Editing Truth (section)

==Ancient Greek philosophy==

{{see also| Aletheia}}
[[Socrates]]', [[Plato]]'s and [[Aristotle]]'s ideas about truth are seen by some as consistent with [[Correspondence theory of truth|correspondence theory]]. In his ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'', Aristotle stated: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true".<ref name=StanfordCorr>David, Marion (2005). [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#1 "Correspondence Theory of Truth"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140225071446/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#1 |date=2014-02-25 }} in [[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]</ref> The [[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] proceeds to say of Aristotle:<ref name=StanfordCorr/>

<blockquote>...{{nbsp}}Aristotle sounds much more like a genuine correspondence theorist in the ''Categories'' (12b11, 14b14), where he talks of "underlying things" that make statements true and implies that these "things" (pragmata) are logically structured situations or facts (viz., his sitting, his not sitting). Most influential is his claim in ''De Interpretatione'' (16a3) that thoughts are "likenesses" (homoiosis) of things. Although he nowhere defines truth in terms of a thought's likeness to a thing or fact, it is clear that such a definition would fit well into his overall philosophy of mind.{{nbsp}}...</blockquote>

Similar statements can also be found in Plato's dialogues (''[[Cratylus (dialogue)|Cratylus]]'' 385b2, ''[[Sophist (dialogue)|Sophist]]'' 263b).<ref name=StanfordCorr/>

Some Greek philosophers maintained that truth was either not accessible to mortals, or of greatly limited accessibility, forming early [[philosophical skepticism]]. Among these were [[Xenophanes]], [[Democritus]], and [[Pyrrho]], the founder of [[Pyrrhonism]], who argued that there was no criterion of truth.

The [[Epicureanism|Epicureans]] believed that all sense perceptions were true,<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism|url=https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995|url-access=limited|last=Asmis|first=Elizabeth|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2009|editor-last=Warren|editor-first=James|page=[https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995/page/n93 84]|chapter=Epicurean empiricism}}</ref><ref name=":252">{{Cite book|title=Epicureanism|last=O'Keefe|first=Tim|publisher=University of California Press|year=2010|pages=97–98}}</ref> and that errors arise in how we judge those perceptions.

The [[Stoicism|Stoics]] conceived truth as accessible from [[Phantasiai|impressions]] via [[katalepsis|cognitive grasping]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Stoic Philosophy of Mind {{!}} Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/stoicmind/ |access-date=2025-03-09 |language=en-US}}</ref>