Editing Battle of Britain (section)

===Intelligence===
The Luftwaffe was ill-served by its lack of [[military intelligence]] about the British defences.<ref name="Bungay 2000, p. 68">{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=68}}</ref> The German intelligence services were fractured and plagued by [[rivalry]]; their performance was "amateurish".<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|pp=69–70}}</ref> By 1940, there were few German agents operating in Great Britain and a handful of attempts to [[Double-Cross System|insert spies into the country were foiled]].<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=186}}</ref>

As a result of intercepted radio transmissions, the Germans began to realise that the RAF fighters were being controlled from ground facilities; in July and August 1939, for example, the airship ''[[LZ 130 Graf Zeppelin|Graf Zeppelin]]'', which was packed with equipment for listening in on RAF radio and RDF transmissions, flew around the coasts of Britain. Although the Luftwaffe correctly interpreted these new ground control procedures, they were incorrectly assessed as being rigid and ineffectual. A British [[radar]] system was well known to the Luftwaffe from intelligence gathered before the war, but the highly developed "[[Dowding system]]" linked with fighter control had been a well-kept secret.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|pp=68–69}}</ref><ref>[http://ftp1.us.proftpd.org/hyperwar//ETO/BOB/BoB-German/ "Lt Col Earle Lund, USAF, p. 13."]{{dead link|date=December 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }} ''ProFTPd''. Retrieved: 13 June 2008.</ref> Even when good information existed, such as a November 1939 ''Abwehr'' assessment of Fighter Command strengths and capabilities by ''Abteilung V'', it was ignored if it did not match conventional preconceptions.

On 16 July 1940, ''Abteilung V'', commanded by ''[[Oberstleutnant]]'' [[Joseph Schmid|"Beppo" Schmid]], produced a report on the RAF and on Britain's defensive capabilities which was adopted by the frontline commanders as a basis for their operational plans. One of the most conspicuous failures of the report was the lack of information on the RAF's RDF network and control systems capabilities; it was assumed that the system was rigid and inflexible, with the RAF fighters being "tied" to their home bases.<ref name="Bungay 2000, p. 188.">{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=188}}</ref><ref name="16 July report on RAF defensive capabilities">[http://ftp1.us.proftpd.org/hyperwar//ETO/BOB/BoB-German/BoB-German-A.html ''Abteilung V'' Intelligence Appreciation of the RAF (see "Appendix 4")] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080827042806/http://ftp1.us.proftpd.org/hyperwar//ETO/BOB/BoB-German/BoB-German-A.html |date=27 August 2008 }}. ''ProFTPd''.. Retrieved: 13 June 2008.</ref> An optimistic (and, as it turned out, erroneous) conclusion reached was:

{{blockquote|'''D. Supply Situation'''...&nbsp;At present the British aircraft industry produces about 180 to 300 first line fighters and 140 first line bombers a month. In view of the present conditions relating to production (the appearance of raw material difficulties, the disruption or breakdown of production at factories owing to air attacks, the increased vulnerability to air attack owing to the fundamental reorganisation of the aircraft industry now in progress), it is believed that for the time being output will decrease rather than increase.

In the event of an intensification of air warfare it is expected that the present strength of the RAF will fall, and this decline will be aggravated by the continued decrease in production.<ref name="16 July report on RAF defensive capabilities" />}}

Because of this statement, reinforced by another more detailed report, issued on 10 August, there was a mindset in the ranks of the Luftwaffe that the RAF would run out of frontline fighters.<ref name="Bungay 2000, p. 188."/> The Luftwaffe believed it was weakening Fighter Command at three times the actual attrition rate.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=193}}</ref> Many times, the leadership believed Fighter Command's strength had collapsed, only to discover that the RAF were able to send up defensive formations at will.

Throughout the battle, the Luftwaffe had to use numerous reconnaissance sorties to make up for poor intelligence. Reconnaissance aircraft (initially mostly Dornier Do 17s, but increasingly Bf 110s) proved easy prey for British fighters, as it was seldom possible for them to be escorted by Bf 109s. Thus, the Luftwaffe operated "blind" for much of the battle, unsure of its enemy's true strengths, capabilities, and deployments. Many of the Fighter Command airfields were never attacked, while raids against supposed fighter airfields fell instead on bomber or coastal defence stations. The results of bombing and air fighting were consistently exaggerated, due to inaccurate claims, over-enthusiastic reports and the difficulty of confirmation over enemy territory. In the euphoric atmosphere of perceived victory, the Luftwaffe leadership became increasingly disconnected from reality. This lack of leadership and solid intelligence meant the Germans did not adopt a consistent strategy, even when the RAF had its back to the wall. Moreover, there was never a systematic focus on one type of target (such as airbases, radar stations, or aircraft factories); consequently, the already haphazard effort was further diluted.<ref name="Allen">{{harvnb|Allen|1974}}{{Page needed|date=March 2015}}</ref>