Editing Blitzkrieg (section)

===Counter-tactics===
{{Unreferenced section|date=December 2021}}
Blitzkrieg is vulnerable to an enemy that is robust enough to weather the shock of the attack and does not panic at the idea of enemy formations in its rear area. That is especially true if the attacking formation lacks the reserve to keep funnelling forces into the spearhead or the mobility to provide infantry, artillery and supplies into the attack. If the defender can hold the shoulders of the breach, it has the opportunity to counter-attack into the flank of the attacker and potentially to cut it off the van, as what happened to [[Joachim Peiper#Battle of the Bulge|Kampfgruppe Peiper]] in the Ardennes.

During the Battle of France in 1940, the [[4th Armored Division (France, 1940)|4th Armoured Division]] (Major-General Charles de Gaulle) and elements of the 1st Army Tank Brigade [[British Expeditionary Force (World War II)|(British Expeditionary Force)]] made probing attacks on the German flank and pushed into the rear of the advancing armored columns at times. That may have been a reason for Hitler to call a halt to the German advance. Those attacks combined with [[Maxime Weygand]]'s [[hedgehog tactic]] would become the major basis for responding to blitzkrieg attacks in the future. [[Defence in depth|Deployment in depth]], or permitting enemy or "shoulders" of a penetration, was essential to channelling the enemy attack; artillery, properly employed at the shoulders, could take a heavy toll on attackers. Allied forces in 1940 lacked the experience to develop those strategies successfully, which resulted in the French armistice with heavy losses, but those strategies characterized later Allied operations.

At the [[Battle of Kursk]], the Red Army used a combination of defence in great depth, extensive minefields and tenacious defense of breakthrough shoulders. In that way, they depleted German combat power even as German forces advanced.{{citation needed|date= July 2013 |reason= invalid ref: Holmes not found in bibliography}} The reverse can be seen in the Russian summer offensive of 1944, [[Operation Bagration]], which resulted in the destruction of Army Group Center. German attempts to weather the storm and fight out of encirclements failed because of the Soviets' ability to continue to feed armored units into the attack, maintain the mobility and strength of the offensive and arrive in force deep in the rear areas faster than the Germans could regroup.{{Citation needed|date=November 2018}}