Editing Utilitarianism (section)

=== Two-level utilitarianism ===
{{Main|Two-level utilitarianism}}
In ''Principles'' (1973), [[R. M. Hare]] accepts that [[rule utilitarianism]] collapses into [[act utilitarianism]] but claims that this is a result of allowing the rules to be "as specific and un-general as we please."<ref name="HareRM">{{cite journal|last=Hare|first=R. M.|author-link=R. M. Hare|date=1972–1973|title=The Presidential Address: Principles|journal=[[Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society]] |series=New Series|volume=73|pages=1–18|doi=10.1093/aristotelian/73.1.1|jstor=4544830}}</ref> He argues that one of the main reasons for introducing rule utilitarianism was to do justice to the general rules that people need for moral education and character development and he proposes that "a difference between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism can be introduced by limiting the specificity of the rules, i.e., by increasing their generality."<ref name="HareRM"/>{{rp|14}} This distinction between a "specific rule utilitarianism" (which collapses into act utilitarianism) and "general rule utilitarianism" forms the basis of Hare's ''two-level utilitarianism''.

When we are "[[Playing God (ethics)|playing God]] or the [[Ideal observer theory|ideal observer]]", we use the specific form, and we will need to do this when we are deciding what general principles to teach and follow. When we are "[[Inculcate|inculcating]]" or in situations where the biases of our human nature are likely to prevent us doing the calculations properly, then we should use the more general rule utilitarianism.

Hare argues that in practice, most of the time, we should be following the general principles:<ref name="HareRM"/>{{rp|17}}

{{blockquote|One ought to abide by the general principles whose general inculcation is for the best; harm is more likely to come, in actual moral situations, from questioning these rules than from sticking to them, unless the situations are very extra-ordinary; the results of sophisticated felicific calculations are not likely, human nature and human ignorance being what they are, to lead to the greatest utility.}}

In ''Moral Thinking'' (1981), Hare illustrated the two extremes. The "archangel" is the hypothetical person who has perfect knowledge of the situation and no personal biases or weaknesses and always uses critical moral thinking to decide the right thing to do. In contrast, the "prole" is the hypothetical person who is completely incapable of critical thinking and uses nothing but intuitive moral thinking and, of necessity, has to follow the general moral rules they have been taught or learned through imitation.<ref name="Hare 1981 b">{{cite book | last = Hare | first = R.M. | author-link = R. M. Hare | title = Moral thinking: its levels, method, and point | publisher = Clarendon Press Oxford University Press | location = Oxford New York | year = 1981 | isbn = 978-0-19-824660-2 | url = https://archive.org/details/moralthinkingits0000hare }}</ref> It is not that some people are [[archangel]]s and others proles, but rather that "we all share the characteristics of both to limited and varying degrees and at different times."<ref name="Hare 1981 b"/>

Hare does not specify when we should think more like an "archangel" and more like a "prole" as this will, in any case, vary from person to person. However, the critical moral thinking underpins and informs the more intuitive moral thinking. It is responsible for formulating and, if necessary, reformulating the general moral rules. We also switch to critical thinking when trying to deal with unusual situations or in cases where the intuitive moral rules give conflicting advice.