Editing Nikita Khrushchev (section)

=== Foreign and defense policies ===
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From 1950 to 1953 Khrushchev was well-placed to closely observe and evaluate Stalin's foreign policy. Khrushchev considered the entire Cold War to be a serious mistake on Stalin's part. In the long term, it created an unnecessary and expensive militarized struggle with NATO. It diverted attention away from the neutral developing world, where progress could be made, and it weakened Moscow's relationship with its East European satellites. Basically Khrushchev was much more optimistic about the future than Stalin or Molotov, and was more of an internationalist. He believed the working classes and the common peoples of the world would eventually find their way towards socialism and even communism, and that conflicts like the Cold War diverted their attention from this eventual goal. Peaceful coexistence of the sort that [[Vladimir Lenin|Lenin]] himself had practiced at first would allow the Soviet Union and its satellite states to build up their economies and their standard of living. Khrushchev decided that Stalin had made a series of mistakes, such as heavy-handed pressure in [[Turkey]] and [[Iran]] in 1945 and 1946, and especially heavy pressure on Berlin that led to the failed Berlin blockade in 1948. Germany was a major issue for Khrushchev, not because he feared a NATO invasion eastward, but because it weakened the East German regime, which economically paled in comparison to the economic progress of West Germany. Khrushchev blamed Molotov for being unable to resolve the conflict with [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]], and largely ignoring the needs of the East European communist satellites.

Khrushchev chose Austria as a way to quickly come to agreement with NATO. It became a small neutralized nation economically tied to the West but diplomatically neutral and no threat.<ref>Aleksandr Fursenko, and Timothy Naftali, ''Khrushchev's cold war: the inside story of an American adversary'' (2006) pp. 23–28.</ref>

When Khrushchev took control, the outside world still knew little of him, and initially was not impressed by him. Short, heavyset, and wearing ill-fitting suits, he "radiated energy but not intellect", and was dismissed by many as a buffoon who would not last long.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=146}} British Foreign Secretary [[Harold Macmillan]] wondered, "How can this fat, vulgar man with his pig eyes and ceaseless flow of talk be the head—the aspirant Tsar for all those millions of people?"{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=149}}

Khrushchev biographer Tompson stated:
<blockquote>
He could be charming or vulgar, ebullient or sullen, he was given to public displays of rage (often contrived) and to soaring hyperbole in his rhetoric. But whatever he was, however, he came across, he was more human than his predecessor or even than most of his foreign counterparts, and for much of the world that was enough to make the USSR seem less mysterious or menacing.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=150}}
</blockquote>

====United States and NATO====
=====Early relations and U.S. visit (1957–1960)=====
{{Further|Berlin Crisis of 1958–1959}}
[[File:Nixon and khrushchev.jpg|thumb|left|alt=A middle-aged man and an older one confer with each other.|Khrushchev with Vice President [[Richard Nixon]], 1959]]

Khrushchev sought to find a lasting solution to the problem of a divided Germany and of the enclave of [[West Berlin]]. In November 1958, calling West Berlin a "malignant tumor", he gave the United States, United Kingdom and [[France]] six months to conclude a peace treaty with both German states and the Soviet Union. If one was not signed, Khrushchev stated, the Soviet Union would conclude a peace treaty with East Germany. This would leave East Germany, which was not a party to treaties giving the Western Powers access to Berlin, in control of the routes to the city. They proposed making Berlin a free city, which meant no outside military forces would be stationed there. West Germany, United States and France strongly opposed the ultimatum, but Britain wanted to consider it as a starting point for negotiations. No one wanted to risk war over the issue. At Britain's request, Khrushchev extended and ultimately dropped the ultimatum, as the Berlin issue became part of the complex agenda of high-level summit meetings.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=195–196}}

Khrushchev sought to sharply reduce levels of conventional weapons and to defend the Soviet Union with missiles. He believed that without this transition, the huge Soviet military would continue to eat up resources, making Khrushchev's goals of improving Soviet life difficult to achieve.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=187, 217}} He abandoned Stalin's plans for a large navy in 1955, believing that the new ships would be too vulnerable to either a conventional or nuclear attack.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=127}} In January 1960, he took advantage of improved relations with the U.S. to order a reduction of one-third in the size of Soviet armed forces, alleging that advanced weapons would make up for the lost troops.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=216–217}} While conscription of Soviet youth remained in force, exemptions from military service became more and more common, especially for students.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|pp=183–184}}

[[File:Nikita-Khrushchev-TIME-1958.jpg|thumb|upright=0.85|Khrushchev featured as ''Time'' Magazine's [[Time Person of the Year|Man of the Year]] for 1957 after the launch of Sputnik]]
Historians Campbell Craig and [[Sergey Radchenko]] later argued that Khrushchev thought that policies like [[Mutual assured destruction|Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)]] were too dangerous for the Soviet Union. His approach did not greatly change his foreign policy or military doctrine but is apparent in his determination to choose options that minimized the risk of war.<ref>Campbell Craig and [[Sergey Radchenko]], "MAD, not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution". ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' (2018) 41#1/2:208–33.</ref> The Soviets had few operable [[ICBM|intercontinental ballistic missiles]] (ICBM), but Khrushchev publicly boasted of the Soviets' missile programs, stating that Soviet weapons were varied and numerous. The First Secretary hoped that public perception that the Soviets were ahead would put psychological pressure on the West resulting in political concessions.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=188}} The Soviet space program, which Khrushchev firmly supported, appeared to confirm his claims when the Soviets launched [[Sputnik 1]] into orbit, a feat that astonished the world. Western governments concluded that the Soviet ICBM program was further along than it actually was.<ref>Walter A. McDougall, "The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite". ''Reviews in American History'' 21.4 (1993): 698–703.</ref> Khrushchev added to this misapprehension by stating in an October 1957 interview that the USSR had all the rockets, of whatever capacity, that it needed.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=187}}
For years, Khrushchev would make a point of preceding a major foreign trip with a rocket launch, to the discomfiture of his hosts.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=187}} In January 1960 Khrushchev told the Presidium that Soviet ICBMs made an agreement with the U.S. possible because "main-street Americans have begun to shake from fear for the first times in their lives".{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=131}} The United States had learned of the underdeveloped state of the Soviet missile program from overflights in the late 1950s, but only high U.S. officials knew of the deception. The perception of a "[[missile gap]]" led to a considerable defense buildup on the part of the United States.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=188}}

During Vice President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union in 1959 he and Khrushchev took part in what later became known as the [[Kitchen Debate]]. Nixon and Khrushchev had an impassioned argument in a model kitchen at the [[American National Exhibition]] in Moscow, with each defending the economic system of his country.{{sfn|Whitman|1971}}{{Sfn|UPI 1959 Year in Review}}
[[File:20111110-OC-AMW-0013 - Flickr - USDAgov.jpg|thumb|left|alt=A group of middle-aged men at a farm. A man in a white suit in the centre is caressing a cow.|Khrushchev with Agriculture Secretary [[Ezra Taft Benson]] (left of Khrushchev) and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations [[Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.|Henry Cabot Lodge]] (far left) during his visit on 16 September 1959 to the [[Agricultural Research Service]] Center]]
Nixon invited Khrushchev to visit the United States, and he agreed. He [[1959 Khrushchev visit to the United States|made his first visit to the United States]], arriving in Washington, on 15 September 1959, spending thirteen days in the country. This first visit by a Soviet premier resulted in an extended media circus.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|p=247}} Khrushchev brought his wife and adult children with him, though it was not usual for Soviet officials to travel with their families.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=421–422}} He visited [[New York City]], [[Los Angeles]], [[San Francisco]] (visiting a supermarket), [[Coon Rapids, Iowa]] (visiting [[Roswell and Elizabeth Garst Farmstead Historic District|Roswell Garst's farm]]), [[Pittsburgh]], and [[Washington, DC|Washington]],{{sfn|Carlson|2009|p=63}} concluding with a meeting with President Eisenhower at [[Camp David]].{{sfn|Carlson|2009|pp=226–227}} During luncheon at the [[Twentieth Century-Fox]] Studio in Los Angeles Khrushchev engaged in an improvised yet jovial debate with his host [[Spyros Skouras]] over the merits of capitalism and communism.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUQ88MsGVT2GWoHtL3GbYhHnLOe22MPRc Khrushchev speech, 19 September 1959]. Youtube</ref> Khrushchev was also to visit [[Disneyland]], but the visit was canceled for security reasons, much to his disgruntlement.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|pp=155–159}}<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pRaYsbFpKY Khrushchev speech, Los Angeles, 19 September 1959]. Youtube</ref> He did, however, visit [[Eleanor Roosevelt]] at her home.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|p=133}} While visiting [[IBM]]'s new research campus in [[San Jose, California]], Khrushchev expressed little interest in computer technology, but he greatly admired the self-service cafeteria, and, on his return, introduced self-service in the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Khrushchev|2000|p=334}}

This visit resulted in an informal agreement that there would be no firm deadline over Berlin, but that there would be a four-power summit to try to resolve the issue. The Russian's goal was to present warmth, charm and peacefulness, using candid interviews to convince Americans of his humanity and good will. He performed well and Theodore Windt calls it "the zenith of his career."<ref>Theodore Otto Windt Jr., "The Rhetoric of Peaceful Coexistence: Khrushchev in America, 1959" ''Quarterly Journal of Speech'' (1971) 57#1 pp. 11–22.</ref> The friendly American audiences convinced Khrushchev that he had achieved a strong personal relationship with Eisenhower and that he could achieve [[détente]] with the Americans. Eisenhower was actually unimpressed by the Soviet leader.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=211}} He pushed for an immediate summit but was frustrated by French President [[Charles de Gaulle]], who postponed it until 1960, a year in which Eisenhower was scheduled to pay a return visit to the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=218}}

=====U-2 and Berlin crisis (1960–1961)=====
[[File:Nikita Khrushchev 1960.jpg|thumb|alt=An older man sits among United Nations delegation tables, looking at the camera.|Khrushchev and head of USSR delegation [[:ru:Миронова, Зоя Васильевна|Zoya Mironova]] at the United Nations, September 1960]]

A constant irritant in Soviet–U.S. relations was the overflight of the Soviet Union by American [[Lockheed U-2|U-2 spy aircraft]]. On 9 April 1960, the U.S. resumed such flights after a lengthy break. The Soviets had protested the flights in the past but had been ignored by Washington. Content in what he thought was a strong personal relationship with Eisenhower, Khrushchev was confused and angered by the flights' resumption, and concluded that they had been ordered by [[CIA]] Director [[Allen Dulles]] without Eisenhower's knowledge. Khrushchev planned to visit the U.S. to meet Eisenhower, but the visit was canceled when [[Soviet Air Defence Forces]] brought down the U.S. U-2.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2000/11/10/gem-of-a-jeweler-faces-a-final-cut/d2394c5f-de3a-4db3-8792-3c1ddeba959c/|url-access=limited|title=Gem of a Jeweler Faces a Final Cut|last=Hamilton|first=Martha|date=10 November 2000|newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=6 April 2019}}</ref> On 1 May, a U-2 [[U-2 crisis of 1960|was shot down]], its pilot, [[Francis Gary Powers]], captured alive.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=219–220}} Believing Powers to have been killed, the U.S. announced that a weather plane had been lost near the Turkish-Soviet border. Khrushchev risked destroying the summit, due to start on 16 May in Paris, if he announced the shootdown, but would look weak in the eyes of his military and security forces if he did nothing.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=219–220}} On 5 May, Khrushchev announced the shootdown and Powers' capture, blaming the overflight on "imperialist circles and militarists, whose stronghold is the Pentagon", and suggesting the plane had been sent without Eisenhower's knowledge.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=223}} Eisenhower could not have it thought that there were rogue elements in the Pentagon operating without his knowledge, and admitted that he had ordered the flights, calling them "a distasteful necessity".{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=224}} The admission stunned Khrushchev and turned the U-2 affair from a possible triumph to a disaster for him, and he even appealed to U.S. Ambassador [[Llewellyn Thompson]] for help.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=225}}

Khrushchev was undecided what to do at the summit even as he boarded his flight. He finally decided, in consultation with his advisers on the plane and Presidium members in Moscow, to demand an apology from Eisenhower and a promise that there would be no further U-2 flights in Soviet airspace.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=225}} Neither Eisenhower nor Khrushchev communicated with the other in the days before the summit, and at the summit, Khrushchev made his demands and stated that there was no purpose in the summit, which should be postponed for six to eight months, until after the [[1960 United States presidential election]]. The U.S. president offered no apology but stated that the flights had been suspended and would not resume and renewed his [[Treaty on Open Skies|Open Skies]] proposal for mutual overflight rights. This was not enough for Khrushchev, who left the summit.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=219–220}} Eisenhower accused Khrushchev "of sabotaging this meeting, on which so much of the hopes of the world have rested".{{sfn|UPI 1960 Year in Review}} Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union, for which the premier had even built a golf course so the U.S. president could enjoy his favorite sport,{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=441}} was cancelled by Khrushchev.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=469}}

Khrushchev made his second and final visit to the US in September 1960. He had no invitation but had appointed himself as head of the USSR's UN delegation.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|pp=265–266}} He spent much of his time wooing the new [[Third World]] states which had recently become independent.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=230}} The U.S. restricted him to the island of [[Manhattan]], with visits to an estate owned by the USSR on [[Long Island]]. The notorious [[shoe-banging incident]] occurred during a debate on 12 October over a Soviet resolution decrying colonialism. Khrushchev was infuriated by a statement of the [[Philippines|Filipino]] delegate [[Lorenzo Sumulong]] charging the Soviets with employing a double standard by decrying colonialism while dominating Eastern Europe. Khrushchev demanded the right to reply immediately and accused Sumulong of being "a fawning lackey of the American imperialists". Sumulong accused the Soviets of hypocrisy. Khrushchev yanked off his shoe and began banging it on his desk.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|pp=284–286}} This behavior by Khrushchev scandalized his delegation.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=139}}

[[File:John Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev 1961.jpg|thumb|left|alt=A younger man and an older one confer together.|Khrushchev and [[John F. Kennedy]], Vienna, June 1961]]

Khrushchev considered U.S. Vice President Nixon a hardliner and was delighted by his defeat in the 1960 presidential election. He considered the victor, [[John F. Kennedy]], as a far more likely partner for détente, but was taken aback by the newly inaugurated U.S. President's tough talk and actions in the early days of his administration.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=232}} Khrushchev achieved a propaganda victory in April 1961 with [[Vostok 1|the first human spaceflight]], while Kennedy suffered a defeat with the failure of the [[Bay of Pigs invasion]]. While Khrushchev had threatened to defend Cuba with Soviet missiles, the premier contented himself with after-the-fact aggressive remarks. The failure in Cuba led to Kennedy's determination to make no concessions at the [[Vienna summit]] scheduled for 3 June 1961. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev took a hard line, with Khrushchev demanding a treaty that would recognize the two German states and refusing to yield on the remaining issues obstructing a test-ban treaty. Kennedy, in contrast, had been led to believe that the test-ban treaty could be concluded at the summit, and felt that a deal on Berlin had to await easing of east–west tensions.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=233–235}}

[[File:Soviet empire 1960.png|thumb|The maximum territorial extent of countries in the world under Soviet [[Sphere of influence|influence]], after the [[Cuban Revolution]] of 1959 and before the official [[Sino-Soviet split]] of 1961]]

An indefinite postponement of action over Berlin was unacceptable to Khrushchev if for no other reason than that East Germany was suffering a continuous [[brain drain]] as highly educated East Germans fled west through Berlin. While the [[Inner German Border|boundary between the two German states]] had elsewhere been fortified, Berlin, administered by the four Allied powers, remained open. Emboldened by statements from former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow [[Charles E. Bohlen]] and [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]] Chairman [[J. William Fulbright]] that East Germany had every right to close its borders, Khrushchev authorized East German leader [[Walter Ulbricht]] to begin construction of what became known as the [[Berlin Wall]]. Construction preparations were made in great secrecy, and the border was sealed off in the early hours of Sunday, 13 August 1961, when most East German workers who earned hard currency by working in West Berlin would be at their homes. The wall was a propaganda disaster and marked the end of Khrushchev's attempts to conclude a peace treaty among the Four Powers and the two German states.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=235–236}} [[Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany|That treaty]] would not be signed until September 1990, as an immediate prelude to [[German reunification]].

====Cuban Missile Crisis and the test ban treaty (1962–1964)====
Superpower tensions culminated in the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] (in the USSR, the "Caribbean crisis") of October 1962, as the Soviet Union sought to install medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, about {{convert|90|mi}} from the U.S. coast.{{sfn|Whitman|1971}} Cuban Prime Minister [[Fidel Castro]] was reluctant to accept the missiles, and, once he was persuaded, warned Khrushchev against transporting the missiles in secret. Castro stated, thirty years later, "We had a sovereign right to accept the missiles. We were not violating international law. Why do it secretly—as if we had no right to do it? I warned Nikita that secrecy would give the imperialists the advantage."{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=248}}

On 16 October, Kennedy was informed that U-2 flights over Cuba had discovered what were most likely medium-range missile sites, and though he and his advisors considered approaching Khrushchev through diplomatic channels, they could come up with no way of doing this that would not appear weak.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|pp=465–466}} On 22 October, Kennedy addressed his nation by television, revealing the missiles' presence and announcing a blockade of Cuba. Informed in advance of the speech but not (until one hour before) the content, Khrushchev and his advisors feared an invasion of Cuba. Even before Kennedy's speech, they ordered Soviet commanders in Cuba that they could use all weapons against an attack—except atomic weapons.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|pp=469–472}}

As the crisis unfolded, tensions were high in the U.S.; less so in the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev made several public appearances and went to the [[Bolshoi Theatre]] to hear American opera singer [[Jerome Hines]].{{sfn|Whitman|1971}}{{sfn|''Life'', 1962-11-09}} By 25 October, with the Soviets unclear about Kennedy's full intentions, Khrushchev decided that the missiles would have to be withdrawn from Cuba.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=145}} Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles in exchange for a U.S. promise not to invade Cuba and a secret promise that the U.S. would withdraw missiles from Turkey.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=575}} As the last term was not publicly announced at the request of the U.S., and was not known until just before Khrushchev's death in 1971,{{sfn|Whitman|1971}} the resolution was seen as a great defeat for the Soviets and contributed to Khrushchev's fall less than two years later.{{sfn|Whitman|1971}} Castro had urged Khrushchev to launch a preemptive nuclear attack on the U.S. in the event of an invasion of Cuba,{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=148}} and was angered by the outcome, referring to Khrushchev in profane terms.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=579}}

After the crisis, superpower relations improved, as Kennedy gave [[American University speech|a conciliatory speech]] on 10 June 1963, recognizing the Soviet people's suffering during World War II, and paying tribute to their achievements.{{sfn|Kennedy|1963}} Khrushchev called the speech the best by a U.S. president since [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], and, in July, negotiated a [[Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty|test ban treaty]] with U.S. negotiator [[Averell Harriman]] and [[Quintin Hogg, Baron Hailsham of St Marylebone|Lord Hailsham]] of the United Kingdom.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=602}} Plans for a second Khrushchev-Kennedy summit were dashed by [[Assassination of John F. Kennedy|Kennedy's assassination]] in November 1963. The new U.S. president, [[Lyndon Johnson]], hoped for continued improved relations but was distracted by other issues and had little opportunity to develop a relationship with Khrushchev before the premier was ousted.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=604–605}}

====Eastern Europe====
[[File:Gheorghiu-Dej & Khrushchev at Bucharest's Baneasa Airport (June 1960).jpg|thumb|left|Khrushchev and [[Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej]] at Bucharest's [[Băneasa Airport]] in June 1960. [[Nicolae Ceaușescu]] can be seen at Gheorghiu-Dej's right-hand side.]]

The Secret Speech, combined with the death of the Polish communist leader [[Bolesław Bierut]], who suffered a heart attack while reading the Speech, sparked considerable liberalization in [[Polish People's Republic|Poland]] and [[Hungarian People's Republic|Hungary]]. In Poland, a worker's strike in [[Poznań]] [[Poznań 1956 protests|developed into disturbances]] that left more than 50 dead in June 1956.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=166–168}} When Moscow blamed the disturbances on Western agitators, Polish leaders ignored the claim and made concessions to the workers. With anti-Soviet displays becoming more common in Poland, and crucial Polish leadership elections upcoming, Khrushchev and other Presidium members flew to Warsaw on 19 October to meet with the Polish Presidium. The Soviets agreed to allow the new Polish leadership to take office, on the assurance there would be no change to the Soviet-Polish relationship.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=166–168}}<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://dziennikpolski24.pl/trzy-dni-pazdziernika/ar/2447598|title=Trzy dni października|date=19 October 2001|website=Dziennik Polski}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://histar.pl/2019/06/07/1956-sowieci-ida-na-warszawe/|title=1956: Sowieci idą na Warszawę!|first=Bartłomiej|last=Michalczyk|date=7 June 2019}}</ref> A period of at least partial liberalization, known as the [[Polish October]], followed.

The Polish settlement emboldened the Hungarians.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|p=122}} A mass demonstration in Budapest on 23 October turned into [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956|a popular uprising]]. In response, Hungarian Party leaders installed reformist [[Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Hungary|Premier]] [[Imre Nagy]].{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=168–170}} Soviet forces in the city clashed with Hungarians and fired on demonstrators, with hundreds of both Hungarians and Soviets killed. Nagy called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Soviet troops, which a Khrushchev-led majority in the Presidium decided to obey, choosing to give the new Hungarian government a chance.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|pp=123–124}} Khrushchev assumed that if Moscow announced liberalization in how it dealt with its allies, Nagy would adhere to the alliance with the Soviet Union.

On 30 October Nagy announced multiparty elections, and the next morning that Hungary would leave the Warsaw Pact.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|p=125}} On 3 November, two members of the Nagy government appeared in Ukraine as the self-proclaimed heads of a provisional government and demanded Soviet intervention, which was forthcoming. The next day, Soviet troops crushed the Hungarian uprising, with a death toll of 4,000 Hungarians and several hundred Soviet troops. Nagy was arrested and later executed. Despite the international outrage over the intervention, Khrushchev defended his actions for the rest of his life. Damage to Soviet foreign relations was severe and would have been greater were it not for the timing of the [[Suez crisis]], which distracted world attention.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=168–170}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-B0116-0010-043, Berlin, VI. SED-Parteitag, 2.Tag.jpg|thumb|alt=Two smiling men raise bouquets of flowers over their heads.|Khrushchev (left) and East German leader [[Walter Ulbricht]], 1963]]
In the aftermath of these crises, Khrushchev made the statement for which he became well-remembered, "[[We will bury you]]". While many in the West took this statement as a threat, Khrushchev made the statement in a speech on peaceful coexistence with the West.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=427–428}} When questioned about the statement during his 1959 U.S. visit, Khrushchev stated that he was not referring to a literal burial, but that, through inexorable historical development, communism would replace capitalism.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|p=96}}

Khrushchev greatly improved relations with [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]], which had been entirely sundered in 1948 when Stalin realized he could not control Yugoslav leader [[Josip Tito]]. Khrushchev led a Soviet delegation to Belgrade in 1955. Though a hostile Tito did everything he could to make the Soviets look foolish, Khrushchev was successful in warming relations, ending the [[Informbiro]] period.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=145–147}} During the Hungarian crisis, Tito initially supported Nagy, but Khrushchev persuaded him of the need for intervention.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=169}} Still, the intervention in Hungary damaged Moscow's relationship with Belgrade, which Khrushchev spent several years trying to repair. He was hampered by the fact that China disapproved of Yugoslavia's [[Reformism#Socialism|reformist socialism]] and attempts to conciliate Belgrade resulted in an angry Beijing.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=189}}

====China====
[[File:Mao Tsé-toung, portrait en buste, assis, faisant face à Nikita Khrouchtchev, pendant la visite du chef russe 1958 à Pékin.jpg|thumb|alt=A balding man and a younger Chinese man sit and smile, the balding man holding a fan|Khrushchev with [[Mao Zedong]], 1958]]
After completing his takeover of mainland China in 1949, [[Mao Zedong]] sought material assistance from the USSR, and also called for the return to China of territories taken from it under the Tsars.{{sfn|Whitman|1971}} Khrushchev increased aid to China, even sending a small corps of experts to help develop the new communist country.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=336}} This assistance was described by historian [[William C. Kirby]] as "the greatest transfer of technology in world history".{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=337}} The Soviet Union spent 7% of its national income between 1954 and 1959 on aid to China.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=111}} On his 1954 visit to China, Khrushchev agreed to return [[Lüshunkou District|Port Arthur]] and [[Dalian]] to China, though Khrushchev was annoyed by Mao's insistence that the Soviets leave their artillery.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=336–337}}

Mao bitterly opposed Khrushchev's attempts to reach a ''rapprochement'' with more liberal Eastern European states such as Yugoslavia. Khrushchev's government was reluctant to endorse Mao's desires for an assertive worldwide revolutionary movement, preferring to conquer capitalism through raising the standard of living in communist-bloc countries.{{sfn|Whitman|1971}}

Relations between the two nations began to cool in 1956, with Mao angered both by the Secret Speech and by the fact that the Chinese had not been consulted in advance about it.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=338}} Mao believed that de-Stalinization was a mistake and a possible threat to his own authority.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=136}} When Khrushchev visited Beijing in 1958, Mao refused proposals for military cooperation.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=391}} Hoping to torpedo Khrushchev's efforts at détente with the U.S., Mao soon thereafter provoked the [[Second Taiwan Strait Crisis]], describing the Taiwanese islands as "batons that keep Eisenhower and Khrushchev dancing, scurrying this way and that."{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=392}}

The Soviets had planned to provide China with an atomic bomb and full documentation, but in 1959, amid cooler relations, the Soviets destroyed the device and papers instead.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=137}} When Khrushchev visited China in September, shortly after his successful U.S. visit, he met a chilly reception, and left the country on the third day of a planned seven-day visit.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=394}} Relations continued to deteriorate in 1960, as both the USSR and China used a Romanian Communist Party congress as an opportunity to attack the other. Khrushchev responded by pulling Soviet experts out of China.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=470–471}}

====West Africa====
Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union provided considerable aid to the newly independent [[Ghana]] and [[Guinea]]. These were seen as ideal places to test the "socialist model of development" because of their critical dependence on economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, in contrast to larger Third World nations like Egypt and Indonesia. This project proved to be a resounding failure, although the lessons learned would have an important influence on Soviet foreign policy towards Africa in the following decades. The Soviet Union's display of ineptitude during the [[Congo Crisis]], where it failed to prevent both the newly independent [[Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville)|Republic of the Congo]] from descending into chaos and the substantial military intervention by Western powers, led to a further cooling of relations between the Soviet Union and its Ghanaian and Guinean partners.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Iandolo |first1=Alessandro |date=14 May 2012 |title=The rise and fall of the 'Soviet Model of Development' in West Africa, 1957–64 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14682745.2011.649255 |journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]] |volume=12 |issue=4 |pages=683–704 |doi=10.1080/14682745.2011.649255 |s2cid=154159207 |access-date=19 March 2023}}</ref>