Editing Rationality (section)

==History==
{{Expand section|with=subsections on ancient Greek philosophy and Kant|date=August 2022}}

===Max Weber===
[[File:MaxWeber1919FotoLeifGeiges.jpg|thumb|right|[[Germany|German]] scholar [[Max Weber]] notably articulated a theory of rationality that divided human capacity to think through things in four ways.<ref name=kalberg>{{cite journal|url=https://www.bu.edu/sociology/files/2010/03/Weberstypes.pdf|jstor=2778894|last1=Kalberg|first1=Stephen|title=Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History|journal=American Journal of Sociology|year=1980|volume=85|issue=5|pages=1145–1179|doi=10.1086/227128|s2cid=16388036|access-date=2020-04-08|archive-date=2020-11-14|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201114000510/http://www.bu.edu/sociology/files/2010/03/Weberstypes.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>]]

The German scholar [[Max Weber]] proposed an interpretation of [[Social actions|social action]] that distinguished between four different [[ideal type|idealized types]] of rationality.<ref name=kalberg/>

The first, which he called ''Zweckrational'' or purposive/[[instrumental rationality]], is related to the expectations about the behavior of other human beings or objects in the environment. These expectations serve as means for a particular actor to attain ends, ends which Weber noted were "rationally pursued and calculated."{{cite quote|date=June 2021}} The second type, Weber called ''Wertrational'' or value/belief-oriented. Here the action is undertaken for what one might call reasons intrinsic to the actor: some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other motives, independent of whether it will lead to success. The third type was affectual, determined by an actor's specific affect, feeling, or emotion—to which Weber himself said that this was a kind of rationality that was on the borderline of what he considered "meaningfully oriented." The fourth was traditional or conventional, determined by ingrained habituation. Weber emphasized that it was very unusual to find only one of these orientations: combinations were the norm. His usage also makes clear that he considered the first two as more significant than the others, and it is arguable that the third and fourth are subtypes of the first two.

The advantage in Weber's interpretation of rationality is that it avoids a value-laden assessment, say, that certain kinds of beliefs are irrational. Instead, Weber suggests that ground or motive can be given—for religious or affect reasons, for example—that may meet the criterion of explanation or justification even if it is not an explanation that fits the ''Zweckrational'' orientation of means and ends. The opposite is therefore also true: some means-ends explanations will not satisfy those whose grounds for action are ''Wertrational''.

Weber's constructions of rationality have been critiqued both from a [[Jürgen Habermas|Habermasian]] (1984) perspective (as devoid of social context and under-theorised in terms of social power)<ref>[[Jürgen Habermas]] (1984) ''The Theory of Communicative Action Volume&nbsp;1; Reason and the Rationalization of Society'', Cambridge: Polity Press.</ref> and also from a [[feminist]] perspective (Eagleton, 2003) whereby Weber's rationality constructs are viewed as imbued with masculine values and oriented toward the maintenance of male power.<ref>Eagleton, M. (ed) (2003) ''A Concise Companion to Feminist Theory'', Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.{{page needed|date=July 2019}}</ref> An alternative position on rationality (which includes both [[bounded rationality]],<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hawkins |first1=David |last2=Simon |first2=Herbert A. |title=Note: Some Conditions of Macroeconomic Stability |journal=Econometrica |date=July 1949 |volume=17 |issue=3/4 |pages=245–8 |doi=10.2307/1905526 |jstor=1905526 }}</ref> as well as the affective and value-based arguments of Weber) can be found in the critique of Etzioni (1988),<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Etzioni |first1=Amitai |title=Normative-affective factors: Toward a new decision-making model |journal=Journal of Economic Psychology |date=June 1988 |volume=9 |issue=2 |pages=125–150 |doi=10.1016/0167-4870(88)90048-7 |s2cid=17871420 }} Republished in: {{cite book |doi=10.1007/978-3-662-03900-7_5 |chapter=Normative-Affective Factors: Toward a New Decision-Making Model |title=Essays in Socio-Economics |pages=91–119 |series=Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy |year=1999 |last1=Etzioni |first1=Amitai |isbn=978-3-642-08415-7 }}</ref> who reframes thought on decision-making to argue for a reversal of the position put forward by Weber. Etzioni illustrates how purposive/instrumental reasoning is subordinated by normative considerations (ideas on how people 'ought' to behave) and affective considerations (as a support system for the development of human relationships).

===Richard Brandt===
[[Richard Brandt]] proposed a "reforming definition" of rationality, arguing someone is rational if their notions survive a form of [[psychotherapy|cognitive-psychotherapy]].<ref>{{cite book|title=Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics|url=https://archive.org/details/ethicaltheorypro0000bran|url-access=registration|publisher=Prentice-Hall|author=Richard B. Brandt|year=1959}}{{page needed|date=July 2019}}</ref>

===Robert Audi===
[[Robert Audi]] developed a comprehensive account of rationality that covers both the theoretical and the practical side of rationality.<ref name="Precis">{{cite journal |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=Précis of the Architecture of Reason |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2003 |volume=67 |issue=1 |pages=177–180 |doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00031.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDPOT |access-date=2020-11-07 |archive-date=2021-04-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210414132814/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDPOT |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Architecture">{{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality |date=2001 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTAO-3 |access-date=2020-11-07 |archive-date=2021-06-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210619215025/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTAO-3 |url-status=live }}</ref> This account centers on the notion of a ''ground'': a [[mental state]] is rational if it is "well-grounded" in a source of [[Justification (epistemology)|justification]].<ref name="Architecture" />{{rp|19}} Irrational mental states, on the other hand, lack a sufficient ground. For example, the perceptual experience of a tree when looking outside the window can ground the rationality of the belief that there is a tree outside.

Audi is committed to a form of [[foundationalism]]: the idea that justified beliefs, or in his case, rational states in general, can be divided into two groups: the ''foundation'' and the ''superstructure''.<ref name="Architecture" />{{rp|13,29–31}} The mental states in the superstructure receive their justification from other rational mental states while the foundational mental states receive their justification from a more basic source.<ref name="Architecture" />{{rp|16–18}} For example, the above-mentioned belief that there is a tree outside is foundational since it is based on a basic source: perception. Knowing that trees grow in soil, we may deduce that there is soil outside. This belief is equally rational, being supported by an adequate ground, but it belongs to the superstructure since its rationality is grounded in the rationality of another belief. Desires, like beliefs, form a hierarchy: intrinsic desires are at the foundation while instrumental desires belong to the superstructure. In order to link the instrumental desire to the intrinsic desire an extra element is needed: a belief that the fulfillment of the instrumental desire is a means to the fulfillment of the intrinsic desire.<ref name="Haji">{{cite journal |last1=Haji |first1=Ish |title=Review of The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality |url=https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-architecture-of-reason-the-structure-and-substance-of-rationality/ |website=Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews |date=9 March 2002 |access-date=7 November 2020 |archive-date=23 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201023025553/https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-architecture-of-reason-the-structure-and-substance-of-rationality/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

Audi asserts that all the basic sources providing justification for the foundational mental states come from [[experience]]. As for ''beliefs'', there are four types of experience that act as sources: perception, memory, introspection, and rational intuition.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology |publisher=Oxford University Press |pages=71–94 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3 |chapter=The Sources of Knowledge |year=2002 |access-date=2020-11-07 |archive-date=2022-06-12 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220612112116/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3 |url-status=live }}</ref> The main basic source of the rationality of ''desires'', on the other hand, comes in the form of hedonic experience: the experience of pleasure and pain.<ref name="Commitment">{{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=Rationality and Religious Commitment |date=2011 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDRAR-2 |access-date=2020-11-07 |archive-date=2020-11-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201113084347/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDRAR-2 |url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|20}} So, for example, a desire to eat ice-cream is rational if it is based on experiences in which the agent enjoyed the taste of ice-cream, and irrational if it lacks such a support. Because of its dependence on experience, rationality can be defined as a kind of responsiveness to experience.<ref name="Commitment"/>{{rp|21}}

''Actions'', in contrast to beliefs and desires, do not have a source of justification of their own. Their rationality is grounded in the rationality of other states instead: in the rationality of beliefs and desires. Desires motivate actions. Beliefs are needed here, as in the case of instrumental desires, to bridge a gap and link two elements.<ref name="Architecture" />{{rp|62}} Audi distinguishes the ''focal'' rationality of individual mental states from the ''global'' rationality of ''persons''. Global rationality has a derivative status: it depends on the focal rationality.<ref name="Precis" /> Or more precisely: "Global rationality is reached when a person has a sufficiently integrated system of sufficiently well-grounded propositional attitudes, emotions, and actions".<ref name="Architecture" />{{rp|232}} Rationality is ''relative'' in the sense that it depends on the experience of the person in question. Since different people undergo different experiences, what is rational to believe for one person may be irrational to believe for another person.<ref name="Precis"/> That a belief is rational does not entail that it is ''true''.<ref name="Haji"/>