Editing History of Russia (section)

===Russian Army===
[[File:RUS-2016-SPB-Monument to Nicholas I of Russia.jpg|thumb|left|[[Monument to Nicholas I]] on [[St. Isaac's Square]], Saint Petersburg]]

Tsar [[Nicholas I of Russia|Nicholas I]] (reigned 1825–1855) lavished attention on his army.<ref>John Shelton Curtiss, "The Army of Nicholas I: Its Role and Character," ''American Historical Review,'' 63#4 (1958), pp. 880-889 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1848945 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210727192308/https://www.jstor.org/stable/1848945 |date=27 July 2021 }}</ref> In a nation of 60–70 million people, it included a million men. They had outdated equipment and tactics, but the tsar took pride in its smartness on parade. The cavalry horses, for example, were only trained in parade formations, and did poorly in battle. He put generals in charge of most of his civilian agencies regardless of their qualifications. The Army became the vehicle of upward social mobility for noble youths from non-Russian areas, such as Poland, the Baltic, Finland and Georgia.<ref>Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, ''From Serf to Russian Soldier'' (1990) [https://www.amazon.com/Russian-Soldier-Elise-Kimerling-Wirtschafter/dp/0691055858/ excerpt] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130629164645/http://www.amazon.com/Russian-Soldier-Elise-Kimerling-Wirtschafter/dp/0691055858 |date=29 June 2013 }}</ref> On the other hand, many miscreants, petty criminals and undesirables were punished by local officials by enlisting them for life in the Army. Village oligarchies controlled employment, conscription for the army, and local patronage; they blocked reforms and sent the most unpromising peasant youth to the army. The conscription system was unpopular with people, as was the practice of forcing peasants to house the soldiers for six months of the year.<ref>Edgar Melton, "Enlightened seigniorialism and its dilemmas in serf Russia, 1750-1830." ''Journal of Modern History'' 62.4 (1990): 676–708.</ref>

Finally the [[Crimean War]] at the end of his reign showed the world that Russia was militarily weak, technologically backward, and administratively incompetent. Despite his ambitions toward the south and Ottoman Empire, Russia had not built its railroad network in that direction, and communications were poor. The bureaucracy was riddled with corruption and inefficiency and was unprepared for war. The Navy was weak and technologically backward; the Army, although very large, was good only for parades, suffered from colonels who pocketed their men's pay, poor morale, and was even more out of touch with the latest technology. The nation's leaders realized that reforms were urgently needed.<ref>E. Willis Brooks, "Reform in the Russian Army, 1856–1861." ''Slavic Review'' 43.1 (1984): 63-82 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2498735 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210728050926/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2498735 |date=28 July 2021 }}.</ref>