improved [[forging]] methods) and more manoeuvrable than the cannons used by the Chinese. As with the naval artillery, British guns out-ranged the Chinese cannon.{{citation needed|date=March 2020}}

In terms of tactics, the British forces in China followed doctrines established during the [[Napoleonic Wars]] that had been adapted during the various colonial wars of the 1820s and 1830s. Many of the British soldiers deployed to China were veterans of [[British conquest of India|colonial wars in India]] and had experience fighting larger but technologically inferior armies.<ref>Jackson, Major Donovan (1940). ''India's Army''. London: Low, Marston. pp. 1–8. {{ISBN|8187226374}}</ref> In battle, the British [[line infantry]] would advance towards the enemy in columns, forming ranks once they had closed to firing range. Companies would commence firing volleys into the enemy ranks until they retreated. If a position needed to be taken, an advance or charge with [[bayonet]]s would be ordered. [[Light infantry]] companies screened the line infantry formations, protecting their flanks and utilising skirmishing tactics to disrupt the enemy.<ref name="Luscombe" /> British artillery was used to destroy the Qing artillery and break up enemy formations. During the conflict, the British superiority in range, rate of fire, and accuracy allowed the infantry to deal significant damage to their enemy before the Chinese could return fire.<ref>Kim Joosam "An Analysis of the Process of Modernization in East Asia and the Corresponding changes in China and Japan after the Opium Wars", ''Asian Study'' 11.3 (2009). ''The Korean Association of Philippine Studies''. Web.</ref>{{full citation needed|reason=cites web without url|date=November 2022}} The use of naval artillery to support infantry operations allowed the British to take cities and forts with minimal casualties.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Welcome to Zhenhai coast defence history museum |url=http://www.zhkhfsg.com/en/about.asp |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304054623/http://www.zhkhfsg.com/en/about.asp |archive-date=4 March 2016 |access-date=30 May 2017 |website=www.zhkhfsg.com}}</ref>{{failed verification|date=September 2021}}<ref name="Hederic">Hederic, p. 234</ref>{{Failed verification|date=September 2021}}

The overall strategy of the British during the war was to inhibit the finances of the Qing Empire, with the ultimate goal of acquiring a colonial possession on the Chinese coast. This was accomplished through the capture of Chinese cities and by blockading major river systems.<ref name="Cone">Cone, Daniel. [http://history.emory.edu/home/documents/endeavors/volume4/Cone.pdf An Indefensible Defense:The Incompetence of Qing Dynasty Officials in the Opium Wars, and the Consequences of Defeat] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170828210706/http://history.emory.edu/home/documents/endeavors/volume4/Cone.pdf |date=28 August 2017 }}.</ref> Once a fort or city had been captured, the British would destroy the local arsenal and disable all of the captured guns.<ref name="Hederic" />{{Failed verification|date=September 2021}} They would then move on to the next target, leaving a small garrison behind. This strategy was planned and implemented by Major General Gough, who was able to operate with minimal input from the British government after Superintendent Elliot was recalled in 1841.<ref>Hoiberg. pp. 28–30</ref> The large number of private British merchants and East India Company ships deployed in [[Singapore]] and the India colonies ensured that the British forces in China were adequately supplied.<ref>''Bulletins of State Intelligence'' 1841, p. 348</ref><ref name="Farooqui-2005" />{{page needed|date=September 2021}}
<gallery class="center" widths="355px" heights="355px">
File:Attack on war junks.jpg|A Royal Navy steamship destroying a Chinese junk with a Congreve rocket. Lightly armoured Chinese warships were decimated by heavy guns and explosive weaponry.
File:Joss House, Chapoo 1842.jpg|British line infantry advancing on a Chinese position.
</gallery>

==== Qing dynasty ====
China did not have a unified navy, instead allowing individual provinces to manage naval defenses.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Dreyer |first=Edward L. |title=Zheng He: China and the Ocean in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405–1433 |year=2007 |publisher=Pearson |location=New York |page=180}}</ref> Although the Qing had invested in naval defences for their adjacent seas in earlier periods, after the death of the [[Qianlong Emperor]] in 1799, the navy decayed as more attention was directed to suppressing the [[Miao Rebellion]] and White Lotus Rebellion. These conflicts left the Qing treasury bankrupt. The remaining naval forces were badly overstretched, undermanned, underfunded and uncoordinated.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Po |first=Ronald C. |title=The Blue Frontier: Maritime Vision and Power in the Qing Empire Cambridge Oceanic Histories |year=2018 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1108424615 |page=80}}</ref>

From the onset of the war, the Chinese navy was severely disadvantaged. Chinese war junks were intended for use against pirates or equivalent types of vessels, and were more effective in close range river engagements. Due to their ships' slow speeds, Qing captains consistently found themselves sailing towards much more manoeuvrable British ships, and as a consequence the Chinese could only use their bow guns.<ref>Bingham 1843, p. 399</ref>{{Primary source inline|date=March 2022}} The size of the British ships made traditional boarding tactics useless, and the junks carried smaller numbers of inferior weaponry.<ref name="BSI-1842b" />{{Primary source inline|date=November 2022}} In addition, the Chinese ships were poorly armoured; in several battles, British shells and rockets penetrated Chinese magazines and detonated gunpowder stores. Highly manoeuvrable steamships such as HMS ''Nemesis'' could decimate small fleets of junks, as the junks had little chance of catching up to and engaging the faster British steamers.<ref name="Hall-1846" />{{Primary source inline|date=November 2022}} The only western-style warship in the Qing Navy, the converted [[East Indiaman]] [[Porcher (1799 ship)|''Cambridge'']], was destroyed in the Battle of First Bar.<ref>Bingham (1843), p. 72.</ref>{{Primary source inline|date=March 2022}}

Apparently, the Chinese emperor was aware of this. In an 1842 edict he said:
<blockquote>... the invasion by the rebellious barbarians, they depended upon their strong ships and effective guns to commit outrageous acts on the seas and harm our people, largely because the native war junks are too small to match them. For this reason I, the emperor, repeatedly ordered our generals to resist on land and not to fight on seas ... When the enemy ships come, no resistance can be offered; when they go away no means of pursuit are available ... In my opinion what the rebellious barbarians rely upon is the fact that Chinese war junks are incapable of going out to sea to fight them.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Chang |first=T. T. |title=Sino Portuguese Trade from 1514 to 1644 |year=1934 |location=Leyden |page=120}}</ref></blockquote>
The defensive nature of the conflict resulted in the Chinese relying heavily on an extensive network of fortifications. The [[Kangxi Emperor]] (1654–1722) began the construction of river defences to combat pirates, and encouraged the use of western style cannons. By the time of the First Opium War, multiple forts defended most major Chinese cities and waterways. Although the forts were well armed and strategically positioned, the Qing defeat exposed major flaws in their design. The cannons used in the Qing defensive fortifications were a collection of Chinese, Portuguese, Spanish, and British pieces.<ref>McPherson, Carruthers (2013) pp. 53</ref> The domestically produced Chinese cannon were crafted using sub-par forging methods, limiting their effectiveness in combat and causing excessive gun barrel wear. The Chinese blend of gunpowder also contained more charcoal than the British mixture did;{{citation needed|date=August 2024}} while this made it more stable and thus easier to store, it also limited its potential as a propellant, decreasing projectile range and accuracy.<ref>{{harvp|Mao|2016|p=32}}</ref><ref name="Opiumwar blog-2014" />{{better source needed|reason=this is a wordpress blog that uses total war center, a forum dedicated to a strategy video game, as a source|date=November 2021}} Overall, Chinese cannon technology was considered to be 200 years behind that of the British.<ref>{{harvp|Mao|2016|p=27}}</ref>

Chinese forts were unable to withstand attacks by European weaponry, as they were designed without angled [[glacis]] and many did not have protected magazines.<ref name="Cone" /><ref name="Rait-1903b">Rait (1903) pp. 189, 231</ref> The limited range of the Qing cannon allowed the British to bombard the Qing defences from a safe distance, then land soldiers to storm them with minimal risk. Many of the larger Chinese guns were built as fixed emplacements and were unable to be maneuvered to fire at British ships.<ref name="PBS-2017">PBS.org, "''The Story of China; Age of Revolution''". Aired 7 November 2017. https://www.pbs.org/video/3001741892/</ref> The failure of the Qing fortifications coupled with the Chinese underestimation of the Royal Navy allowed the British to force their way up major rivers and impede Qing logistics.<ref name="Cone" /> Most notably, the powerful series of forts at Humen were well positioned to stop an invader from proceeding upriver to Guangzhou, but it had not been considered that an enemy would attack and destroy the forts themselves, as the British did during the war.<ref>Haijian, Mao (2016). ''The Qing Empire and the Opium War''. Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1107069879}}. p. 201</ref>

At the start of the war the Qing army consisted of over 200,000 soldiers, with around 800,000 men being able to be called for war. These forces consisted of Manchu [[Bannermen (ethnic group)|bannermen]], the [[Green Standard Army]], provincial militias, and imperial garrisons. The Qing armies were armed with matchlocks and shotguns, which had an effective range of 100&nbsp;metres.<ref name="Opiumwar blog-2014" />{{better source needed|reason=this is a wordpress blog that uses total war center, a forum dedicated to a strategy video game, as a source|date=November 2021}} Chinese historians Liu and Zhang note that the Chinese soldiers "were equipped with sixty or seventy percent traditional weapons, of which the most important were the long lance, the side sword, the bow and arrow, and the rattan shield, and only thirty or forty percent [of their armament consisted of] gunpowder weapons, of which the most important were the matchlock musket, the heavy musket, the cannon, the fire arrow, and the earthshaking bomb and such things."<ref name="Andrade-2016">{{Cite book |last=Andrade |first=Tonio |author-link=Tonio Andrade |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1jRJCgAAQBAJ&q=liu+and+zhang+qing+military&pg=PA241 |title=The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History |year=2016 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-1-4008-7444-6}}</ref>{{page needed|date=September 2021}} Chinese soldiers were also equipped with halberds, spears, swords, and crossbows. The Qing dynasty also employed large batteries of artillery in battle.<ref name="Westminster-1903">{{Cite web |year=1903 |title=The life and campaigns of Hugh, first Viscount Gough, Field-Marshal |url=https://archive.org/stream/cu31924088002120#page/n269/mode/2up |access-date=3 June 2016 |website=archive.org |publisher=Westminster, A. Constable & Co.}}</ref>

The tactics of the Qing remained consistent with what they had been in previous centuries.<ref name="Andrade-2016" />{{page needed|date=November 2021}}<ref>[[Military of the Qing dynasty#CITEREFElliott2001|Elliott 2001]], pp. 283–284.</ref> Soldiers with firearms would form ranks and fire volleys into the enemy while men armed with spears and pikes would drive the enemy off of the battlefield.<ref>[[Military of the Qing dynasty#CITEREFElliott2001|Elliott 2001]], pp. 283–284, 300–303.</ref> Cavalry was used to break infantry formations and pursue routed enemies, while Qing artillery was used to scatter enemy formations and destroy fortifications.<ref>[[Qing dynasty#CITEREFCrossleySiuSutton2006|CrossleySiuSutton (2006)]], p. [https://books.google.com/books?id=EtNVMUx9qIIC&pg=PA50 50]</ref> During the First Opium War, these tactics were unable to successfully deal with British firepower. Chinese melee formations were decimated by artillery, and Chinese soldiery armed with matchlocks could not effectively exchange fire with British ranks, who greatly outranged them.<ref>Rait (1903) p. 228</ref><ref name="Luscombe" /> Most battles of the war were fought in cities or on cliffs and riverbanks, limiting the Qing usage of cavalry. Many Qing cannon were destroyed by British [[counter-battery fire]], and British light infantry companies were consistently able to outflank and capture Chinese artillery batteries.<ref name="Rait-1903b" />{{failed verification|date=November 2021}} A British officer said of the opposing Qing forces, "The Chinese are robust muscular fellows, and no cowards; the Tartars [i.e. Manchus] desperate; but neither are well commanded nor acquainted with European warfare. Having had, however, experience of three of them, I am inclined to suppose that a Tartar bullet is not a whit softer than a French one."<ref name="Westminster-1903" />

The strategy of the Qing dynasty during the war was to prevent the British from seizing Chinese territory.<ref name="Westminster-1903" /> This defensive strategy was hampered by the Qing severely underestimating the capacity of the British military. Qing defences on the Pearl and Yangtze rivers were ineffective in stopping the British push inland, and superior naval artillery prevented the Chinese from retaking cities.<ref name="Waley 2013 p. 171" /><ref name="China: The First Opium War" /> The Qing imperial bureaucracy was unable to react quickly to the prodding British attacks, while officials and commanders often reported false, faulty, or incomplete information to their superiors.<ref>Waley 1958, pp. 71–73</ref> The Qing military system made it difficult to deploy troops to counter the mobile British forces.<ref>{{harvp|Mao|2016|p=204}}</ref> In addition, the ongoing conflict with Sikhs on the Qing border with India drew away some of the most experienced Qing units from the war with Britain.<ref name="Rubin-1960" />{{page range too broad|date=September 2021}}

<gallery class="center" widths="355px" heights="355px">
File:Chinese soldiers with gingals.jpg|Chinese soldiers armed with a [[gingal]] during the First Opium War.
</gallery>