Editing Erwin Rommel (section)

=== Plot against Hitler ===
{{Main|20 July plot}}
The role that Rommel played in the military's [[German resistance to Nazism|resistance against Hitler]] or the [[20 July plot]] is difficult to ascertain as most of the leaders who were directly involved did not survive, and limited documentation exists on the conspirators' plans and preparations.{{sfn|Hansen|2014|p=57}}{{sfn|Beckett|2014|p=6}} One piece of evidence that points to the possibility that Rommel came to support the assassination plan was [[Heinrich Eberbach|General Eberbach]]'s confession to his son (eavesdropped on by British agencies) while in British captivity which stated that Rommel explicitly said to him that Hitler and his close associates had to be killed because this would be the only way out for Germany.<ref name="the Fuehrer had to go&nbsp;...">{{cite book|last1=Schröder|first1=Stephen Schröder|title=Zwanzigste Juli 1944 – Profile, Motive, Desiderate|isbn=978-3-8258-1171-6|page=191|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fpbMV5fIWzEC&pg=PA191|year=2008|publisher=LIT Verlag Münster }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Prados|first1=John|title=Normandy Crucible: The Decisive Battle that Shaped World War II in Europe|isbn=978-1-101-51661-4|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LKojFcDjF7IC&pg=PT156|date=2011|publisher=Penguin }}</ref>{{sfn|Hansen|2014|p= 56}}{{sfn|Neitzel|2007|p=103}} This conversation occurred about a month before Rommel was coerced into suicide.

Other notable evidence includes the papers of [[Rudolf Hartmann]] (who survived the later purge) and [[Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel]], who were among the leaders of the military resistance (alongside Rommel's chief of staff General [[Hans Speidel]], Colonel [[Karl-Richard Koßmann]], Colonel [[Eberhard Finckh]] and Lieutenant Colonel [[Caesar von Hofacker]]). These papers, accidentally discovered by historian Christian Schweizer in 2018 while doing research on Rudolf Hartmann, include Hartmann's eyewitness account of a conversation between Rommel and Stülpnagel in May 1944, as well as photos of the mid-May 1944 meeting between the inner circle of the resistance and Rommel at Koßmann's house. According to Hartmann, by the end of May, in another meeting at Hartmann's quarters in Mareil–Marly, Rommel showed "decisive determination" and clear approval of the inner circle's plan.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Klaper|first1=Elisabeth|title=Widerstandskämpfer und Demokrat|url=http://www.murrhardter-zeitung.de/node/1127424|work=Murrhardter Zeitung|date=28 April 2018|archive-date=20 April 2019|access-date=9 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190420063023/https://www.murrhardter-zeitung.de/node/1127424|url-status=live}}</ref> In a post-war account by [[Karl Strölin]], three of Rommel's friends—the ''Oberbürgermeister'' of Stuttgart, Strölin (who had served with Rommel in the First World War), [[Alexander von Falkenhausen]] and Stülpnagel—began efforts to bring Rommel into the anti-Hitler conspiracy in early 1944. According to Strölin, sometime in February, Rommel agreed to lend his support to the resistance.{{sfn|Shirer|1960|pp=1031, 1177}}
[[File:A meeting between the military resistance's inner circle and Rommel, Mareil-Marly, 15. May 1944.jpg|thumb|right|upright|A meeting of the military resistance's inner circle and Rommel at [[Mareil-Marly]] 15 May 1944. From left, Speidel – behind, Rommel – centre, Stülpnagel – front. The officer standing left is Rudolf Hartmann. The others are unknown.]]

On 15 April 1944, Rommel's new chief of staff, [[Hans Speidel]], arrived in Normandy and reintroduced Rommel to Stülpnagel.{{sfn|Hart|2014|pp=142–150}} Speidel had previously been connected to [[Carl Goerdeler]], the civilian leader of the resistance, but not to the plotters led by [[Claus von Stauffenberg]], and came to Stauffenberg's attention only upon his appointment to Rommel's headquarters. The conspirators felt they needed the support of a field marshal on active duty. [[Erwin von Witzleben]], who would have become commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht had the plot succeeded, was a field marshal, but had been inactive since 1942. The conspirators gave instructions to Speidel to bring Rommel into their circle.{{sfn|Hart|2014|pp=139–142}} Speidel met with former foreign minister [[Konstantin von Neurath]] and Strölin on 27 May in Germany, ostensibly at Rommel's request, although the latter was not present. Neurath and Strölin suggested opening immediate surrender negotiations in the West, and, according to Speidel, Rommel agreed to further discussions and preparations.{{sfn|Hart|2014|p=146}}  Around the same timeframe, the plotters in Berlin were not aware that Rommel had allegedly decided to take part in the conspiracy. On 16 May, they informed [[Allen Dulles]], through whom they hoped to negotiate with the Western Allies, that Rommel could not be counted on for support.{{sfn|Hart|2014|pp=145–146}}

At least initially, Rommel opposed assassinating Hitler.{{sfn|Naumann|2009|pp=189–191}} According to some authors,{{sfn|Remy|2002|pp=241–355}}<ref>{{cite book|last1=Beevor|first1=Antony|title=D-Day: The Battle for Normandy|isbn=978-1-101-14872-3|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rB1iBwAAQBAJ&pg=PT342|date= 2012|publisher=Penguin Books Ltd. }}</ref><ref name="kas.de" />{{sfn|Faltin|2014|loc=Cornelia Hecht considered it (Eberbach's testimony) authentic, "Why did he have to lie?"}}<ref>{{cite book|last1=Richie|first1=Alexandra|title=Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler, and the Warsaw Uprising|date= 2013|publisher=Macmillan|isbn=978-1-4668-4847-4|page=26|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uQouAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA26}}</ref> he gradually changed his attitude. After the war, his widow—among others—maintained that Rommel believed an assassination attempt would spark a civil war in Germany and Austria, and Hitler would have become a martyr for a lasting cause.{{sfn|Hart|2014|p=140: Sourced to Speidel (1950) ''Invasion 1944: We Defended Normandy'', pp. 68, 73}} Instead, Rommel reportedly suggested that Hitler be arrested and brought to trial for his crimes; he did not attempt to implement this plan when Hitler visited Margival, France, on 17 June. The arrest plan would have been highly improbable as Hitler's security was extremely tight. Rommel would have known this, having commanded Hitler's army protection detail in 1939.{{sfn|Hart|2014|pp=145–147}} He was in favour of peace negotiations and repeatedly urged Hitler to negotiate with the Allies which is dubbed by some as "hopelessly naive" considering no one would trust Hitler.{{sfn|Pimlott|2003|pp=213, 218}}{{sfn|Scheck|2010}}<ref>{{cite news|last1=Reuth|first1=Ralf Georg|title=Das Rommel- Komplott|url=https://www.welt.de/print-wams/article116801/Das-Rommel-Komplott.html|work=Die Welt|year=2004|archive-date=6 December 2021|access-date=6 March 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211206212642/https://www.welt.de/print-wams/article116801/Das-Rommel-Komplott.html|url-status=live}}</ref>  "As naive as it was idealistic, the attitude he showed to the man he had sworn loyalty".{{sfn|Knopp|2013|p=81}}

According to Reuth, the reason Lucie Rommel did not want her husband to be associated with any conspiracy was that even after the war, the German population neither grasped nor wanted to comprehend the reality of the genocide, thus conspirators were still treated as traitors and outcasts.{{sfn|Reuth|2005|pp=119–120}} On the other hand, the resistance depended on the reputation of Rommel to win over the population.{{sfn|Hecht|2008|pp=90–137}}{{sfn|Hoffmann|1996|p=352}} Some officers who had worked with Rommel also recognised the relationship between Rommel and the resistance: Westphal said that Rommel did not want any more senseless sacrifices.{{sfn|Hecht|2008|pp=90–137}} Butler, using Ruge's recollections, reports that when told by Hitler himself that "no one will make peace with me", Rommel told Hitler that if he was the obstacle to peace, he should resign or kill himself, but Hitler insisted on fanatical defence.{{sfn|Butler|2015|p=495}}

Reuth, based on Jodl's testimony, reports that Rommel forcefully presented the situation and asked for political solutions from Hitler, who rebuffed that Rommel should leave politics to him.{{sfn|Reuth|2005|p=45}} Brighton comments that Rommel seemed devoted, even though he did not have much faith in Hitler anymore considering he kept informing Hitler in person and by letter about his changing beliefs despite facing a military dilemma as well as a personal struggle.{{sfn|Brighton|2008|pp=390–391}} Lieb remarks that Rommel's attitude in describing the situation honestly and requiring political solutions was almost without precedent and contrary to the attitude of many other generals.{{sfn|Lieb|2014|pp=132–136}}<ref name="kas.de" /> Remy comments that Rommel put himself and his family (which he had briefly considered evacuating to France, but refrained from doing so) at risk for the resistance out of a combination of his concern for the fate of Germany, his indignation at atrocities and the influence of people around him.{{sfn|Remy|2002|p=337}}

On 15 July, Rommel wrote a letter to Hitler giving him a "last chance" to end the hostilities with the Western Allies, urging Hitler to "draw the proper conclusions without delay". What Rommel did not know was that the letter took two weeks to reach Hitler because of Kluge's precautions.{{sfn|Remy|2002|p=301}}<ref>{{cite book|last1=Kane|first1=Robert B.|title=Disobedience and Conspiracy in the German Army, 1918–1945|date=2002|publisher=McFarland|isbn=978-0-7864-1104-7|url=https://archive.org/details/disobediencecons00kane|url-access=registration|page=[https://archive.org/details/disobediencecons00kane/page/187 187]}}</ref> Various authors report that many German generals in Normandy, including some SS officers like [[Paul Hausser|Hausser]], [[Wilhelm Bittrich|Bittrich]], [[Sepp Dietrich|Dietrich]] (a hard-core Nazi and Hitler's long-time supporter) and Rommel's former opponent Geyr von Schweppenburg, pledged support to him even against Hitler's orders, while Kluge supported him with much hesitation.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Bennett|first1=David|title=A Magnificent Disaster: The Failure of Market Garden, the Arnhem Operation, September 1944|date=2011|publisher=Casemate Publishers|isbn=978-1-935149-97-2|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QIQ_0WtkGjYC&pg=PT74}}</ref>{{sfn|Hansen|2014|p=57}}{{sfn|Brighton|2008|p=295}} Rundstedt encouraged Rommel to carry out his plans but refused to do anything himself, remarking that it had to be a man who was still young and loved by the people,{{sfn|Shepherd|2016|p=587}}<ref>{{cite book|last1=Messenger|first1=Charles|title=The Last Prussian: A Biography of Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt|date=2012|publisher=Pen and Sword|isbn=978-1-4738-1946-7|page=191|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9yfAAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA191}}</ref> while [[Erich von Manstein]] was also approached by Rommel but categorically refused, although he did not report them to Hitler either.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Lemay|first1=Benoît|title=Erich Von Manstein: Hitler's Master Strategist|date=2010|publisher=Casemate Publishers|isbn=978-1-935149-55-2|page=405|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Amn_pandW3MC&pg=PA405}}</ref> [[Peter Hoffmann (historian)|Peter Hoffmann]] reports that he also attracted into his orbit officials who had previously refused to support the conspiracy, like [[Julius Dorpmüller]] and [[Karl Kaufmann]] (according to Russell A. Hart, reliable details of the conversations are now lost, although they certainly met).{{sfn|Hoffmann|1996|p=352}}{{sfn|Hart|2014|p=145}}

On 17 July 1944, Rommel was incapacitated by an Allied air attack, which many authors describe as a fateful event that drastically altered the outcome of the bomb plot.{{sfn|Hansen|2014|p=46}}{{sfn|Rice |2009 |p=95 }}{{sfn|Remy|2002|p=306}} Writer Ernst Jünger commented: "The blow that felled Rommel&nbsp;... robbed the plan of the shoulders that were to be entrusted the double weight of war and civil war—the only man who had enough naivety to counter the simple terror that those he was about to go against possessed."{{sfn|Remy|2002|pp=306–307}} After the failed bomb attack of 20 July, many conspirators were arrested and the dragnet expanded to thousands.{{sfn|Hart|2014|p=152}} Rommel was first implicated when Stülpnagel, after his suicide attempt, repeatedly muttered "Rommel" in delirium.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Martin|first1=Blumenson|title=Heroes Never Die: Warriors and Warfare in World War II|date=2001|publisher=Cooper Square Press|isbn=978-0-8154-1152-9|page=[https://archive.org/details/heroesneverdiewa0000blum/page/375 375]|url=https://archive.org/details/heroesneverdiewa0000blum/page/375}}</ref>{{sfn|Brighton|2008}} Under torture, Hofacker named Rommel as one of the participants.{{sfn|Hart|2014|pp=141, 152}} Additionally, Goerdeler had written down Rommel's name on a list as potential Reich President (according to Stroelin. They had not managed to announce this intention to Rommel yet and he probably never heard of it until the end of his life).{{sfn|Hansen|2014|p=51}}{{sfn|Reuth|2005|p=183}}{{sfn|Young|1950|p=197}}{{sfn|Shirer|1960|p=1031}}

On 27 September, Martin Bormann submitted to Hitler a memorandum which claimed that "the late General Stülpnagel, Colonel Hofacker, Kluge's nephew who has been executed, Lieutenant Colonel Rathgens, and several ... living defendants have testified that Field Marshal Rommel was perfectly in the picture about the assassination plan and has promised to be at the disposal of the New Government."{{sfn|Remy|2002|p=293}}<ref name="Rommel ist und bleibt ein Mythos">{{cite web |last1=Lasserre |first1=Caroline |title=Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung |url=http://www.kas.de/niedersachsen/de/publications/38303/ |access-date=3 August 2016 |date=7 July 2014 |archive-date=11 December 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161211195434/http://www.kas.de/niedersachsen/de/publications/38303/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> Gestapo agents were sent to Rommel's house in Ulm and placed him under surveillance.{{sfn|Reuth|2005|p=198}} Historian Peter Lieb considers the memorandum, as well as Eberbach's conversation and the testimonies of surviving resistance members (including Hartmann), to be the three key sources that indicate Rommel's support of the assassination plan. He further notes that while Speidel had an interest in promoting his own post-war career, his testimonies should not be dismissed, considering his bravery as an early resistance figure.{{sfn|Kellerhoff|2018}} Remy writes that even more important than Rommel's attitude to the assassination is the fact Rommel had his own plan to end the war. He began to contemplate this plan some months after El Alamein and carried it out with a lonely decision and conviction, and in the end, had managed to bring military leaders in the West to his side.{{sfn|Remy|2002|p=358}}