Editing Anton Webern (section)

====Anschluss====
Krasner's last visit with Webern was interrupted by [[Kurt Schuschnigg]]'s broadcast speech that the [[Anschluss]] was imminent.{{sfnm|Bailey Puffett|1998|1loc=164–165|Krasner and Seibert|1987|2loc=343|Moldenhauer and Moldenhauer|1978|3loc=476}} Krasner had been playing some of Schoenberg's [[Violin Concerto (Schoenberg)|Violin Concerto]] for Webern and trying to convince him to write a sonata for solo violin.{{sfn|Krasner and Seibert|1987|loc=338–343}} When Webern turned on the radio and heard this speech, he urged Krasner to flee.{{sfnm|Bailey Puffett|1998|1loc=164|Krasner and Seibert|1987|2loc=343|Moldenhauer and Moldenhauer|1978|3loc=476}} Because Webern's family included Nazis, Krasner wondered whether Webern had already known that the Anschluss was planned for that day.{{sfnm|Bailey Puffett|1998|1loc=164–165|Krasner and Seibert|1987|2loc=343}} He also wondered whether Webern's warning had been solely for his safety or whether it had also been to save Webern the embarrassment of the violinist's presence in the event of celebration at the Webern home.{{sfn|Krasner and Seibert|1987|loc=343}}

Much of Austria did celebrate.{{sfnm|Greissle-Schönberg|2003b|Hochman|2016|2loc=237–238|Krasner and Seibert|1987|3loc=343|Moldenhauer and Moldenhauer|1978|4loc=476–477, 495|Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart|2009|5loc=52}} But Webern made only a terse note of the Anschluss in his notebook without registering any clear emotion.{{sfn|Moldenhauer and Moldenhauer|1978|loc=476–477}} In fact, he wrote Jone and her husband [[Josef Humplik]] asking not to be disturbed as he was "totally immersed" in work on Op. 28.{{sfnm|Bailey Puffett|1998|1loc=164–165|Moldenhauer and Moldenhauer|1978|2loc=476–477|Shreffler|1999|3loc=299}} Thus, Bailey Puffett suggested that Webern may have received Krasner's visit as a distraction.{{sfn|Bailey Puffett|1998|loc=154–155, 158–160, 164–165, 171, 174, 189–190}}

By now, [[Hartmut Krones]] wrote, Webern likely realized his error in anticipating the Nazis' self-moderation.{{sfn|Krones|2007|loc=Biographie, 1933–1939}} Bailey Puffett proposed that Krasner, with the benefit of hindsight from the perspective of his 1987 account, may have resented Webern for "refusing to see the reality of Hitler's antisemitism", at least until after 1936.{{sfn|Bailey Puffett|1998|loc=154–155, 158–160, 164–165, 171, 174, 189–190}} That year, Webern had insisted that Krasner and he travel through Nazi Germany to stop at a [[Munich]] train station café, where Krasner said "anything untoward was the least likely to happen", in an attempt to demonstrate the lack of danger.{{sfnm|Bailey Puffett|1998|1loc=154–155, 158–160, 164–165|Krasner and Seibert|1987|2loc=337–338}}

Support for the Anschluss rested on antisemitism, economic prospects,{{efn|Austrofascists enacted unpopular economic measures amid 1930s mass unemployment; the Nazis waged [[economic warfare]] (e.g., the [[thousand-mark ban]]).{{sfn|Obinger|2018|loc=86}}}} and the idea of a [[German question|Greater Germany]].{{sfn|Bukey|2000|loc=151–152}}{{efn|Austrian pan-Germans, {{lang|de|Grossdeutschen}}, or {{lang|de|[[Deutschnationalismus|Deutschnationalisten]]}} hoped for stable prosperity via some form of Greater German [[nation-state]] like the ''[[German Reich#Reich as "national people" versus Reich as "state territory"|Reich]]''.{{sfnm|Berger|2003|1loc=74|Czerwińska-Schupp|2016|2loc=1, 20–21 (quoting {{ill|Josef Redlich|de}})|Moldenhauer and Moldenhauer|1978|3loc=497|Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart|2009|rloc=52, 55–56}} This hope was shared by some Social Democrats and was not alien to Social Christians.{{sfn|Czerwińska-Schupp|2016|loc=23}} The [[Greater German People's Party]] received a maximum of 17% of the vote during 1919–1933 elections, mostly from students, teachers, and civil servants.{{sfn|Bukey|2000|loc=9}} They were most popular in [[Styria]] and [[Carinthia]].{{sfn|Kirk|2003|loc=15}} First they governed with the Social Christians.{{sfn|Berger|2003|loc=78, 86}} [[Austrian Nazi]]s won their parliamentary seats by 1933.{{sfnm|Berger|2003|1loc=86–87|Kirk|2003|2loc=18}} That year they joined forces with the Social Democrats.{{sfn|Kirk|2003|loc=20}} They had Nazi affinity, though not identity, as of 1934.{{sfn|Lassner|2003|loc=167}} Schuschnigg described Hitler's plans for Austria as "pan-German" in 1936.{{sfn|Lassner|2003|loc=172–173}}}} Under some duress, [[Theodor Innitzer]] ushered in Catholic support.{{sfnm|Bukey|2000|1loc=32, 35–36|Krasner and Seibert|1987|2loc=342–343}} The [[Austrian Nazi]]s and Social Democrats, both outlawed, were linked in opposition to the Austrofascists.{{sfn|Krones|2007|loc=Biographie, 1939–1945}} [[Karl Renner]] supported unification as a matter of [[self-determination]] before the years (1933–1938) of {{lang|de|[[Gleichschaltung]]}} and Nazi [[soft power]],{{efn|Deteriorating German-Austrian relations and Austrian weakening were marked by the [[July Putsch]], assassinations (including [[Engelbert Dollfuss]]'s), and terror (including bombings "almost daily" in Austria).{{sfnm|Berger|2003|1loc=87–89|Lassner|2003|2loc=164–169, 180n4|Moldenhauer and Moldenhauer|1978|3loc=680n26}}}} and he and others now supported (or accepted as inevitable) the 1938 Anschluss.{{sfnm|Bukey|2000|1loc=11–12, 36–38, 76–79, 227–228|Hochman|2016|2loc=7–9, 22–23, 34–36, 46–47, 191–193, 231–242}} [[Otto Bauer]], in exile, expressed some acceptance with profound resignation and misgivings, having worked toward Austria's German incorporation since [[Provisional National Assembly]]'s 1918 vote.{{sfn|Czerwińska-Schupp|2016|loc=1, 22–24, 39–44, 162–167, 192–194, 210–211, 217–218, 339–350}} Webern had long shared in common pan-German sentiments, especially during wartime.{{sfn|Moldenhauer and Moldenhauer|1978|loc=209–210, 496–500, 525–532, 555}} He also likely hoped to conduct again, securing a firmer future for his family under a new regime proclaiming itself "[[socialism|socialist]]" no less than [[nationalist]].{{sfn|Bailey Puffett|1998|loc=161}} According to what Josef Polnauer, a fellow early Schoenberg pupil, historian, and librarian, told the Moldenhauers, Webern's optimism was not dispelled until 1941.{{sfn|Moldenhauer and Moldenhauer|1978|loc=499, 683n8: "According to Polnauer, Webern only very gradually came to realize what was happening ... It took ... three years [after 1938] until his childlike faith ... was definitely shaken"; cf. 458, 474, 529, 538, 588: "optimism"}}

Krasner emphasized Webern's "naiveté" but acknowledged that he himself had been "foolhardy" as to the danger of antisemitism, recalling "read[ing] in the papers ... denials" and "want[ing] to see for myself" in 1938.{{sfn|Krasner and Seibert|1987|loc=337–338, 343–345}}{{efn|Krasner further recalled that only his US passport saved him from locals and police when revisiting Vienna in 1941 to help friends (e.g., Schoenberg's daughter Gertrude, her husband Felix Greissle) emigrate.{{sfn|Krasner and Seibert|1987|loc=343–345}}}} Consensus had emerged on the center, left, and in some mainstream Jewish organizations that antisemitism was only a means to political power since its 1890s definition as the "[[Antisemitism is the socialism of fools|socialism of fools]]".{{sfn|Wistrich|2012|loc=18–19}} The [[Frankfurt School]] first treated it within the rubric of [[class conflict]] (Adorno began to consider it otherwise in his 1939 "Fragments on Wagner"),{{sfn|Jay|1986|loc=90–93}} and [[Franz Neumann (political scientist)|Franz Neumann]] briefly contended that the Nazis would "never allow a complete extermination of the Jews" in his 1942 ''[[Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism|Behemoth]]'' (before revisions in 1944).{{sfn|Wistrich|2012|loc=18–19}}