Editing Hu Jintao (section)

==Political positions==

===Scientific Outlook on Development===
{{main|Scientific Outlook on Development}}
Political observers indicate that Hu distinguished himself from his predecessor in both domestic and foreign policy. Hu's political philosophy during his leadership is summarized by three slogans — a "[[Harmonious Society|Harmonious Socialist Society]]" domestically and "Peaceful Development" internationally, the former aided by the [[Scientific Outlook on Development|Scientific Development Concept]], which seeks integrated sets of solutions to arrays of economic, environmental and social problems, and recognizes, in inner circles, a need for cautious and gradual political reforms.<ref name=Kuhn/> The Scientific Outlook on Development was written into the CCP and State Constitutions in [[17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|2007]] and [[2008 National People's Congress|2008]], respectively. The role of the Party has changed, as formulated by [[Deng Xiaoping]] and implemented by [[Jiang Zemin]], from a revolutionary party to a ruling party. During his tenure he continued the Party's modernization, calling for both "Advancement" of the Party and its increasing transparency in governance.

What emerges from these philosophies, in Hu's view, is a country with a systematic approach to national structure and development that combines dynamic economic growth, a free market energized by a vigorous "nonpublic" (i.e., private) sector, heavy-handed political and media control, personal but not political freedoms, concern for the welfare of all citizens, cultural enlightenment, and a synergistic approach to diverse social issues (the Scientific Development Perspective) that lead, in Hu's vision, to a "Harmonious Socialist Society". In the view of the Chinese government, these philosophies, which have created a new "China Model" of governance, serve as a legitimate alternative to the West's "Democracy Model", particularly for developing countries. In Hu's words, "A Harmonious Socialist Society should feature democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality."<ref name=Kuhn/> Such a society, he says, will give full scope to people's talent and creativity, enable all the people to share the social wealth brought by reform and development, and forge an ever-closer relationship between the people and government. Hu even emphasized the potential of religious communities to contribute to economic and social development under the banner of "Building a Harmonious Socialist Society."<ref name="georgetown1">{{cite web|url=http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/countries/china |title=China |publisher=[[Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs]] |access-date=14 December 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130316102321/http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/countries/china |archive-date=16 March 2013 }} See drop-down essay on "An Era of Opening"</ref>

Some observers attribute the political origins of low-carbon development strategy to Hu's Scientific Outlook on Development, although some industrial support in this area had already begun before Hu's formulation of the Scientific Outlook on Development.<ref name=":32">{{Cite book |last=Lewis |first=Joanna I. |title=Cooperating for the Climate: Learning from International Partnerships in China's Clean Energy Sector |date=2023 |publisher=The [[MIT Press]] |isbn=978-0-262-54482-5 |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts}}</ref>{{Rp|page=23}}

Western criticism of Hu, particularly regarding human rights, exposes his hypersensitivity to social stability but does not lay as much emphasis on his fresh commitment to address China's [[Social issues in China|multi-faceted social problems]].<ref name=Kuhn/> Hu's pragmatic, non-ideological agenda had two core values—maintaining social stability to further economic development and sustaining Chinese culture to enrich national sovereignty. In domestic policy, he seems to want more openness to the public on governmental functions and meetings. Recently, China's news agency published many Politburo Standing Committee meeting details. He also cancelled many events that are traditionally practiced, such as the lavish send-off and welcoming-back ceremonies of Chinese leaders when visiting foreign lands. Furthermore, the Chinese leadership under Hu also focused on such problems as the gap between rich and poor and uneven development between the interior and coastal regions. Both party and state seem to have moved away from a definition of development that focuses solely on [[Gross domestic product|GDP]] growth and toward a definition which includes social equality and environment effects.<ref name="Zhao Suisheng 2010">Zhao Suisheng, "Chinese foreign policy under Hu Jintao: The struggle between low-profile policy and diplomatic activism." ''Hague Journal of Diplomacy'' 5.4 (2010): 357-378.</ref>

In June 2007, Hu gave an important speech at the [[Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Party School]] that was indicative of his position of power and his guiding philosophies. In the speech Hu used a very populist tone to appeal to ordinary Chinese, making serious note of the recent challenges China was facing, especially with regards to income disparity. In addition, Hu noted the need for "increased democracy" in the country.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Democratization in China, Korea and Southeast Asia?: Local and National Perspectives (Politics in Asia)|last=Zhou|first=Kate Xiao|publisher=Routledge; 1 edition}}</ref>

===Moral guidance===
In response to the great number of social problems in China, in March 2006, Hu Jintao released the "[[Eight Honors and Eight Shames]]" as a set of moral codes to be followed by the Chinese people, and emphasized the need to spread the message to the youth.<ref>{{cite news |script-title=zh:胡锦涛关于“八荣八耻”的论述 |trans-title=Hu Jintao regarding 'The eight honors and eight shames' |language=zh-hans |publisher=[[Sohu]] |date=20 March 2006 |url=http://news.sohu.com/20060320/n242378439.shtml |access-date=16 May 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090104232609/http://news.sohu.com/20060320/n242378439.shtml |archive-date=4 January 2009 |url-status=live }}</ref> Alternatively known as the "Eight Honors and Disgraces", it contained eight poetic lines which summarized what a good citizen should regard as an honor and what to regard as a shame. It has been widely regarded as one of Hu Jintao's ideological solutions to the perceived increasing lack of morality in China after [[Chinese economic reform]]s brought in a generation of Chinese predominantly concerned with earning money and power in an increasingly frail social fabric.<ref>Alice Miller, "Hu Jintao and the sixth Plenum." ''China Leadership Monitor'' 20 (2007): 1-12. [https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/clm20am.pdf online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190929193716/https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/clm20am.pdf |date=29 September 2019 }}</ref>

It has become a norm for Chinese communist leaders to make their own contributions to [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist–Leninist theory]]. Whether this is Hu's contribution to Marxist–Leninist theory is debatable, but its general reception with the Chinese public has been moderate. Its promotion, however, is visible almost everywhere: in classroom posters, banners on the street, and electronic display boards for the preparation of the 2008 Olympics, and [[Expo 2010]] in Shanghai. The codes differ from the ideologies of his predecessors, namely, Jiang's Three Represents, [[Deng Xiaoping Theory]], and [[Maoism|Mao Zedong Thought]] in that the focus, for the first time, has been shifted to codifying moral standards as opposed to setting social or economic goals.<ref>Guoxin Xing, "Hu Jintao's Political Thinking and Legitimacy Building: A Post-Marxist Perspective." ''Asian Affairs'' 36.4 (2009): 213-226.</ref>