Editing Logical positivism (section)

===Hilary Putnam===

In his critique of the [[received view of theories|received view]] in 1962, [[Hilary Putnam]] attacked the [[Logical positivism#Observation-theory distinction|observation-theory distinction]].<ref>{{cite book |title=Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science |last=Putnam |first=Hilary |pages=240–251 |chapter=What Theories are Not |year=1962 |publisher=Stanford University Press |location=Stanford |editor1= E. Nagel |editor2=P. Suppes |editor3=A. Tarski }}</ref> Putnam proposed that the division between "observation terms" and "theoretical terms" was untenable, determining that both categories have the potential to be [[theory-laden]]. Accordingly, he remarked that observational reports frequently refer to theoretical terms in practice.<ref>{{cite book |first=Hilary |last=Putnam |chapter=Problems with the observational/theoretical distinction |title=Scientific Inquiry |editor=Robert Klee |location=New York |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1999 |pages=25–29}}</ref> He illustrated cases in which observation terms can be applied to entities that [[Rudolf Carnap|Carnap]] would classify as [[unobservable]]s. For example, in [[Isaac Newton|Newton]]'s [[corpuscular theory of light]], observation concepts can be applied to the consideration of both [[Orders of magnitude (volume)#Sub-microscopic|sub-microscopic]] and macroscopic objects.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |last=Andreas |first=Holger |editor=Edward N. Zalta |year=2013 |edition=August 2021 |title=Theoretical Terms in Science |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/ |access-date=30 January 2025}}</ref>

Putnam advocated [[scientific realism]], whereby scientific theory describes a [[reality|real world]] existing independently of the senses. He rejected positivism, which he dismissed as a form of [[idealism|metaphysical idealism]], in that it precluded any possibility to acquire knowledge of the unobservable aspects of nature. He also spurned [[instrumentalism]], according to which a scientific theory is judged, not by whether it corresponds to reality, but by the extent to which it allows empirical predictions or resolves conceptual problems.<ref name="Friedman-pxii"/>