Editing Individualism (section)

=== Subjectivism ===
{{main|Subjectivism}}
Subjectivism is a philosophical tenet that accords primacy to subjective experience as fundamental of all measure and law. In extreme forms such as solipsism, it may hold that the nature and existence of every object depends solely on someone's subjective awareness of it. In the proposition 5.632 of the ''[[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]]'', [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] wrote: "The subject doesn't belong to the world, but it is a limit of the world". Metaphysical subjectivism is the theory that reality is what we perceive to be real, and that there is no underlying true reality that exists independently of perception. One can also hold that it is [[consciousness]] rather than perception that is reality ([[subjective idealism]]). In [[probability]], a subjectivism stands for the belief that probabilities are simply degrees-of-belief by rational agents in a certain proposition and which have no objective reality in and of themselves.

[[Ethical subjectivism]] stands in opposition to [[moral realism]], which claims that moral propositions refer to objective facts, independent of human opinion; to [[error theory]], which denies that any moral propositions are true in any sense; and to [[non-cognitivism]], which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all. The most common forms of ethical subjectivism are also forms of [[moral relativism]], with moral standards held to be relative to each culture or society, i.e. [[cultural relativism]], or even to every individual. The latter view, as put forward by [[Protagoras]], holds that there are as many distinct scales of good and evil as there are subjects in the world. Moral subjectivism is that species of moral relativism that relativizes moral value to the individual subject.

[[Horst Matthai Quelle]] was a Spanish-language German anarchist philosopher influenced by [[Max Stirner]].<ref name="books.google.com.ec">{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=E6JFPiDRlikC&q=horst+matthai+el+humanismo+como+problema+humano&pg=PA345|title=Textos filosoficos (1989–1999)|first=Horst Matthai|last=Quelle|year= 2002|publisher=UABC|isbn=978-9709051322|via=Google Books}}</ref> Quelle argued that since the individual gives form to the world, he is those objects, the others and the whole universe.<ref name="books.google.com.ec"/> One of his main views was a "theory of infinite worlds" which for him was developed by [[Pre-Socratic philosophy|pre-socratic philosophers]].<ref name="books.google.com.ec"/>

==== Solipsism ====
{{main|Solipsism}}
Solipsism is the [[philosophical]] idea that only one's own [[mind]] is sure to exist. The term comes from [[Latin]] ''solus'' ("alone") and ''ipse'' ("self"). Solipsism as an [[epistemological]] position holds that [[knowledge]] of anything outside one's own mind is unsure. [[Philosophical skepticism|The external world]] and [[problem of other minds|other minds]] cannot be known, and might not exist outside the mind. As a [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]] position, solipsism goes further to the conclusion that the world and other minds do not exist. Solipsism is the only epistemological position that, by its own [[wikt:postulate#Pronunciation|postulate]], is both [[wikt:irrefutable#English|irrefutable]] and yet indefensible in the same manner. Although the number of individuals sincerely espousing solipsism has been small, it is not uncommon for one philosopher to accuse another's arguments of entailing solipsism as an unwanted consequence, in a kind of [[reductio ad absurdum]]. In the history of philosophy, solipsism has served as a [[skeptical hypothesis]].