Editing Mind–body dualism (section)

===The zombie argument===
{{Main|Philosophical zombie}}
{{See also|Chinese room|Knowledge argument}}

The [[p-zombie|zombie argument]] is based on a [[thought experiment]] proposed by [[David Chalmers]] over the issue of [[qualia]] or the [[hard problem of consciousness]]. The basic idea is that one can imagine, and, therefore, conceive the existence of, an apparently functioning human being/body without any conscious states being associated with it.

Chalmers' argument is that it seems plausible that such a being could exist because all that is needed is that all and only the things that the physical sciences describe and observe about a human being must be true of the zombie. None of the concepts involved in these sciences make reference to consciousness or other mental phenomena, and any physical entity can be described scientifically via physics whether it is conscious or not. The mere logical possibility of a p-zombie demonstrates that consciousness is a natural phenomenon beyond the current unsatisfactory explanations. Chalmers states that one probably could not build a living p-zombie because living things seem to require a level of consciousness. However (unconscious?) robots built to simulate humans may become the first real p-zombies. Hence Chalmers half-joking calls for the need to build a "consciousness meter" to ascertain if any given entity, human or robot, is conscious or not.<ref>{{cite book |author=Chalmers, David |title=The Conscious Mind |publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1997 |isbn=978-0-19-511789-9}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author=Chalmers, David |title=The Character of Consciousness|publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-19-531110-5}}</ref>

Others such as Dennett have [[Philosophical zombie#Criticism|argued]] that the notion of a philosophical zombie is an incoherent,<ref>{{cite journal |author=Dennett, Daniel |title=The unimagined preposterousness of zombies |year=1995 |journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|volume=2 |pages=322–326}}</ref> or unlikely,<ref>{{cite book |author=Dennett, Daniel |title=Consciousness Explained |publisher=Little, Brown and Co. |year=1991 |page=[https://archive.org/details/consciousnessexp00denn/page/95 95] |isbn=978-0-316-18065-8 |url=https://archive.org/details/consciousnessexp00denn/page/95 }}</ref> concept. In particular, nothing proves that an entity (e.g., a computer or robot) which would perfectly mimic human beings, and especially perfectly mimic expressions of feelings (like joy, fear, anger, ...), would not indeed experience them, thus having similar states of consciousness to what a real human would have. It is argued that under [[physicalism]], one must either believe that anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie—following from the assertion that one's own conviction about being (or not being) a zombie is a product of the physical world and is therefore no different from anyone else's.

[[Avshalom Elitzur]] has described himself as a "reluctant dualist". One argument Elitzur makes in favor of dualism is an argument from bafflement. According to Elitzur, a conscious being can conceive of a P-zombie version of his/herself. However, a P-zombie cannot conceive of a version of itself that lacks corresponding qualia.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Elitzur |first1=Avshalom |date=2009 |title=Consciousness makes a difference: A reluctant dualist's confession |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/ELICMA |journal=Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness |volume= |issue= |pages= |doi= |access-date=24 January 2025}}</ref>