Editing First Triumvirate (section)

== Evaluation ==

The alliance was clearly successful in winning short-term political advantage for its members in Caesar's consulship of 59&nbsp;BC. However, over the following years, it broke down: "cooperation was shaky and the disenchantment of former supporters proved.. to be debilitating". Moreover, its very success triggered "the coalescence of aristocratic groups in opposition" with greatly lessened success in the later half of the 50s.{{sfn|Gruen|1995|p=91}} Overall, the alliance was "never entirely stable" and was marked by periods of renewal followed by a return to rivalries between the three members. The goals sought together were broadly opportunistic and self-interested.{{sfn|Russell|2015}} The alliance, however, was part of the thinking that went into the creation of the [[Second Triumvirate]] a few decades later.{{sfn|Flower|2010|p=148}}

The formation of the three-way alliance "has been seen as a momentous milestone in the crippling of republican institutions" since ancient times. The ancient historian [[Gaius Asinius Pollio]] chose to start his history of the civil wars with its formation; other historians, including Ronald Syme in ''Roman Revolution'' (1939), have taken a similar tact, viewing it as "the end of the free state".<ref>{{harvnb|Gruen|1995|p=90|ps=, quoting {{cite book |last=Syme |first=Ronald |title=Roman Revolution |year=1939 |pages=[https://books.google.com/books?id=F5ebGZNzSUIC&pg=PA36 35–36] |publisher=Clarendon Press |location=Oxford }} }}</ref> For example, Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg in the ''Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic'' (2014), wrote:

{{blockquote|
Their friendship (''amicitia'') could have been a traditional alliance within the framework of what was usual in Roman political life. Yet their agreement that nothing should be done in Rome that was displeasing to any of the three... changed the rules of the game. There had never been a time when three men had conceived of the notion that their private arrangements should regulate what would happen in Rome. For there had never before been three men with the necessary resources and power to impose their vision on the state.{{sfn|von Ungern-Sternberg|2014|p=91}}
}}

Others disagree. Erich Gruen, for example, writes "the union of political cliques in 59 was an information ''amicitia''... [it was] no novelty in Roman politics and simply underlined the mobility of grouping that had been characteristic of previous decades".{{sfn|Gruen|1995|p=90}} In this vein, the alliance can be seen as something similar also to "the kind of political deal the [[Lucius Appuleius Saturninus|Saturninus]] and [[Gaius Servilius Glaucia|Glaucia]] were trying to organise in 100"&nbsp;BC.{{sfn|Flower|2010|p=148}} Amy Russell, writing in the ''Encyclopedia of Ancient History'', similarly focuses on how the alliance failed to dominate elections, viewing instead the accusations of ''regnum'' from Cicero and lamentations of tyranny as "deriv[ing] from their opponents' rhetoric... [who] at the same time... were working to divide them [the allies]".{{sfn|Russell|2015}} Similarly, Mary Beard says the alliance "was not such a complete takeover as those comments [from Horace and Cicero] imply[;] there were all kinds of strains, disagreements, and rivalries between the three men ... the electoral process sometimes got the better of them and someone quite different, not at all to their liking, was voted in".{{sfn|Beard|2015|p=279}}

The alliance's collapse after Crassus' death was because his death put the two remaining men in competition with one another. Coupled with Caesar's military success in Gaul, he was no longer a junior partner. Pompey's search for new allies to counter-balance Caesar led him into conflict.{{sfn|Russell|2015}}