Editing European Court of Human Rights (section)

===Implementation===
[[File:Compliance with all compliance-relevant judgments of the European Court of Human Rights as of 10 March 2017.png|thumb|Compliance with all compliance-relevant judgments of the European Court of Human Rights as of 10 March 2017. At that date, the oldest non-complied judgement was from 1996.{{sfn|von Staden|2018|p=23}}|262x262px]]
[[File:Implementation of European Court of Human Rights verdicts as of August 2021.svg|thumb|Implementation of leading cases from the last 10 years as of August 2021. No implementation is coloured black while 100% implementation is white. Average implementation is 53%, with the lowest being [[Azerbaijan in the Council of Europe|Azerbaijan]] (4%) and [[Russia in the Council of Europe|Russia]] (10%) and the highest Luxembourg, Monaco, and Estonia (100%) and Czechia (96%). (Belarus appears white here because it is excluded from the map: it is not a member state and does not implement rulings.)<ref>{{cite web |title=Country Map |url=https://www.einnetwork.org/countries-overview |website=European Implementation Network |access-date=25 September 2021}}</ref>|262x262px]]

The court lacks enforcement powers. Some states have ignored ECtHR verdicts and continued practices judged to be human rights violations.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Abdelgawad |first1=Élisabeth Lambert |editor1-first=András |editor1-last=Jakab |editor2-first=Dimitry |editor2-last=Kochenov |chapter=The Enforcement of ECtHR Judgments|title=The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States' Compliance |year=2017 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-180848-7 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746560.001.0001}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Glas |first1=Lize R. |title=The European Court of Human Rights supervising the execution of its judgments |journal=Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights |date=2019 |volume=37 |issue=3 |pages=228–244 |doi=10.1177/0924051919861844|s2cid=198671225 |doi-access=free |hdl=2066/206988 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> Although all damages must be paid to the applicant within the time frame specified by the court (usually three months) or else will accumulate interest, there is no formal deadline for any more complex compliance required by the judgement. However, by leaving a judgement unimplemented for a long period of time, brings into question the state's commitment to addressing human rights violations in a timely fashion.{{sfn|von Staden|2018|pp=22, 24}}

The number of non-implemented judgements rose from 2,624 in 2001 to 9,944 at the end of 2016, 48% of which had gone without implementation five years or more. In 2016, all but one of the 47 member countries of the Council of Europe had not implemented at least one ECtHR verdict in a timely fashion, although most non-implemented verdicts concern a few countries: Italy (2,219), Russia (1,540), Turkey (1,342), and Ukraine (1,172). More than 3,200 non-implemented judgements "concerned violations by security forces and poor detention conditions".<ref name=Hervey/>

Council of Europe [[Commissioner for Human Rights]], [[Nils Muižnieks]], stated: "Our work is based on cooperation and good faith. When you don't have that, it's very difficult to have an impact. We kind of lack the tools to help countries that don't want to be helped."<ref name=Hervey>{{cite news |last1=Hervey |first1=Ginger |title=Europe's human rights court struggles to lay down the law |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/human-rights-court-ilgar-mammadov-azerbaijan-struggles-to-lay-down-the-law/ |access-date=4 September 2020 |work=POLITICO |date=20 September 2017}}</ref> Russia systematically ignores ECtHR verdicts, paying compensation in most cases but refusing to fix the problem, leading to a high number of repeat cases.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Mälksoo |first1=Lauri |title=Russia and the European Court of Human Rights |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-23507-5 |pages=3–25|date=2017 |chapter-url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/russia-and-the-european-court-of-human-rights/introduction/96C2DC95C4B59C40D8E73AF5F5BE7CEB/core-reader |language=en |chapter=Introduction}}</ref> Russian legislation has set up a specific fund for paying the claimants in successful ECtHR verdicts.<ref name="Fikfak" />

Notable non-implemented judgements include:
*In ''[[Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2)|Hirst v. United Kingdom]]'' (2005), and several subsequent cases, the court found that a blanket deprivation of suffrage to British prisoners violated Article 3 of Protocol 1, which guarantees the [[right to vote]]. A minimal compromise was implemented in 2017.<ref>{{cite news |title=Prisoner voting rights compromise struck |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-42271100 |access-date=14 September 2020 |work=BBC News |date=7 December 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Celiksoy |first1=Ergul |title=Execution of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Prisoners' Right to Vote Cases |journal=Human Rights Law Review |date=2020 |volume=20 |issue=3 |pages=555–581 |doi=10.1093/hrlr/ngaa027}}</ref>
*The [[Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina]] was first ruled to be discriminatory in 2009 (''[[Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina]]''), for preventing Bosnian citizens who were not of Bosniak, Croat, or Serb ethnicity from being elected to certain state offices. As of December 2019, the discriminatory provisions have yet to be repealed or amended, despite three subsequent cases confirming their incompatibility with the Convention.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Milanovic |first1=Marko |title=Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina |journal=American Journal of International Law |date=2010 |volume=104 |issue=4 |pages=636–641 |doi=10.5305/amerjintelaw.104.4.0636|s2cid=155306157 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Zivanovic |first1=Maja |title=Bosnia Constitution Still 'Outrageously' Violates Minority Rights – HRW |url=https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/13/bosnia-constitution-still-outrageously-violates-minority-rights-hrw/ |access-date=4 September 2020 |work=Balkan Insight |date=13 December 2019}}</ref>
*In ''[[Alekseyev v. Russia]]'' (2010), the ban on [[Moscow Pride]] was judged to violate [[freedom of assembly]]. In 2012, Russian courts banned the event for the next 100 years.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Johnson |first1=P. |title=Homosexuality, Freedom of Assembly and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights: Alekseyev v Russia |journal=Human Rights Law Review |date=2011 |volume=11 |issue=3 |pages=578–593 |doi=10.1093/hrlr/ngr020}}</ref><ref name=Russia2020/><ref name=Bartenev/> The ECtHR confirmed its ruling that bans on pride parades violate freedom of assembly rights in ''Alekseyev and Others v. Russia'' (2018).<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Cannoot |first1=Pieter |title=Alekseyev and Others v. Russia (Eur. Ct. H.R.) |journal=International Legal Materials |date=2019 |volume=58 |issue=6 |pages=1251–1280 |doi=10.1017/ilm.2019.53|s2cid=212883311 |url=https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8639782 }}</ref>
* ''[[Bayev and Others v. Russia]]'' (2017), relating to the [[Russian gay propaganda law]] and related laws, which the court judged to abridge [[freedom of speech]].<ref name=Russia2020>{{cite journal |last1=Endsjø |first1=Dag Øistein |title=The other way around? How freedom of religion may protect LGBT rights |journal=The International Journal of Human Rights |date=2020 |volume=24 |issue=10 |pages=1681–1700 |doi=10.1080/13642987.2020.1763961|doi-access=free|hdl=10852/83580 |hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref name=Bartenev>{{cite book |last1=Bartenev |first1=Dmitri |title=Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Strasbourg Effect |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-25687-2 |pages=326–352 |chapter=LGBT rights in Russia and European human rights standards|date=2017|doi=10.1017/9781108235075.013}}</ref>
*Azerbaijani opposition politician [[Ilgar Mammadov]], whose imprisonment the ECtHR ruled illegal in 2014; he was not released until 2018.<ref name=Hervey/> He was subsequently acquitted and paid compensation.<!--ref: see his article-->
*Following ''Burmych and Others v. Ukraine'' (2017), the ECtHR dismissed all 12,143 cases following the pattern of ''Ivanov v. Ukraine'' (2009) as well as any future cases following that pattern, handing them to the Department of Execution at the Council of Europe for enforcement. These cases all involved complainants not being paid money they were due under Ukrainian law.<ref name="Fikfak" /><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ulfstein |first1=Geir |last2=Zimmermann |first2=Andreas |title=Certiorari through the Back Door? The Judgment by the European Court of Human Rights in Burmych and Others v. Ukraine in Perspective |journal=The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals |date=2018 |volume=17 |issue=2 |pages=289–308 |doi=10.1163/15718034-12341381|hdl=10852/67292 |s2cid=149916470 |url=http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-70469 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> In the eight years between ''Ivanov'' and ''Burmych'', Ukraine made no effort to resolve these cases, leading the ECtHR to "effectively [give] up on trying to incentivize Ukraine to comply with its judgments".<ref name="Fikfak" /> As of 2020, the money owed to the complainants in these cases remains unpaid.<ref name="Fikfak" />

Another issue is delayed implementation of judgements.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Szklanna |first1=Agnieszka |title=European Yearbook on Human Rights 2018 |publisher=Intersentia |isbn=978-1-78068-800-8 |pages=445–464 |edition=1 |doi=10.1017/9781780688008.019 |chapter=Delays in the Implementation of ECtHR Judgments: The Example of Cases Concerning Electoral Issues|year=2018 |s2cid=189722427 }}</ref>