Editing Suez Crisis (section)

== Nationalisation of the Suez Canal ==
[[File:1956-07-30 Suez Canal Seized.ogv|thumb|upright=1.15|Nasser announces the nationalisation of the canal ([[Universal Newsreel]], 30 July 1956).]]
[[File:Suez Canal, Port Said - ISS 2.jpg|thumb|upright=1.15|[[Port Said]], at the entrance to the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean.]]

Nasser's response was the nationalisation of the [[Suez Canal]]. On 26 July 1956, in a speech in [[Alexandria]], Nasser gave a riposte to Dulles. During his speech he deliberately pronounced the name of [[Ferdinand de Lesseps]], the builder of the canal, a code-word for Egyptian forces to seize control of the canal and implement its nationalisation.<ref>{{Harvnb|Kissinger|1994|p=530}}</ref> He announced that the Nationalization Law had been published, that all assets of the Suez Canal Company had been frozen, and that stockholders would be paid the price of their shares according to the day's closing price on the [[Paris Stock Exchange]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=1956-07-26 |title=1956: Egypt seizes Suez Canal |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/26/newsid_2701000/2701603.stm |access-date=2023-03-17 |work=BBC}}</ref> That same day, Egypt closed the canal to Israeli shipping.<ref name="BBC: 1956: Egypt Seizes Suez Canal">{{Cite news |date=26 July 1956 |title=1956: Egypt Seizes Suez Canal |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/26/newsid_2701000/2701603.stm |access-date=4 March 2007 |publisher=BBC}}</ref> Egypt also closed the [[Straits of Tiran]] to Israeli shipping, and blockaded the [[Gulf of Aqaba]], in contravention of the [[Convention of Constantinople|Constantinople Convention of 1888]]. Many argued that this was also a violation of the [[1949 Armistice Agreements]].<ref name="Sachar455">{{Harvnb|Sachar|1996|p=455}}</ref><ref name="State Dept.: Background Note: Israel">{{Cite web |title=Background Note: Israel |url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3581.htm |access-date=4 March 2007 |publisher=US State Department}}</ref>

According to the Egyptian historian Abd al-Azim Ramadan, the events leading up to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, as well as other events during Nasser's rule, showed Nasser to be far from a rational, responsible leader. Ramadan notes Nasser's decision to nationalise the Suez Canal without political consultation as an example of his predilection for solitary decision-making.<ref name="PodehWinckler2004p105">{{Cite book |last1=Podeh |first1=Elie |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1Z-po72YcH4C |title=Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt |last2=Winckler |first2=Onn |date=1 December 2004 |publisher=University Press of Florida |isbn=978-0-8130-3137-8 |pages=105, 106 |quote=the prominent historian and commentator Abd al-Azim Ramadan, In a series of articles published in AlWafd, subsequently compiled in a book published in 2000, Ramadan criticized the Nasser cult.... The events leading up to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, as other events during Nasser's rule, Ramadan wrote, showed Nasser to be far from a rational, responsible leader.... His decision to nationalize the Suez Canal was his alone, made without political or military consultation. ... The source of all this evil. Ramadan noted, was Nasser's inclination to solitary decision making ... the revolutionary regime led by the same individual—Nasser— repeated its mistakes when it decided to expel the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and close the Straits of Tiran in 1967. Both decisions led to a state of war with Israel, despite the lack of military preparedness}}</ref>

=== British response ===
The nationalisation surprised Britain and its [[British Commonwealth|Commonwealth]]. There had been no discussion of the canal at the [[Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference]] in London in late June and early July.<ref name="eayrs1964">{{Cite book |last=Eayrs |first=James |title=The Commonwealth and Suez: A Documentary Survey |date=1964 |publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref>{{Rp|7–8}} Egypt's action, however, threatened British economic and military interests in the region. Prime Minister Eden was under immense domestic pressure from Conservative MPs who drew direct comparisons between the events of 1956 and those of the [[Munich Agreement]] in 1938. Since the U.S. government did not support the British protests, the British government decided in favour of military intervention against Egypt to keep the oil supply flowing<ref name="Thorpe"/> and avoid the complete collapse of British influence in the region.<ref>{{Citation |last=Verbeek |first=Bertjan |title=The 1956 Suez Crisis as a Perfect Case for Crisis Research |date=2020-09-28 |encyclopedia=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics |url=https://oxfordre.com/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1619 |access-date=2024-12-14 |language=en |doi= |isbn=978-0-19-022863-7}}</ref>

Eden was hosting a dinner for King [[Feisal II]] of Iraq and his Prime Minister, [[Nuri es-Said]], when he learned the canal had been nationalised. They both unequivocally advised Eden to "hit Nasser hard, hit him soon, and hit him by yourself" – a stance shared by the vast majority of the British people in subsequent weeks. "There is a lot of humbug about Suez," [[Guy Millard]], one of Eden's private secretaries, later recorded. "People forget that the policy at the time was extremely popular." Leader of the Opposition [[Hugh Gaitskell]] was also at the dinner. He immediately agreed that military action might be inevitable, but warned Eden would have to keep the Americans closely informed.<ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|p=181}}</ref> After a session of the House of Commons expressed anger against the Egyptian action on 27 July, Eden justifiably believed that Parliament would support him; Gaitskell spoke for his party when he called the nationalisation a "high-handed and totally unjustifiable step".{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|8–9}} When Eden made a ministerial broadcast on the nationalisation, Labour declined its right to reply.<ref name="goodwin2005">{{Cite journal |last=Goodwin |first=Peter |date=2005 |title=Low Conspiracy? — Government interference in the BBC |journal=Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=96–118 |doi=10.16997/wpcc.10 |issn=1744-6708 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

However, in the days that followed, Gaitskell's support became more cautious. On 2 August he said of Nasser's behaviour, "It is all very familiar. It is exactly the same that we encountered from Mussolini and Hitler in those years before the war". He cautioned Eden, however, that "[w]e must not, therefore, allow ourselves to get into a position where we might be denounced in the [[United Nations Security Council|Security Council]] as aggressors, or where the majority of the [[United Nations General Assembly|Assembly]] was against us". He had earlier warned Eden that Labour might not support Britain acting alone against Egypt.{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|8–9}} In two letters to Eden sent on 3 and 10 August 1956, Gaitskell condemned Nasser but again warned that he would not support any action that violated the [[United Nations Charter]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|pp=231–232}}</ref> In his letter of 10 August, Gaitskell wrote:
{{Blockquote|Lest there should be any doubt in your mind about my personal attitude, let me say that I could not regard an armed attack on Egypt by ourselves and the French as justified by anything which Nasser has done so far or as consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Nor, in my opinion, would such an attack be justified in order to impose a system of international control over the Canal-desirable though this is. If, of course, the whole matter were to be taken to the United Nations and if Egypt were to be condemned by them as aggressors, then, of course, the position would be different. And if further action which amounted to obvious aggression by Egypt were taken by Nasser, then again it would be different. So far what Nasser has done amounts to a threat, a grave threat to us and to others, which certainly cannot be ignored; but it is only a threat, not in my opinion justifying retaliation by war.<ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|p=232}}</ref>}}

Two dozen Labour MPs issued a statement on 8 August stating that forcing Nasser to denationalise the canal against Egypt's wishes would violate the UN charter. Other opposition politicians were less conditional in their support. Former Labour Foreign Minister [[Herbert Morrison]] hinted that he would support unilateral action by the government.{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|9–10}} [[Jo Grimond]], who became [[Leader of the Liberal Party (UK)|Leader of the Liberal Party]] that November, thought if Nasser went unchallenged the whole Middle East would go his way.<ref name="Thorpe"/>

In Britain, the nationalisation was perceived as a direct threat to British interests. In a letter to the British Ambassador on 10 September 1956, [[Ivone Kirkpatrick]], the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office wrote: {{Blockquote|If we sit back while Nasser consolidates his position and gradually acquires control of the oil-bearing countries, he can and is, according to our information, resolved to wreck us. If Middle Eastern oil is denied to us for a year or two, our [[gold reserves]] will disappear. If our gold reserves disappear, the [[sterling area]] disintegrates. If the sterling area disintegrates and we have no reserves, we shall not be able to maintain a [[British Army of the Rhine|force in Germany]], or indeed, anywhere else. I doubt whether we shall be able to pay for the bare minimum necessary for our defence. And a country that cannot provide for its defence is finished.<ref>{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|pp=225–226}}</ref>}}

Direct military intervention, however, ran the risk of angering Washington and damaging Anglo-Arab relations.{{fact|date=July 2024}} As a result, the British government concluded a secret military pact with France and Israel that was aimed at regaining control over the Suez Canal.{{fact|date=July 2024}}

=== French response ===
The French Prime Minister [[Guy Mollet]], outraged by Nasser's move, determined that Nasser would not get his way.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 144">{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|p=144}}</ref> French public opinion very much supported Mollet, and apart from the [[French Communist Party]], all of the criticism of his government came from the right, who very publicly doubted that a socialist like Mollet had the guts to go to war with Nasser.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 144"/> During an interview with publisher [[Henry Luce]], Mollet held up a copy of Nasser's book ''The Philosophy of the Revolution'' and said: "This is Nasser's ''Mein Kampf''. If we're too stupid not to read it, understand it and draw the obvious conclusions, then so much the worse for us."<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 145">{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|p=145}}</ref>

[[File:Suez nationalization.ogv|thumb|upright=1.15|thumbtime=2:32|1956 newsreels about Western reactions to the nationalisation. Pictured: [[John Foster Dulles]], US Secretary of State, and British Foreign Secretary [[Selwyn Lloyd]] at conference in London.]]

On 29 July 1956, the [[Government of France|French Cabinet]] decided upon military action against Egypt in alliance with Israel, and Admiral Nomy of the French Naval General Staff was sent to Britain to inform the [[leader]]s of that country of France's decision, and to invite them to co-operate if interested.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 145"/> At the same time, Mollet felt very much offended by what he considered to be the lackadaisical attitude of the Eisenhower administration to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 156">{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|p=156}}</ref> This was especially the case because earlier in 1956 the Soviet Foreign Minister [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] had offered the French a deal whereby if Moscow ended its support of the [[National Liberation Front (Algeria)|FLN]] in Algeria, Paris would remain in [[NATO]] but become "semi-neutralist" in the [[Cold War]].<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 156"/>

Given the way that Algeria (which the French considered an integral part of France) had become engulfed in a spiral of increasing violence that French leaders longed to put an end to, the Mollet administration had felt tempted by Molotov's offer, but in the end, Mollet, a firm [[Atlanticism|Atlanticist]], had chosen to remain faithful to NATO. In Mollet's view, his fidelity to NATO had earned him the right to expect firm American support against Egypt, and when that support proved not forthcoming, he became even more determined that if the Americans were not willing to do anything about Nasser, then France would act.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 156"/>{{additional citation needed|date=August 2024}}

=== Commonwealth response ===
Among the "White Dominions" of the [[Commonwealth of Nations|British Commonwealth]], Canada had few ties with the Suez Canal and twice had refused British requests for peacetime military aid in the Middle East. It had little reaction to the seizure before military action. By 1956 the [[Panama Canal]] was much more important than Suez to Australia and New Zealand; the following year two experts would write that it "is not vital to the [[Economy of Australia|Australian economy]]". The memory, however, of the two nations fighting in two world wars to protect a canal which many still called their "lifeline" to Britain or "jugular vein", contributed to Australian Prime Minister [[Robert Menzies]] and New Zealand Prime Minister [[Sidney Holland]] supporting Britain in the early weeks following the seizure. On 7 August Holland hinted to his parliament that New Zealand might send troops to assist Britain, and received support from the opposition. On 13 August, Menzies, who had travelled to London from the United States after hearing of the nationalisation and became an informal member of the [[Cabinet of the United Kingdom|British Cabinet]] discussing the issue, spoke on the BBC in support of the Eden government's position on the canal. He called the dispute over the canal "a crisis more grave than any since the Second World War ended".{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|13–16,56–58,84}} An elder statesman of the Commonwealth who felt that Nasser's actions threatened trading nations like Australia, he argued publicly that Western powers had built the canal but that Egypt was now seeking to exclude them from a role in its ownership or management.<ref name="ReferenceB"/><ref name="ReferenceC">Brian Carroll; From Barton to Fraser; Cassell Australia; 1978</ref> South Africa's [[Johannes Strijdom]] stated "it is best to keep our heads out of the beehive". His government saw Nasser as an enemy but would benefit economically and geopolitically from a closed canal, and diplomatically from [[Foreign relations of South Africa during apartheid|not opposing a nation's right to govern its internal affairs]].{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|16–18}}

The "non-white Dominions" saw Egypt's seizing of the canal as an admirable act of [[anti-imperialism]], and Nasser's Arab nationalism as similar to Asian nationalism. Indian Prime Minister [[Jawaharlal Nehru]] was with Nasser when he learned of the Anglo-American withdrawal of aid for the Aswan Dam. As India was a major user of the canal, however, he remained publicly neutral other than warning that any use of force, or threats, could be "disastrous". Suez was also very important to the [[Dominion of Ceylon]]'s economy, and it was renegotiating defence treaties with Britain, so its government was not as vocal in supporting Egypt as it would have likely been otherwise. Pakistan was also cautious about supporting Egypt given their rivalry as leading Islamic nations, but its government did state that Nasser had the right to nationalise.{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|18–24,79}}

=== Western diplomacy ===
On 1 August 1956, a tripartite meeting was opened at [[10 Downing Street]] between British Foreign Secretary [[Selwyn Lloyd]], U.S. Ambassador [[Robert Daniel Murphy|Robert D. Murphy]] and French Foreign Affairs Minister [[Christian Pineau]].<ref>{{Cite AV media |url=https://www.ina.fr/video/AFE85006880 |title=Le canal de Suez et la nationalisation par le Colonel Nasser |date=1 August 1956 |type=Television production |language=French |publisher=[[Institut national de l'audiovisuel]] |access-date=3 July 2021 |work=Les Actualités françaises}}</ref>

[[File:Portrait Menzies 1950s.jpg|thumb|upright|left|Australian Prime Minister [[Robert Menzies]] led an international committee in negotiations with Nasser in September 1956, which sought to achieve international management of the Suez Canal. The mission was a failure.]]

Almost immediately after the nationalisation, Eisenhower suggested to Eden a conference of maritime nations that used the canal. The British preferred to invite the most important countries, but the Americans believed that inviting as many as possible amid maximum publicity would affect world opinion. Invitations went to the eight surviving signatories of the [[Convention of Constantinople|Constantinople Convention]] and the 16 other largest users of the canal: Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, West Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All except Egypt—which sent an observer, and used India and the Soviet Union to represent its interests—and Greece accepted the invitation, and the 22 nations' representatives met in London from 16 to 23 August.<ref name="life19560827">{{Cite magazine |date=27 August 1956 |title=Compromise-Minded Conferees |magazine=Life |page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=6UcEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA43 43]}}</ref>{{Sfn|Kingseed|1995|pp=66–67}}{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|81–89}}

Fifteen of the nations supported the American-British-French position of international operation of the canal; Pakistan chose its western allies over its sympathy for Egypt's anti-western position despite resulting great domestic controversy. Ceylon, Indonesia, and the Soviet Union supported India's competing proposal—which Nasser had preapproved—of international supervision only. India criticised Egypt's seizure of the canal, but insisted that its ownership and operation now not change. The majority of 18 chose five nations to negotiate with Nasser in Cairo led by Menzies, while their proposal for international operation of the canal would go to the Security Council.{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|81–89}}<ref name="ReferenceB">{{Cite book |last=Menzies |first=R. G. |title=Speech is of Time |date=1958 |publisher=Cassell |location=London}}</ref>{{Sfn|Kingseed|1995|pages=66–67}}

Menzies' 7 September official communique to Nasser presented a case for compensation for the Suez Canal Company and the "establishment of principles" for the future use of the canal that would ensure that it would "continue to be an international waterway operated free of politics or national discrimination, and with financial structure so secure and an international confidence so high that an expanding and improving future for the Canal could be guaranteed" and called for a convention to recognise Egyptian sovereignty of the canal, but for the establishment of an international body to run the canal. Nasser saw such measures as a "derogation from Egyptian sovereignty" and rejected Menzies' proposals.<ref name="ReferenceB"/> Menzies hinted to Nasser that Britain and France might use force to resolve the crisis, but Eisenhower openly opposed the use of force and Menzies left Egypt without success.<ref name="ReferenceC"/>

Instead of the 18-nation proposal, the United States proposed an association of canal users that would set rules for its operation. Whereas 14 of the other nations, not including Pakistan, agreed. Britain, in particular, believed that violation of the association rules would result in military force, but after Eden made a speech to this effect in parliament on 12 September, the US Ambassador Dulles insisted "...we do not intend to shoot our way through" the canal.{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|89–92}} The United States worked through diplomatic channels to resolve the crisis without military conflict. "The British and French reluctantly agreed to pursue the diplomatic avenue but viewed it as merely an attempt to buy time, during which they continued their military preparations."<ref>{{Harvnb|Risse-Kappen|1997|p=86}}</ref> The British, [[Special Relationship|Washington's closest ally]], disregarded Eisenhower's argument that the American people would not accept a military solution.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Shaw |first=Tony |title=Eden, Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion During the Suez Crisis |date=1996 |publisher=I.B. Tauris |isbn=978-1-8504-3955-4 |page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ElFPJNo3n6UC&pg=PA171 171]}}</ref>

On 25 September 1956 the Chancellor of the Exchequer [[Harold Macmillan]] met informally with Eisenhower at the [[White House]]. Macmillan doubted that Eisenhower had a determination to avoid war, and told Eden that the Americans would not in any way oppose the attempt to topple Nasser.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Williams |first=Charles |title=Harold Macmillan |date=2009 |pages=250–252}}</ref> The Americans refused to support any move that could be seen as [[imperialism]] or [[colonialism]], seeing the US as the champion of [[Decolonization|decolonisation]]. Eisenhower felt the crisis had to be handled peacefully; he told Eden that American public opinion, and the international community, "would be outraged" unless all peaceful routes had been exhausted, and even then "the eventual price might become far too heavy".<ref>{{Harvnb|James|1986|loc=pp. 462–465, quote p. 472 dated 31 July 1956}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Skardon |first=C. Philip |title=A Lesson for Our Times: How America Kept the Peace in the Hungary-Suez Crisis of 1956 |date=2010 |pages=194–195}}</ref> Eden and other leading British officials believed Nasser's support for [[Palestinian fedayeen]] against Israel, as well as his attempts to destabilise pro-western regimes in Iraq and other Arab states, would deter the US from intervening with the operation. London believed that Nasser's engagement with communist states would persuade the Americans to accept British and French actions if they were presented as a ''[[fait accompli]]''.{{fact|date=August 2024}}