Editing Richard Helms (section)

===Events and views===

During his first year as ambassador, Helms had fielded the American and Iranian reaction to the 1973 [[1973 oil crisis|Arab oil embargo]] and consequent price hikes following the [[Yom Kippur War]]. Immediately, Helms made requests to the shah regarding fueling favors for the United States Navy near [[Bandar Abbas]]. Subsequently, the Shah, flush with increased oil revenue, had placed huge orders for foreign imports and American military hardware, e.g., high performance warplanes. Helms wrote in his memoirs, "Foreign businessmen flooded Tehran. Few had any knowledge of the country; fewer could speak a word of Persian." Tens of thousands of foreign commercial agents, technicians and experts, took up temporary residence. "There is no doubt [the Shah] tried to go too fast. Which led to the ports' congestion and the overheating of the economy," Helms later commented.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 419 (fueling favors; imports, warplanes).</ref><ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) p. 266 (Helms "Shah" quote).</ref><ref>Said Amir Arjomand, ''The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran'' (Oxford University 1988) on the 1973 [[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries|OPEC]] effect: "The sudden increase in the price of oil generated a boom for the next three years while seriously distorting the path of economic development" (at 110).</ref><ref>"In 1977 the number of American citizens working in Iran in various areas totaled about 31,000." Rinn-Sup Shinn, "Foreign Relations" pp. 221–239, at 231, in ''Iran: A Country Study'' (American Univ., 3d ed. 1978), edited by Richard F. Nyrop. Cf., p. 415: 1,400 U.S. Dept. of Defense personnel.</ref> The 'oil bonanza' followed by the rapid expenditure of 'petrodollars' led to an accelerated corruption involving enormous sums.<ref>Arjomand, ''The Turban for the Crown'' (Oxford Univ. 1988), about the "oil bonanza" and "petrodollars": "Corruption among the high civilian officials became phenomenal and spread to the generals as billions of dollars were being siphoned off through government and army contracts" (at 111). Arjomand noted its political results, "the utter lack of any moral commitment to the shah's regime among those who had a stake in it, the top civil servants and the well-to-do entrepreneurs" (at 111).</ref><ref>Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran'' (2008, 2010) pp. 244–247 (corruption), p. 273 (oil revenues quadruple), pp. 325–326 (opulence of "the one-thousand families"). "Corruption in its broad sense was intrinsic to the functioning of the regimes" (pp. 244–245). Professor Fakhreddin Azimi, about the shah's labored rule, mentions former premier (1961–1962) [[Ali Amini]] and his belief that 'although the Shah undoubtedly loved his country, the love did not extend to the people" (p. 301).</ref>

[[File:1975 Algiers Agreement.jpg|thumb|[[Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi|The Shah]], [[Houari Boumedienne|Boumedienne]], [[Saddam Hussein|Hussein]], 1975]]
In March 1975, Helms learned the shah alone had negotiated a major agreement with [[Saddam Hussein]] of Iraq while in Algiers at an [[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries|OPEC]] meeting. There the Algerian head of state [[Houari Boumedienne]] had translated the shah's French into Arabic for the negotiation. As part of the deal, the shah had disowned, quit his support for the [[Iraqi Kurdistan|Kurdish struggle in Iraq]]. The resulting [[1975 Algiers Agreement|treaty]] was evidently a surprise to the shah's own ministers, as well as to Helms and the USG.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 417–418. In exchange, the shah got changes in the border, and rights for Iranian pilgrims to visit Shi'a holy sites in Iraq. Helms notes that subsequently many anti-Shah, pro-Ayatollah audio cassettes were smuggled back into Iran by pilgrims.</ref><ref>Cf., Ranelagh (1986) pp. 607–608.</ref> As a result, the CIA also abandoned the Kurds, whose struggling people became another of those stateless nations who would remember with "regret and bitterness" their dealings with the Agency.<ref>Powers (1979) p. 40 (quote).</ref>

Helms articulated several understandings, derived from his working knowledge and experiences as ambassador in Iran. "He came to realize that he could never understand the Iranians," writes [[William Shawcross]]. He quotes Helms, "They have a very different turn of mind. Here would be ladies, dressed in Parisian clothes. ... But before they went on trips abroad, they would ship up to [[Mashhad]] in [[chador]]s to ask for protection." Helms with his wife had visited the pilgrimage site in Mashhad, 'the tomb of the [[Ali al-Ridha|eighth Imam]]'. As to the shah's statecraft, Helms' May 1976 memo observes, "Iranian government and society are highly structured and authoritarian and all major decisions are made at the top. Often even relatively senior officials are not well informed about policies and plans and have little influence on them."<ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) at 267 ("Mashhad" quote), 267–268 (travel to Mashhad); at 269 ("authoritarian" quote).</ref> In July 1976 Helms send a message to the U.S. Department of State which, while confident, again voiced various concerns, e.g., about the "inadequate 'political institutionalization'" of the regime.<ref>Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran'' (Harvard Univ. 2008, 2010) at 353.</ref> Professor [[Abbas Milani]] comments that in 1975 Helms had "captured the nature of the shah's vulnerability when he wrote that 'the conflict between rapid economic growth and modernization vis-à-vis a still autocratic rule' was the greatest uncertainty about the shah's future." Milani, looking ahead after Helms' departure, writes that the election of [[Carter administration|President Carter]] in 1976 "forced the Shah to expedite his liberalization plans."<ref>Milani, ''The Shah'' (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) p. 375.</ref><ref>Cf., above section "Iran: Mossadegh" regarding Helms's reflections on the CIA and the Islamic revolution in Iran.</ref>

During the course of his service as ambassador, Helms had dealt with the 1973 oil crisis and Iran's oil bonanza, and the shah's 1975 deal with Iraq and abandonment of the Kurds. In 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger visited Iran. He agreed to Helms' plan to resign as ambassador before the presidential election.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 417–418, 419 (Iraq deal, oil bonanza). Helms ends here saying that he and his wife "decided it was time to begin to think about leaving Iran and government service" (pp. 419–420).</ref> Helms submitted his resignation to President Ford in the middle of October. Meanwhile, the grand jury sitting in Washington had "shifted the focus of its investigation" about past activities of the CIA.<ref>Powers (1979) p. 348. The scope of the investigation included 1970 actions by CIA, and Helms' 1973 testimony about it. The eventual result was legal action against Helms.</ref>