Editing Hafez al-Assad (section)

====Sectarianism====
[[File: Hafez al-Assad and his top officials in 1971.png|thumbnail|alt=Four men in suits|Hafez in 1971 with Sunni members of the political elite: (L–R) Ahmad al-Khatib, Assad, Abdullah al-Ahmar and Mustafa Tlass]]
[[File:President Hafez al-Assad of Syria greets President Nixon on his arrival at Damascus airport - NARA - 194584.tif|thumb|Assad greeting [[Richard Nixon]] on the latter's arrival at [[Damascus Airport]], 15 July 1974]]
When Assad came to power, he increased Alawite dominance of the security and intelligence sectors to a near-monopoly.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=65}} The coercive framework was under his control, weakening the state and party. According to Hinnebusch, the Alawite officers around Assad "were pivotal because as personal kinsmen or clients of the president, they combined privileged access to him with positions in the party and control of the levers of coercion. They were, therefore, in an unrivalled position to act as political brokers and, especially in times of crisis, were uniquely placed to shape outcomes".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=65}} The leading figures in the Alawite-dominated security system had family connections; [[Rifaat al-Assad]] controlled the Struggle Companies, and Assad's brother-in-law [[Adnan Makhlouf]] was his second-in-command as Commander of the Presidential Guard.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=65}} Other prominent figures were [[Ali Haydar (Syrian army officer)|Ali Haydar]] (special-forces head), Ibrahim al-Ali (Popular Army head), [[Muhammad al-Khuli]] (head of Assad's [[Air Force Intelligence Directorate]] from 1970 to 1987) and Military Intelligence head [[Ali Duba]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|pp=65–66}} Assad controlled the military through Alawites such as Generals [[Shafiq Fayadh]] (commander of the 3rd Division), [[Ibrahim Safi]] (commander of the 1st Division) and [[Adnan Badr Hassan]] (commander of the 9th Division).{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=66}} During the 1990s, Assad further strengthened Alawite dominance by replacing Sunni General [[Hikmat al-Shihabi]] with General [[Ali Aslan]] as chief of staff.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=66}} The Alawites, with their high status, appointed and promoted based on kinship and favor rather than professional respect.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=66}} Therefore, an Alawite elite emerged from these policies.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=66}} [[Anti-Sunnism|Anti-Sunni]] orientation of his Alawite regime also pushed Assad to pursue closer relations with [[Shia Islam|Shia]] Iran.{{Sfn|Lüthi|2020|p=507}}

During the early years of his rule, some of Assad's elite had appeared non-sectarian;{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=66}} prominent Sunni figures at the beginning of his rule were [[Abdul Halim Khaddam]], Shihabi, Naji Jamil, [[Abdullah al-Ahmar]] and [[Mustafa Tlass]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=66}} However, none of these people had a power base distinct from that of Assad.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=226}} Although Sunnis held the positions of Air Force Commander from 1971 to 1994 (Jamil, Subhi Haddad and Ali Malahafji), General Intelligence head from 1970 to 2000 (Adnan Dabbagh, Ali al-Madani, Nazih Zuhayr, Fuad al-Absi and Bashir an-Najjar), Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army from 1974 to 1998 (Shihabi) and defense minister from 1972 until after Assad's death (Tlass), none had power separate from Assad or the Alawite-dominated security system.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=226}} When Jamil headed the Air Force, he could not issue orders without the knowledge of Khuli (the Alawite head of Air Force Intelligence).{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=226}} After the failed Islamst uprising, Assad's reliance on his relatives intensified;{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=226}} before that, his Sunni colleagues had some autonomy.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=226}} A defector from Assad's government said, "Tlass is in the army but at the same time seems as if he is not of the army; he neither binds nor loosens and has no role other than that of the tail in the beast."{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=227}} Another example was Shihabi, who occasionally represented Assad.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=227}} However, he had no control in the Syrian military; Ali Aslan, First Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations during most of his tenure, was responsible for troop maneuvers.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=227}} Although the Sunnis were in the forefront, the Alawites had the power.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=227}}