Editing Nile (section)

== Water sharing dispute ==
[[File:Nile hydro power.jpg|thumb|Hydropower dams in the Nile (plus huge dam under construction in Ethiopia)]]{{Further|Water politics in the Nile Basin}}{{Further|Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam # Controversies}}

The Nile waters have affected the populations, cultures, economies, and politics of [[Northeast Africa]] and the [[Nile Basin]] for many decades. The most recent water sharing dispute is the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the $4.5 billion [[Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam]], which has become a national preoccupation in both countries, stoking [[patriotism]], deep-seated fears and even murmurs of war.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Walsh |first=Decian |date=9 February 2020 |title=For Thousands of Years, Egypt Controlled the Nile. A New Dam Threatens That |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/09/world/africa/nile-river-dam.html |url-status=live |access-date=10 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200210015121/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/09/world/africa/nile-river-dam.html |archive-date=10 February 2020 }}</ref> In both Egypt and Ethiopia the Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaisance Dam are parts of the [[national identity]]. In Ethiopia it is seen as a path towards increased development, whereas in Egypt fears of [[drought]] and [[Water scarcity|water shortage]] prevail.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Yihdego |first=Zeray |date=2017-05-25 |title=The Fairness ‘Dilemma’ in Sharing the Nile Waters: What Lessons from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam for International Law? |url=https://brill.com/view/journals/rpwl/2/2/article-p1_1.xml |journal=Brill Research Perspectives in International Water Law |volume=2 |issue=2 |pages=2-3 |doi=10.1163/23529369-12340006 |issn=2352-9350|hdl=2164/12347 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> For Egypt, to justify its excessive access to Nile waters, three treaties signed in 1902, 1929, and 1959 are used, which are however criticized. The 1902 and 1929 treaties were heavily influenced by [[colonialism]] as the [[British Empire]] made [[Colonisation of Africa|African colonies]] make concessions on Nile waters to the benefit of [[History of Egypt under the British|British Egypt]]. With the end of colonialism and the emergence of [[postcolonialism]], these treaties are seen as colonial products, which have lost their validity.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Milas |first=Seifulaziz Leo |title=Sharing the Nile: Egypt, Ethiopia and the geo-politics of water |date=2013 |publisher=Pluto Press |isbn=978-1-84964-813-4 |location=London |pages=65-68, 72-73}}</ref> The distribution of Nile waters in the treaties also sets the foundation for the alliance of Sudan and Egypt in the Nile Basin. Both states distributed practically all Nile waters between them in the 1959 agreement and still align their politics regarding the Nile waters.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ranjan |first=Amit |date=2024-01-02 |title=Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute: implications, negotiations, and mediations |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589001.2023.2287425 |journal=Journal of Contemporary African Studies |language=en |volume=42 |issue=1 |pages=18, 23-24 |doi=10.1080/02589001.2023.2287425 |issn=0258-9001}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Matthews |first=Ron |last2=Vivoda |first2=Vlado |date=2023-07-04 |title=‘Water Wars’: strategic implications of the grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2023.2257137 |journal=Conflict, Security & Development |language=en |volume=23 |issue=4 |pages=339 |doi=10.1080/14678802.2023.2257137 |issn=1467-8802|doi-access=free }}</ref> After the announcement of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Sudan and Egypt conducted three [[Military exercise|military exercises]] together.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Matthews |first=Ron |last2=Vivoda |first2=Vlado |date=2023-07-04 |title=‘Water Wars’: strategic implications of the grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2023.2257137 |journal=Conflict, Security & Development |language=en |volume=23 |issue=4 |pages=349 |doi=10.1080/14678802.2023.2257137 |issn=1467-8802|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=İlkbahar |first=Hasan |last2=Mercan |first2=Muhammed Hüseyin |date=2023 |title=Hydro-Hegemony, Counter-Hegemony and Neoclassical Realism on the Nile Basin: An Analysis of Egypt’s Response to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00219096231188953 |journal=Journal of Asian and African Studies |language=en |volume=60 |issue=2 |pages=7-8 |doi=10.1177/00219096231188953 |issn=0021-9096}}</ref>

Already before the plans for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam were published in 2014, several attempts have been made to establish new agreements between the countries sharing the Nile waters. Countries including Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya have complained about Egyptian domination of its water resources and the 1999 [[Nile Basin Initiative]] promoted a peaceful cooperation among those states.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.nilebasin.org/aboutUs.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070627132253/http://www.nilebasin.org/aboutUs.htm |url-status=dead |title=The Nile Basin Initiative |archive-date=27 June 2007 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Cambanis |first=Thanassis |date=25 September 2010 |title=Egypt and Thirsty Neighbors Are at Odds Over Nile |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/world/middleeast/26nile.html?_r=1&ref=world |url-status=live |access-date=25 September 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110927004209/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/world/middleeast/26nile.html?_r=1&ref=world |archive-date=27 September 2011 }}</ref> On 14 May 2010 at [[Entebbe]], Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Tanzania signed a new agreement on sharing the Nile waters even though this agreement raised strong opposition from Egypt and Sudan. Ideally, such international agreements should promote equitable and efficient usage of the Nile basin's water resources. Without a better understanding about the availability of the future water resources of the Nile, it is possible that conflicts could arise between these countries relying on the Nile for their water supply, economic and social developments.<ref name="hdl.handle" /> The conflicting priorities of the Nile riparian countries according to different domestic factors such as socioeconomic status, level of development, or climatic conditions severely affect the stance of Egypt and Ethiopia in negotiations.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Roussi |first=Antoaneta |date=2020-07-23 |title=Row over Africa’s largest dam in danger of escalating, warn scientists |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02124-8 |journal=Nature |language=en |volume=583 |issue=7817 |pages=501–502 |doi=10.1038/d41586-020-02124-8 |issn=0028-0836}}</ref> In the several rounds of negotiations since 2014 especially the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in times of water scarcity appeared to be a critical topic where no consensus was found.<ref name=":1" /> The talks about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam are almost exclusively between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, however some rounds of negotiations were accompanied and led by other actors such as the [[United States]], the [[African Union]], or the [[European Union]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ranjan |first=Amit |date=2024-01-02 |title=Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute: implications, negotiations, and mediations |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589001.2023.2287425 |journal=Journal of Contemporary African Studies |volume=42 |issue=1 |pages=28-30 |doi=10.1080/02589001.2023.2287425 |issn=0258-9001}}</ref> The failure of the several rounds of negotiations has led some to argue that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute might develop into a [[Water conflict|water war]]. Especially after the failed negotiations led by the United States, this risk was discussed as president [[Donald Trump|Trump]] threatened that Egypt might “blow up the dam”.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Matthews |first=Ron |last2=and Vivoda |first2=Vlado |date=2023-07-04 |title=‘Water Wars’: strategic implications of the grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2023.2257137 |journal=Conflict, Security & Development |volume=23 |issue=4 |pages=346 |doi=10.1080/14678802.2023.2257137 |issn=1467-8802|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=İlkbahar |first=Hasan |last2=Mercan |first2=Muhammed Hüseyin |date=2025-03-01 |title=Hydro-Hegemony, Counter-Hegemony and Neoclassical Realism on the Nile Basin: An Analysis of Egypt’s Response to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00219096231188953 |journal=Journal of Asian and African Studies |language=EN |volume=60 |issue=2 |pages=10 |doi=10.1177/00219096231188953 |issn=0021-9096}}</ref> Nevertheless, a water war is thus far considered unlikely, given the serious consequences this would have for the countries involved and the region.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Milas |first=Seifulaziz Leo |title=Sharing the Nile: Egypt, Ethiopia and the geo-politics of water |date=2013 |publisher=Pluto Press |isbn=978-1-84964-813-4 |location=London |pages=168-176}}</ref> Also, given the high protection of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam it is unclear if the [[Egyptian Armed Forces|Egyptian military]] would be successful in an attack.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Matthews |first=Ron |last2=and Vivoda |first2=Vlado |date=2023-07-04 |title=‘Water Wars’: strategic implications of the grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2023.2257137 |journal=Conflict, Security & Development |volume=23 |issue=4 |pages=348-350 |doi=10.1080/14678802.2023.2257137 |issn=1467-8802|doi-access=free }}</ref>