Editing Balfour Declaration (section)

== Reaction ==

The text of the declaration was published in the press one week after it was signed, on 9{{nbsp}}November 1917.{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=342}} Other related events took place within a short timeframe, the two most relevant being the almost immediate British military capture of Palestine and the leaking of the previously secret Sykes–Picot Agreement. On the military side, both [[Third Battle of Gaza|Gaza]] and [[Battle of Jaffa (1917)|Jaffa fell]] within several days, and [[Battle of Jerusalem|Jerusalem was surrendered]] to the British on 9 December.{{sfn|Grainger|2006|pp=109–114}} The publication of the Sykes–Picot Agreement, following the Russian Revolution, in the Bolshevik ''[[Izvestia]]'' and ''[[Pravda]]'' on 23 November 1917 and in the British ''[[The Guardian|Manchester Guardian]]'' on 26 November 1917, represented a dramatic moment for the Allies' Eastern campaign:{{sfn|Ulrichsen|Ulrichsen|2014|p=157}}{{sfn|Allawi|2014|p=108}} "the British were embarrassed, the Arabs dismayed and the Turks delighted."<ref>[[Peter Mansfield (historian)|Peter Mansfield]], ''The British Empire '' magazine, no. 75, Time-Life Books, 1973</ref> The Zionists had been aware of the outlines of the agreement since April and specifically the part relevant to Palestine, following a meeting between Weizmann and Cecil where Weizmann made very clear his objections to the proposed scheme.{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=223}}

=== Zionist reaction ===

[[File:Balfour Declaration in the Times 9 November 1917.jpg|thumb|left|Balfour Declaration as published in ''[[The Times]]'', 9{{nbsp}}November 1917]]
The declaration represented the first public support for Zionism by a major political power{{sfn|Caplan|2011|p=78|ps=: "...&nbsp;becoming the first major power&nbsp;..."}} – its publication galvanized Zionism, which finally had obtained an official charter.{{sfn|Stein|2003|p=129}} In addition to its publication in major newspapers, leaflets were circulated throughout Jewish communities. These leaflets were [[airdrop]]ped over Jewish communities in Germany and Austria, as well as the [[Pale of Settlement]], which [[Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Ukraine–Central Powers)|had been given to the Central Powers]] following the Russian withdrawal.{{sfn|Palestine Royal Commission|1937|p=23}}

Weizmann had argued that the declaration would have three effects: it would swing Russia to maintain pressure on Germany's [[Eastern Front (World War I)|Eastern Front]], since Jews had been prominent in the [[February Revolution|March Revolution of 1917]]; it would rally the large Jewish community in the United States to press for greater funding for the [[American entry into World War I|American war effort]], underway since April of that year; and, lastly, that it would undermine German Jewish support for [[Wilhelm II|Kaiser Wilhelm II]].{{sfn|Watts|2008|p=190a}}

The declaration spurred an unintended and extraordinary increase in the number of adherents of American Zionism; in 1914 the 200 American Zionist societies comprised a total of 7,500 members, which grew to 30,000 members in 600 societies in 1918 and 149,000 members in 1919.{{efn|group=lower-roman|name=Reinharz2}} Whilst the British had considered that the declaration reflected a previously established dominance of the Zionist position in Jewish thought, it was the declaration itself that was subsequently responsible for Zionism's legitimacy and leadership.{{efn|group=lower-roman|James Renton wrote: "Overall, it is clear that the Declaration, the Anglo-Zionist propaganda campaign, the public support from international labour and President Wilson gave the Zionists a powerful position from which to further their influence in American Jewry. This could not have been further from the effect intended by the British Government. The Balfour Declaration was certainly not meant as a tool to aid the growth of the Zionist movement, or to exacerbate communal divisions. Its issuance was supposed to reflect a shift that had already taken place within world Jewry, but in fact was responsible for the Zionists claim to legitimacy and leadership."{{sfn|Renton|2007|p=148}}}}

Exactly one month after the declaration was issued, a large-scale celebration took place at the [[Royal Opera House]] – speeches were given by leading Zionists as well as members of the British administration including Sykes and Cecil.{{sfn|Sokolow|1919|pp=99–116|ps=; Sokolow published the speeches in full.}} From 1918 until the [[Second World War]], Jews in [[Mandatory Palestine]] celebrated [[Balfour Day]] as an annual national holiday on 2{{nbsp}}November.{{sfn|Sorek|2015|p=25}} The celebrations included ceremonies in schools and other public institutions and festive articles in the Hebrew press.{{sfn|Sorek|2015|p=25}} In August 1919 Balfour approved Weizmann's request to name the first post-war settlement in Mandatory Palestine, "[[Balfouria]]", in his honour.{{sfn|Tomes|2002|p=198}}{{sfn|Glass|2002|p=199}} It was intended to be a model settlement for future American Jewish activity in Palestine.{{sfn|Glass|2002|p=200}}

Herbert Samuel, the Zionist MP whose 1915 memorandum had framed the start of discussions in the British Cabinet, was asked by Lloyd George on 24{{nbsp}}April 1920 to act as the first [[High Commissioners for Palestine and Transjordan|civil governor of British Palestine]], replacing the [[Occupied Enemy Territory Administration|previous military administration]] that had ruled the area since the war.{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=94}} Shortly after beginning the role in July 1920, he was invited to read the ''[[haftarah]]'' from [[Isaiah 40]] at the [[Hurva Synagogue]] in Jerusalem,{{sfn|Domnitch|2000|pp=111–112}} which, according to his memoirs, led the congregation of older settlers to feel that the "fulfilment of ancient prophecy might at last be at hand".{{efn|group=qt|On walking to the [[Hurva Synagogue]] on [[Shabbat Nachamu]], Samuel wrote in his memoirs that he "found the surrounding streets densely thronged, and the great building itself packed to the doors and to the roof, mostly by older settlers, some of those who had come to live, and to die, in the Holy City for piety's sake. Now, on that day, for the first time since the destruction of the Temple, they could see one of their own people as governor in the Land of Israel. To them, it seemed that the fulfilment of ancient prophecy might at last be at hand. When, in accordance with the usual ritual, I was 'called to the Reading of the Law' and from the central platform recited in Hebrew the prayer and the blessing, 'Have mercy upon Zion, for it is the home of our life, and save her that is grieved in spirit, speedily, even in our days. Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who makest Zion joyful through her children': and when there followed the opening words of a chapter of Isaiah appointed for that day, 'Comfort ye, comfort ye my people, saith your God. Speak ye comfortably to Jerusalem, and cry unto her, that her warfare is accomplished, that her iniquity is pardoned,' – the emotion that I could not but feel seemed to spread throughout the vast congregation. Many wept. One could almost hear the sigh of generations."{{sfn|Samuel|1945|p=176}}}}{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=96}}

=== Opposition in Palestine ===

[[File:Filastin (La Palestine) March 25th 1925 editorial addressed to Lord Balfour.pdf|thumb|right|The most popular Palestinian Arab newspaper, ''[[Filastin (newspaper)|Filastin]]'', published a four-page editorial addressed to Lord Balfour in March 1925. The editorial begins with [[J'Accuse…!|"J'Accuse!", in a reference to the outrage at French anti-semitism 27 years previously]].]]
The local Christian and Muslim community of Palestine, who constituted [[Demographic history of Palestine (region)|almost 90% of the population]], strongly opposed the declaration.{{sfn|Palin Commission|1920|p=11}} As described by the Palestinian-American philosopher [[Edward Said]] in 1979, it was perceived as being made: "(a){{nbsp}}by a European power, (b){{nbsp}}about a non-European territory, (c){{nbsp}}in a flat disregard of both the presence and the wishes of the native majority resident in that territory, and (d){{nbsp}}it took the form of a promise about this same territory to another foreign group."{{efn|group=lower-roman|name=Said|[[Edward Said]] wrote in his 1979 ''The Question of Palestine'': "What is important about the declaration is, first, that it has long formed the juridical basis of Zionist claims to Palestine and, second, and more crucial for our purposes here, that it was a statement whose positional force can only be appreciated when the demographic or human realities of Palestine are kept clearly in mind. That is, the declaration was made (a)&nbsp;by a European power, (b)&nbsp;about a non-European territory, (c)&nbsp;in a flat disregard of both the presence and the wishes of the native majority resident in that territory, and (d)&nbsp;it took the form of a promise about this same territory to another foreign group, so that this foreign group might, quite literally, ''make'' this territory a national home for the Jewish people. There is not much use today in lamenting such a statement as the Balfour Declaration. It seems more valuable to see it as part of a history, of a style and set of characteristics centrally constituting the question of Palestine as it can be discussed even today."{{sfn|Said|1979|pp=15–16}}}}

According to the 1919 King–Crane Commission, "No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist programme could be carried out except by force of arms."{{sfn|Friedman|2000|p=273}} A delegation of the [[Muslim-Christian Associations|Muslim-Christian Association]], headed by [[Musa al-Husayni]], expressed public disapproval on 3{{nbsp}}November 1918, one day after the Zionist Commission parade marking the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration.{{sfn|Wasserstein|1991|p=31}} They handed a petition signed by more than 100 notables to Ronald Storrs, the British military governor:
{{Blockquote|We have noticed yesterday a large crowd of Jews carrying banners and over-running the streets shouting words which hurt the feeling and wound the soul. They pretend with open voice that Palestine, which is the Holy Land of our fathers and the graveyard of our ancestors, which has been inhabited by the Arabs for long ages, who loved it and died in defending it, is now a national home for them&nbsp;... We Arabs, Muslim and Christian, have always sympathized profoundly with the persecuted Jews and their misfortunes in other countries&nbsp;... but there is wide difference between such sympathy and the acceptance of such a nation&nbsp;... ruling over us and disposing of our affairs.{{sfn|Wasserstein|1991|p=32|ps=; Wasserstein quotes Storrs to OETA headquarters, 4 Nov. 1918 (ISA 2/140/4A)}}}}

The group also protested the carrying of new "white and blue banners with two inverted triangles in the middle",<ref name="Hun32" /> drawing the attention of the British authorities to the serious consequences of any political implications in raising the banners.<ref name="Hun32">{{harvnb|Huneidi|2001|p=32|ps=, Huneidi cites: Zu'aytir, Akram, Watha'iq al-haraka a-wataniyya al-filastiniyya (1918–1939), ed. Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hut. Beirut 1948. Papers, p.&nbsp;5.}}</ref> Later that month, on the first anniversary of the occupation of [[Jaffa]] by the British, the Muslim-Christian Association sent a lengthy memorandum and petition to the military governor protesting once more any formation of a Jewish state.{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=32a|ps=, Huneidi cites: 'Petition from the Moslem-Christian Association in Jaffa, to the Military Governor, on the occasion of the First Anniversary of British Entry into Jaffa', 16&nbsp;November 1918. Zu'aytir papers, pp.&nbsp;7–8.}} The majority of Britain's military leaders considered Balfour's declaration either a mistake, or one that presented grave risks.{{sfn|McTague|1978|p=76}}

=== Broader Arab response ===
In the broader Arab world, the declaration was seen as a betrayal of the British wartime understandings with the Arabs.{{sfn|Watts|2008|p=190a}} The Sharif of Mecca and other Arab leaders considered the declaration a violation of a previous commitment made in the McMahon–Hussein correspondence in exchange for launching the Arab Revolt.{{sfn|Shlaim|2005|pp=251–270}}

Following the publication of the declaration in an Egyptian newspaper, ''[[Al Muqattam]]'',<ref name=aida>{{cite thesis|author=Aida Ali Najjar|id={{ProQuest|288060869}}|title=The Arabic Press and Nationalism in Palestine, 1920-1948|url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/288060869|isbn=978-1-0838-5146-8
|location=Syracuse University|page=42|degree=PhD|year=1975}}</ref> the British dispatched Commander [[David George Hogarth]] to see Hussein in January 1918 bearing [[Hogarth Message|the message]] that the "political and economic freedom" of the Palestinian population was not in question.<ref name="Khouri"/> Hogarth reported that Hussein "would not accept an independent Jewish State in Palestine, nor was I instructed to warn him that such a state was contemplated by Great Britain".{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=66}} Hussein had also learned of the Sykes–Picot Agreement when it was leaked by the new [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] government in December 1917, but was satisfied by [[Bassett Letter|two disingenuous messages]] from Sir [[Reginald Wingate]], who had replaced McMahon as High Commissioner of Egypt, assuring him that the British commitments to the Arabs were still valid and that the Sykes–Picot Agreement was not a formal treaty.<ref name="Khouri"/>

Continuing Arab disquiet over Allied intentions also led during 1918 to the British [[Declaration to the Seven]] and the [[Anglo-French Declaration]], the latter promising "the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations".<ref name="Khouri" /><ref>[http://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/4c4f7515dc39195185256cf7006f878c Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151024004146/http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/4C4F7515DC39195185256CF7006F878C |date=24 October 2015 }}, UNISPAL, Annex&nbsp;A, paragraph&nbsp;19.</ref>

In 1919, King Hussein refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. After February 1920, the British ceased to pay subsidy to him.{{sfn|Paris|2003|p=249}} In August 1920, five days after the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, which formally recognized the Kingdom of Hejaz, Curzon asked Cairo to procure Hussein's signature to both treaties and agreed to make a payment of £30,000 conditional on signature.{{sfn|Mousa|1978|pp=184–5}} Hussein declined and in 1921, stated that he could not be expected to "affix his name to a document assigning Palestine to the Zionists and Syria to foreigners."{{sfn|Mousa|1978|p=185}} Following the 1921 Cairo Conference, Lawrence was sent to try and obtain the King's signature to a treaty as well as to Versailles and Sèvres, a £60,000 annual subsidy being proposed; this attempt also failed.{{sfn|Paris|2003|p=252}} During 1923, the British made one further attempt to settle outstanding issues with Hussein and once again, the attempt foundered, Hussein continued in his refusal to recognize the Balfour Declaration or any of the Mandates that he perceived as being his domain. In March 1924, having briefly considered the possibility of removing the offending article from the treaty, the government suspended any further negotiations;{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|pp=71–2}} within six months they withdrew their support in favour of their [[Sultanate of Nejd|central Arabian]] ally [[Ibn Saud]], who proceeded to [[Saudi conquest of Hejaz|conquer Hussein's kingdom]].{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=72}}

=== Allies and Associated Powers ===
The declaration was first endorsed by a foreign government on 27 December 1917, when [[Kingdom of Serbia|Serbian]] Zionist leader and diplomat [[David Albala]] announced the support of Serbia's [[government in exile]] during a [[Diplomatic mission|mission]] to the United States.{{sfn|Lebel|2007|pp=159, 212–213}}<ref>{{cite news|author=Michael Freund|newspaper=[[The Jerusalem Post]]|title=David Albala: Serbian Warrior, Zionist Hero|url=http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/David-Albala-Serbian-warrior-Zionist-hero-330619|date=4 November 2013|access-date=3 October 2017}}</ref>{{sfn|Mitrović|2016|p=71}}{{sfn|Rock|2019|p=112}} The French and Italian governments offered their endorsements, on 14 February and 9 May 1918, respectively.{{sfn|Palestine Royal Commission|1937|p=22}} At a [[1918 Clemenceau–Lloyd George Agreement (Middle East)|private meeting in London on 1 December 1918]], Lloyd George and French Prime Minister [[Georges Clemenceau]] agreed to certain modifications to the Sykes–Picot Agreement, including British control of Palestine.{{sfn|Rose|2010|p=17}}

On 25 April 1920, the [[San Remo conference]] – an outgrowth of the Paris Peace Conference attended by the prime ministers of Britain, France and Italy, the [[:Category:Ambassadors of Japan to France|Japanese Ambassador to France]], and the [[United States Ambassador to Italy]] – established the basic terms for three League of Nations mandates: a French mandate for Syria, and British mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine.{{sfn|Quigley|2010|pp=27–29}} With respect to Palestine, the resolution stated that the British were responsible for putting into effect the terms of the Balfour Declaration.{{sfn|Quigley|2010|p=29}} The French and the Italians made clear their dislike of the "Zionist cast of the Palestinian mandate" and objected especially to language that did not safeguard the "political" rights of non-Jews, accepting Curzon's claim that "in the British language all ordinary rights were included in "civil rights"".{{sfn|Pedersen|2015|p=35}} At the request of France, it was agreed that an undertaking was to be inserted in the mandate's [[procès-verbal]] that this would not involve the surrender of the rights hitherto enjoyed by the non-Jewish communities in Palestine.{{sfn|Quigley|2010|p=29}} The Italian endorsement of the Declaration had included the condition "...&nbsp;on the understanding that there is no prejudice against the legal and political status of the already existing religious communities&nbsp;..."<!-- "... che non ne venga nessun pregiudizio allo stato giuridico e politico delle gia esistenti communita religiose ..." --><ref>{{cite journal|author= Frank E. Manuel|title=The Palestine Question in Italian Diplomacy, 1917–1920|journal=The Journal of Modern History|volume=27|issue=3|pages=263–280|date= September 1955|jstor=1874269|doi=10.1086/237809|s2cid=154362416}}</ref> The boundaries of Palestine were left unspecified, to "be determined by the Principal Allied Powers."{{sfn|Quigley|2010|p=29}} Three months later, in July 1920, the French defeat of Faisal's [[Arab Kingdom of Syria]] precipitated the British need to know "what is the 'Syria' for which the French received a mandate at San Remo?" and "does it include Transjordania?"{{sfn|Wilson|1990|p=44|ps=: Wilson cites Hubert Young to Ambassador Hardinge (Paris), 27 July 1920, FO 371/5254}} – it subsequently decided to pursue a policy of associating [[Emirate of Transjordan|Transjordan]] with the mandated area of Palestine without adding it to the area of the Jewish National Home.{{sfn|Wilson|1990|pp=44, 46–48}}{{sfn|Wasserstein|2008|pp=105–106|ps=: "...&nbsp;the myth of Palestine's 'first partition'..."}}

In 1922, Congress officially endorsed America's support for the Balfour Declaration through the passage of the [[Lodge–Fish Resolution]],{{sfn|Lebow|1968|p=501}}<ref>67th Congress, {{USBill|67|hjres|322}}; [https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/67th-congress/Session%202/c67s2ch372.pdf pdf]</ref>{{sfn|Brecher|1987}} notwithstanding opposition from the State Department.{{sfn|Davidson|2002|pp=27–30}} Professor [[Lawrence Davidson]], of [[West Chester University]], whose research focuses on American relations with the Middle East, argues that President Wilson and Congress ignored democratic values in favour of "biblical romanticism" when they endorsed the declaration.{{sfn|Davidson|2002|p=1}} He points to an organized pro-Zionist lobby in the United States, which was active at a time when the country's small [[Arab Americans|Arab American]] community had little political power.{{sfn|Davidson|2002|p=1}}

=== Central Powers ===

The publication of the Balfour Declaration was met with tactical responses from the Central Powers;{{sfn|Friedman|1997|pp=340–343}} however the participation of the Ottoman Empire in the alliance meant that Germany was unable to effectively counter the British pronouncement.{{sfn|Polkehn|1975|p=89}}{{efn|group=qt|Weizmann explained as follows: "The German government, on the other hand, was deeply distressed that the British government should get the better of it. It called our representatives in Germany together and tried to explain to them that the German government would have eventually done the same thing, but that it could not because of its alliance with Turkey, which compelled it to move slowly in the matter."{{sfn|Polkehn|1975|p=89}}}}

Two weeks following the declaration, [[Ottokar Czernin]], the Austrian Foreign Minister, gave an interview to [[Arthur Menachem Hantke|Arthur Hantke]], President of the [[Zionist Federation of Germany]], promising that his government would influence the Turks once the war was over.{{sfn|Cohen|1946|p=120}} On 12{{nbsp}}December, the Ottoman [[Grand Vizier]], [[Talaat Pasha]], gave an interview to the German newspaper ''[[Vossische Zeitung]]''{{sfn|Cohen|1946|p=120}} that was published on 31{{nbsp}}December and subsequently released in the German-Jewish periodical ''[[Jüdische Rundschau]]'' on 4{{nbsp}}January 1918,{{sfn|Friedman|1997|p=379}}{{sfn|Cohen|1946|p=120}} in which he referred to the declaration as "une blague"{{sfn|Cohen|1946|p=120}} (a deception) and promised that under Ottoman rule "all justifiable wishes of the Jews in Palestine would be able to find their fulfilment" subject to the absorptive capacity of the country.{{sfn|Cohen|1946|p=120}} This Turkish statement was endorsed by the [[Federal Foreign Office|German Foreign Office]] on 5{{nbsp}}January 1918.{{sfn|Cohen|1946|p=120}} On 8{{nbsp}}January 1918, a German-Jewish Society, the Union of German Jewish Organizations for the Protection of the Rights of the Jews of the East,{{efn|group=qt|In the original German: ''Vereinigung jüdischer Organisationen Deutschlands zur Wahrung der Rechte der Juden des Ostens'' (VJOD)}} was formed to advocate for further progress for Jews in Palestine.{{sfn|Toury|1968|pp=81–84}}

Following the war, the [[Treaty of Sèvres]] was signed by the Ottoman Empire on 10{{nbsp}}August 1920.{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|pp=18–19}} The treaty dissolved the Ottoman Empire, requiring Turkey to renounce sovereignty over much of the Middle East.{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|pp=18–19}} Article{{nbsp}}95 of the treaty incorporated the terms of the Balfour Declaration with respect to "the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as may be determined by the Principal Allied Powers".{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|pp=18–19}} Since incorporation of the declaration into the Treaty of Sèvres did not affect the legal status of either the declaration or the Mandate, there was also no effect when Sèvres was superseded by the [[Treaty of Lausanne (1923)|Treaty of Lausanne]], which did not include any reference to the declaration.{{sfn|De Waart|1994|p = 113}}

In 1922, German [[anti-Semitic]] theorist [[Alfred Rosenberg]] in his primary [[racial policy of Nazi Germany|contribution to Nazi theory]] on Zionism,{{sfn|Helmreich|1985|p=24}} ''Der Staatsfeindliche Zionismus'' ("Zionism, the Enemy of the State"), accused German Zionists of working for a German defeat and supporting Britain and the implementation of the Balfour Declaration, in a version of the [[stab-in-the-back myth]].{{efn|group=lower-roman|This is described similarly by [[William Helmreich]] and Francis Nicosia. Helmreich noted that: "It represented in part an elaboration on ideas already expressed in articles in the ''Volkischer Beobachter'' and in other published works, notably ''Die Spur.'' The title provides the gist of a thesis that Rosenberg sought to convey to his readers: "The Zionist organization in Germany is nothing more than an organization that pursues a legalized undermining of the German state." He accused German Zionists of having betrayed Germany during the war by supporting Britain's Balfour Declaration and pro-Zionist policies and charged that they had actively worked for a German defeat and the Versailles settlement to obtain a Jewish National Home in Palestine. He went on to assert that the interests of Zionism were first and foremost those of world Jewry, and by implication the international Jewish conspiracy."{{sfn|Helmreich|1985|p=24}} In addition, Nicosia notes: "Rosenberg argues that the Jews had planned the Great War in order to secure a state in Palestine. In other words, he suggested that they generated violence and war among the gentiles in order to secure their own, exclusively Jewish, interests."{{sfn|Nicosia|2008|p=67}}}} [[Adolf Hitler]] took a similar approach in some of his speeches from 1920 onwards.{{sfn|Nicosia|2008|p=67}}

=== The Holy See ===
{{further|Pope Benedict XV and Judaism}}

With the advent of the declaration and the British entry into Jerusalem on 9 December, the Vatican reversed its earlier sympathetic attitude to Zionism and adopted an oppositional stance that was [[Holy See–Israel relations|to continue until the early 1990s]].{{sfn|Ciani|2011|p=13}}

=== Evolution of British opinion ===

{{Quote box|width=256px|bgcolor=#c6dbf7|align=right|quote=
"It is said that the effect of the Balfour Declaration was to leave the Moslems and Christians dumbfounded&nbsp;... It is impossible to minimise the bitterness of the awakening. They considered that they were to be handed over to an oppression which they hated far more than the Turk's and were aghast at the thought of this domination&nbsp;... Prominent people openly talk of betrayal and that England has sold the country and received the price&nbsp;... Towards the Administration [the Zionists] adopted the attitude of "We want the Jewish State and we won't wait", and they did not hesitate to avail themselves of every means open to them in this country and abroad to force the hand of an Administration bound to respect the "Status Quo" and to commit it, and thereby future Administrations, to a policy not contemplated in the Balfour Declaration&nbsp;... What more natural than that [the Moslems and Christians] should fail to realise the immense difficulties the Administration was and is labouring under and come to the conclusion that the openly published demands of the Jews were to be granted and the guarantees in the Declaration were to become but a dead letter?"
| source=Report of the [[Palin Commission]], August 1920{{sfn|Palin Commission|1920|p=10}}
}}

The British policy as stated in the declaration was to face numerous challenges to its implementation in the following years. The first of these was the indirect peace negotiations which took place between Britain and the Ottomans in December 1917 and January 1918 during a pause in the hostilities for the rainy season;{{sfn|Grainger|2006|p=218}} although these peace talks were unsuccessful, archival records suggest that key members of the War Cabinet may have been willing to permit leaving Palestine under nominal Turkish sovereignty as part of an overall deal.{{sfn|Schneer|2010|pp=347–360}}

In October 1919, almost a year after the end of the war, [[George Curzon, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston|Lord Curzon]] succeeded Balfour as Foreign Secretary. Curzon had been a member of the 1917 Cabinet that had approved the declaration, and according to British historian [[Sir David Gilmour, 4th Baronet|Sir David Gilmour]], Curzon had been "the only senior figure in the British government at the time who foresaw that its policy would lead to decades of Arab–Jewish hostility".{{sfn|Gilmour|1996|p=67}} He therefore determined to pursue a policy in line with its "narrower and more prudent rather than the wider interpretation".{{sfn|Gilmour|1996|p=66|ps=; Gilmour quotes: Curzon to Allenby, 16&nbsp;July 1920, CP&nbsp;112/799}} Following [[Bonar Law]]'s appointment as Prime Minister in late 1922, Curzon wrote to Law that he regarded the declaration as "the worst" of Britain's Middle East commitments and "a striking contradiction of our publicly declared principles".<ref>{{harvnb|Gilmour|1996|p=67}}; Gilmour quotes: Curzon to Bonar Law, 14&nbsp;December 1922, Bonar Law Papers, 111/12/46</ref>

In August 1920 the report of the [[Palin Commission]], the first in a long line of British [[Public inquiry|Commissions of Inquiry]] on the question of Palestine during the Mandate period,{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=35}} noted that "The Balfour Declaration&nbsp;... is undoubtedly the starting point of the whole trouble". The conclusion of the report, which was not published, mentioned the Balfour Declaration three times, stating that "the causes of the alienation and exasperation of the feelings of the population of Palestine" included:

* "inability to reconcile the Allies' declared policy of self-determination with the Balfour Declaration, giving rise to a sense of betrayal and intense anxiety for their future";{{sfn|Kattan|2009|p=84}}
* "misapprehension of the true meaning of the Balfour Declaration and forgetfulness of the guarantees determined therein, due to the loose rhetoric of politicians and the exaggerated statements and writings of interested persons, chiefly Zionists";{{sfn|Kattan|2009|p=84}} and
* "Zionist indiscretion and aggression since the Balfour Declaration aggravating such fears".{{sfn|Kattan|2009|p=84}}

British public and government opinion became increasingly unfavourable to state support for Zionism; even Sykes had begun to change his views in late 1918.{{efn|Diplomat and Sykes's biographer, [[Shane Leslie]], wrote in 1923 of Sykes: "His last journey to Palestine had raised many doubts, which were not set at rest by a visit to Rome. To Cardinal Gasquet he admitted the change of his views on Zionism, and that he was determined to qualify, guide and, if possible, save the dangerous situation which was rapidly arising. If death had not been upon him it would not have been too late."{{sfn|Leslie|1923|p=284}}}} In February 1922 Churchill telegraphed Samuel, who had begun his role as High Commissioner for Palestine 18 months earlier, asking for cuts in expenditure and noting:{{Blockquote|In both Houses of Parliament there is growing movement of hostility, against Zionist policy in Palestine, which will be stimulated by recent [[Alfred Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Northcliffe|Northcliffe]] articles.{{efn|group=qt|[[Alfred Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Northcliffe|Viscount Northcliffe]], who owned ''The Times'', the ''Daily Mail'', and other publishing totalling around two fifths of the total British newspaper circulation, published a statement from Cairo on 15&nbsp;February 1922 (p.&nbsp;10) suggesting Palestine risked becoming a second Ireland. Further articles were published in ''The Times'' on 11&nbsp;April (p.&nbsp;5), 26&nbsp;April (p.&nbsp;15), 23&nbsp;June (p.&nbsp;17), 3&nbsp;July (p.&nbsp;15) and 25&nbsp;July (p.&nbsp;15){{sfn|Defries|2014|p=103}}}} I do not attach undue importance to this movement, but it is increasingly difficult to meet the argument that it is unfair to ask the British taxpayer, already overwhelmed with taxation, to bear the cost of imposing on Palestine an unpopular policy.{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=57|ps=; &nbsp;Huneidi cites: CO 733/18, Churchill to Samuel, Telegram, Private and Personal, 25&nbsp;February 1922}}}}
Following the issuance of the Churchill White Paper in June 1922, the House of Lords rejected a Palestine Mandate that incorporated the Balfour Declaration by 60 votes to 25, following a motion issued by [[John Dickson-Poynder, 1st Baron Islington|Lord Islington]].{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=58}}<ref>[[Hansard]], [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1922/jun/21/palestine-mandate Palestine Mandate]: HL Deb 21 June 1922 vol 50 cc994-1033 (outcome of the vote cc1033 on next page)</ref> The vote proved to be only symbolic as it was subsequently overruled by a vote in the House of Commons following a tactical pivot and variety of promises made by Churchill.{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=58}}{{efn|group=lower-roman|Churchill concluded the Commons debate with the following argument: "Palestine is all the more important to us&nbsp;... in view of the ever-growing significance of the Suez Canal; and I do not think £1,000,000 a year&nbsp;... would be too much for Great Britain to pay for the control and guardianship of this great historic land, and for keeping the word that she has given before all the nations of the world."<ref>[[Hansard]], [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1922/jul/04/colonial-office Colonial Office]: HC&nbsp;Deb 04&nbsp;July 1922 vol&nbsp;156 cc221–343 (outcome of the vote cc343)</ref> Mathew described Churchill's manoeuvre as follows: "...&nbsp;the judgment was overturned by a large majority in the Commons, a result not of a sudden opinion shift but of Churchill's skillful opportunism in turning at the last minute a general debate on funding for the colonies worldwide into a vote of confidence on the government's Palestine policy, emphasizing in his concluding remarks not a Zionist argument but imperial and strategic considerations.{{sfn|Mathew|2011|p=36}}}}

In February 1923, following the change in government, Cavendish, in a lengthy memorandum for the Cabinet, laid the foundation for a secret review of Palestine policy:

{{blockquote|It would be idle to pretend that the Zionist policy is other than an unpopular one. It has been bitterly attacked in Parliament and is still being fiercely assailed in certain sections of the press. The ostensible grounds of attack are threefold:(1) the alleged violation of the McMahon pledges; (2) the injustice of imposing upon a country a policy to which the great majority of its inhabitants are opposed; and (3) the financial burden upon the British taxpayer&nbsp;...{{sfn|Quigley|2011|p=269}}}}

His covering note asked for a statement of policy to be made as soon as possible and that the cabinet ought to focus on three questions: (1) whether or not pledges to the Arabs conflict with the Balfour declaration; (2) if not, whether the new government should continue the policy set down by the old government in the 1922 White Paper; and (3) if not, what alternative policy should be adopted.{{sfn|Huneidi|1998|p=33}}

[[Stanley Baldwin]], replacing Bonar Law as Prime Minister, in June 1923 set up a cabinet sub-committee whose terms of reference were:

{{blockquote|examine Palestine policy afresh and to advise the full Cabinet whether Britain should remain in Palestine and whether if she remained, the pro-Zionist policy should be continued.{{sfn|Cohen|2010|p=6}}}}

The Cabinet approved the report of this committee on 31 July 1923. Describing it as "nothing short of remarkable", Quigley noted that the government was admitting to itself that its support for Zionism had been prompted by considerations having nothing to do with the merits of Zionism or its consequences for Palestine.{{sfn|Quigley|2011|p=279}} As Huneidi noted, "wise or unwise, it is well nigh impossible for any government to extricate itself without a substantial sacrifice of consistency and self-respect, if not honour."{{sfn|Huneidi|1998|p=37}}

The wording of the declaration was thus incorporated into the British [[Mandate for Palestine]], a legal instrument that created Mandatory Palestine with an explicit purpose of putting the declaration into effect and was finally formalized in September 1923.{{sfn|Renton|2016|p=16}}{{sfn|Palestine Royal Commission|1937|p=31}} Unlike the declaration itself, the Mandate was legally binding on the British government.{{sfn|Renton|2016|p=16}} In June 1924, Britain made its report to the Permanent Mandates Commission for the period July 1920 to the end of 1923 containing nothing of the candor reflected in the internal documents; the documents relating to the 1923 reappraisal stayed secret until the early 1970s.{{sfn|Quigley|2011|pp=280–2}}