Editing Politics of Iraq (section)

==== Incompetent government ====
Those two ''muhasasa'' agreements in and after 2003 (see [[#Elite cartel ruling Iraq by muhasasa|above]]) had the effect that, starting with the first [[Al Maliki I Government|post–2003 Iraqi government after elections]] in 2006, if a party "controlled" a ministry, it appointed also the top positions in their civil services to their party followers and faction members;<ref name=chatham,2019/> also the positions for senior public service were distributed on the basis of "ethnic, religious and/or party affiliation" rather than merit,<ref name=U4,client.>{{Cite web |last=Schöberlein |first=Jennifer |date=2020-12-10 |title=Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption (section 'Clientelism and patronage') |url=https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre |language=en |agency=[[Transparency International]] |archive-date=2022-10-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019104212/https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> professional competence or experience.<ref name="al-Hasan2015"/> This incompetence caused mismanagement in the successive Iraqi governments of [[Nouri al-Maliki|Al-Maliki (2006–2014)]], [[Haider al-Abadi|Al-Abadi (2014–2018)]],<ref name="al-Hasan2015_economy"/><ref name=U4,muhas/> and also [[Adil Abdul-Mahdi|Abdul-Mahdi (2018–2020)]],<ref name=U4->{{Cite web |last=Schöberlein |first=Jennifer |date=2020-12-10 |title=Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption |url=https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre |language=en |agency=[[Transparency International]] |archive-date=2022-10-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019104212/https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=chatham,2019/> leading to hundreds of billions of dollars being wasted on failed projects and the neglect of electricity networks, the transportation sector, economic legislation, and other infrastructure,<ref name="al-Hasan2015_economy">{{cite web|url=http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|title=Social Protest in Iraq and Reality of the Internal Shia Dispute (section: 'Economic crisis') |publisher=Al Jazeera|author=Harith al-Hasan|date=30 August 2015|access-date=2020-04-18 |archive-date=2020-07-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200726005317/https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|url-status=live}}</ref> as well as citizen demands not being responded to.<ref name=U4,muhas/> Such incompetence – next to other forms of political turmoil like corruption (see [[#Clientelism, patronage|next subsection]]) and instability – is considered by many analysts to have also fostered [[Iraq#2014–2017: War against the Islamic State|the rise of ISIL, in 2014]].<ref name="vox2016">{{cite web|url=https://www.vox.com/2016/4/19/11451550/iraq-protests-sadr|title=The political crisis rocking Baghdad and why it matters for the war on ISIS|publisher=vox.com|access-date=2016-04-30|date=19 April 2016| archive-date=2016-04-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160422165545/http://www.vox.com/2016/4/19/11451550/iraq-protests-sadr|url-status=live}}</ref> (During the [[Abdul Mahdi Government#Background|formation of the Abdul Mahdi Government in 2018]], this new prime minister attempted to break through the traditional ''muhasasa'' procedures, but there's no clear information as to how far he succeeded in that, or whether the Iraqi governments since 2018 worked more competently or less corruptly.)