Editing Dean Rusk (section)

===Vietnam in 1964 ===
Just after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Rusk supported the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.<ref>Langguth, A.J. ''Our Vietnam'' 2000 p.&nbsp;302</ref> 
On August 29, 1964, amid the ongoing presidential election, Rusk called for bipartisan support to ensure that the US's foreign policy have both consistency and reliability and said Republican presidential nominee [[Barry Goldwater]] was creating "mischief".<ref>{{cite news|url=http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1964/08/30/page/8/article/rusk-assails-barrys-hot-line-charges|title=Rusk Assails Barry's Hot Line Charges|newspaper=Chicago Tribune|date=August 30, 1964}}</ref> The following month, at a September 10 press conference in the main auditorium of the State Department, Rusk said that Senator Goldwater's critiques "reflect a basic lack of understanding" of a U.S. President's handling of conflict and peace.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1964/09/11/page/2/article/barrys-blasts-foolish-rusk-charges|title=Barry's Blasts Foolish, Rusk Charges|date=September 11, 1964|newspaper=Chicago Tribune}}</ref>

On September 7, 1964, Johnson assembled his national security team to seek a consensus about what to do about Vietnam.<ref>Karnow, Stanley ''Vietnam: A History'', 1983 p.398</ref> Rusk advised caution, arguing that Johnson should embark on military measures only after diplomacy had been exhausted.<ref>Karnow, Stanley ''Vietnam: A History'', New York: Viking, 1983 p.399</ref> In September 1964, Rusk grew frustrated with the endless infighting amongst South Vietnam's junta of generals and after a failed coup d'état against [[Nguyễn Khánh]]  sent a message to [[Maxwell Taylor]], the ambassador in Saigon, on September 14, stating he was to "make it emphatically clear" to Khánh and the rest of the junta that Johnson was tired of the infighting.<ref name="Karnow 377">Karnow, Stanley ''Vietnam: A History'', 1983 p.377</ref> Rusk also instructed Taylor to say: "The United States has not provided massive assistance to South Vietnam, in military equipment, economic resources, and personnel in order to subsidize continuing quarrels among South Vietnamese leaders."<ref name="Karnow 377"/> Reflecting the general vexation with South Vietnam's chronic political instability in Washington, Rusk argued to Johnson: "Somehow we must change the pace at which these people move, and I suspect that this can only be done with a pervasive intrusion of Americans into their affairs."<ref name="Karnow 378">Karnow, Stanley ''Vietnam: A History'', 1983 p.378</ref> Increasingly, the feeling in Washington was if South Vietnam could not defeat the Viet Cong guerrillas on its own, the Americans would have to step in and win the war that the South Vietnamese had proved incapable of winning.<ref name="Karnow 378"/> On September 21, Rusk said the US would not be pushed out of the [[Gulf of Tonkin]] and that the prevention of it becoming a "communist lake" would be assured by the continued presence of American forces there.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1964/09/22/page/2/article/reds-cant-push-u-s-from-gulf-rusk-says|title=Reds Can't Push U.S. from Gulf, Rusk Says|first=Seymour|last=Korman|newspaper=Chicago Tribune|date=September 22, 1964}}</ref>

In September 1964, a peace initiative was launched by the UN Secretary General [[U Thant]] who tried to set up secret peace talks in his native Burma, which were supported by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev who pressured Ho Chi Minh to take part in the projected peace talks, saying he would only increase Soviet aid to North Vietnam if the North Vietnamese took part in a diplomatic effort to end the war first.<ref name="Karnow 377"/> U Thant reported to Rusk that the Soviet pressure seemed to be working as North Vietnam's other arms supplier, China, could not match the hi-tech weaponry that only the Soviet Union could supply.<ref name="Karnow 377"/> Rusk did not press on this information on Johnson, saying to take part in the planned talks in Burma would have signaled "the acceptance or the confirmation of aggression".<ref name="Karnow 377"/> In October, the peace initiative was ended by Khrushchev being ousted and his successor, Leonid Brezhnev, was not interested in U Thant's plan.<ref name="Karnow 377"/>

On 1 November 1964, the Viet Cong attacked the American airbase at Bien Hoa, killing 4 Americans.<ref>Langguth, A.J. ''Our Vietnam'' 2000 p.319</ref> Rusk told Ambassador Taylor that with the elections occurring in less than 48 hours, Johnson did not want to act, but after the election there would be "a more systematic campaign of military pressure on the North with all implications we have always seen in their course of action".<ref>Langguth, A.J. ''Our Vietnam'' 2000 p.&nbsp;319</ref>