Editing Armed Forces of the Philippines (section)

====Philippine Defense Reform Program (2003-2016)====
[[File:Philippine Defense Reform Program framework.png|thumb|Framework of the Philippine Defense Reform Program]]
In October 1999, the Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) began as a policy level discussion between the Philippine Secretary of National Defense and the US Secretary of Defense. An initial JDA report in 2001 provided an objective evaluation of Philippine defense capability. During a May 2003 state visit to Washington DC, President Arroyo requested U.S. assistance in conducting a strategic assessment of the Philippine defense system. This led to a follow-up JDA and formulation of recommendations addressing deficiencies found in the Philippine defense structure.<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|pp=6–7}}</ref>

The results of the 2003 JDA were devastating. The JDA findings revealed that the AFP was only partially capable of performing its most critical missions. Moreover, the results pointed overwhelmingly toward institutional and strategic deficiencies as being the root cause of most of the shortcomings. A common thread in all: the lack of strategy-based planning that would focus DND/AFP on addressing priority threats and link capability requirements with the acquisition process.

Specifically, the 2003 JDA revealed critical deficiencies in the following specific areas:<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=7}}</ref>
* Systemic approach to policy planning
* Personnel management and leadership
* Defense expenditures and budgeting
* Acquisition
* Supply and maintenance
* Quality assurance for existing industrial base
* Infrastructure support

During a reciprocal visit to the Philippines in October 2003 by U.S. President Bush, he and President Arroyo issued a joint statement expressing their commitment to embark upon a multi-year plan to implement the JDA recommendations. The Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program is the result of that agreement.

The JDA specifically identified 65 key areas and 207 ancillary areas of concern. These were reduced to ten broad-based and inter-related recommendations that later became the basis for what became known as the PDR Priority Programs. The ten are:<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=8}}, [https://web.archive.org/web/20060128011809/http://www.afp.mil.ph/0/news/transforming.php DND and AFP: Transforming while Performing], [http://www.afp.mil.ph/ Armed forces of the Philippines]. (archived from [http://www.afp.mil.ph/0/news/transforming.php the original] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060128011809/http://www.afp.mil.ph/0/news/transforming.php |date=January 28, 2006 }} on January 28, 2006)</ref>

# Multi-Year Defense Planning System (MYDPS)
# Improve Intelligence, Operations, and Training Capacities
# Improve Logistics Capacity
# Professional Development Program
# Improve Personnel Management System
# Multi-year Capabilities Upgrade Program (CUP)
# Optimization of Defense Budget and Improvement of Management Controls
# Centrally Managed Defense Acquisition System Manned by a Professional Workforce
# Development of Strategic Communication Capability
# Information Management Development Program

From the perspective of the Philippine Department of National Defense (DND), the framework for reforms is based on an environment of increasing economic prowess and a gradually decreasing threat level over time, and seeks to make the following improvements:<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|pp=12–14}}</ref>
1. Address AFP capability gaps to enable the AFP to effectively fulfill its mission.
2. Implement capability for seamless interoperability by developing proficiency in the conduct of joint operations, eliminating crisis handling by individual major services as done previously.
3. improve effectiveness of internal security operations.
4. Enhance capability to counter terrorism and other transnational threats.
5. Provide sustainment and/or long-term viability of acquired capabilities.
6. Improve cost-effectiveness of operations.
7. Improve accountability and transparency in the DND.
8. Increase professionalism in the AFP through reforms in areas such as promotions, assignments, and training.
9. Increase involvement of AFP in the peace process.

[[File:Philippine Defense Reform Program steps.png|thumb|Steps of the Philippine Defense Reform Program]]
According to the goals stated in the Philippines Defense Reform Handbook: "The PDR serves as the overall framework to re-engineer our systems and re-tool our personnel."<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=14}}, citing Philippine Defense Reform Handbook, Revised January 31, 2008.</ref> The Philippine Defense Reform follows a three-step implementation plan:<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=16}}</ref>
1. Creating the environment for reform (2004–2005);
2. Enabling the defense establishment (2005–2007);
3. Implementing and institutionalizing reform (2007–2010).

On September 23, 2003, President Arroyo issued Executive Order 240, streamlining procedures for defense contracts for the expeditious implementation of defense projects and the speedy response to security threats while promoting transparency, impartiality, and accountability in government transactions. Executive Order 240, creating the Office of the Undersecretary of Internal Control in the DND, mandated in part to institutionalize reforms in the procurement and fund disbursement systems in the AFP and the DND.<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=21}}, [https://web.archive.org/web/20120429220810/http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/index10.php?doctype=Executive%20Orders&docid=a45475a11ec72b843d74959b60fd7bd645fb139b33ad8 Executive Order No. 240], [http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/ Philippine Supreme Court E-Library]. (archived from [http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/index10.php?doctype=Executive%20Orders&docid=a45475a11ec72b843d74959b60fd7bd645fb139b33ad8 the original] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110815144610/http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/index10.php?doctype=Executive%20Orders&docid=a45475a11ec72b843d74959b60fd7bd645fb139b33ad8 |date=August 15, 2011 }} on April 29, 2012)</ref> On November 30, 2005, the Secretary of National Defense issued Department Order No. 82 (DO 82), creating the PDR Board and formalizing the reform organizational set-up between the DND and the AFP and defining workflow and decision-making processes.<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=18}}</ref>

[[File:Philippine Defense Reform Program funding.png|thumb|Funding of the Philippine Defense Reform Program]]
The PDR is jointly funded by the U.S. and R.P. governments. From 2004 to 2008, funding amounted to $51.8 million from the U.S. and $514.0 million from the RP.<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=27}}</ref> Initial planning assumptioned that the 18-year span of reform would encompass a period of steady rise in economic growth coupled with equally steady decline in the military threat from terrorists and separatists. Neither of these projections have proven accurate. {{as of|2010}}, at the six-year mark of PDR, the Philippine economy was internally strong, but suffering during a period of recession that crippled Philippine purchasing power. Worse, the threat situation in the Philippines had not improved significantly, or as in the case of the Sulu Archipelago, was deteriorating.<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=34}}</ref>

During the Arroyo presidency, deliberate 'Rolodexing' of senior leadership within the DND and AFP constantly put U.S. PDR advocates in a position of re-winning previously won points and positions, and gave U.S. observers a 'two steps forward, one step back' impression of the program. {{as of|2010}}, U.S. observers were uncertain whether Arroyo's successor, [[Benigno Aquino III]], chosen in Philippine Presidential elections on May 10, 2010, will continue the tradition of rapid turnover of senior leadership.<ref name="Comer 2010 35">{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=35}}</ref>

U.S. observers have reported that overall progress of the PDR is unmistakable and has clearly struck a wider swath of the Philippine defense establishment than originally hoped. However, they see some troubling signs that the depth of the PDR's impact may not be as significant as originally desired. For example, the Philippine legislature continues to significantly underfund the DND and AFP, currently at.9 percent of GDP, compared to an average of 2 percent worldwide, and a 4 percent outlay by the U.S. Even with full implementation of all the PDR's programs and recommendations, the defense establishment would not be able to sustain itself at current funding levels. While this can be made up by future outlays, {{as of|2010|lc=on}} observers see no outward sign the legislature is planning to do so.<ref name="Comer 2010 35"/> One U.S. observer likened PDR process to the progress of a [[Jeepney]] on a busy Manila avenue—explaining, "a Jeepney moves at its own pace, stops unexpectedly, frequently changes passengers, moves inexplicably and abruptly right and left in traffic, but eventually arrives safely."<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=36}}</ref> President Aquino has promised to implement the PDR program.<ref>[http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/aquino-promises/62 Promise 62: Implement the Defense Reform Program] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110317145649/http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/ |date=March 17, 2011 }}, [http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/ ABS-CBN News].</ref> {{as of|2011|3|9}}, a major Philippine news organization tracking performance on his promises evaluated that one as "To Be Determined."<ref>[http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/aquino-promises/summaries/table Aquino Promises] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110317145649/http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/ |date=March 17, 2011 }}, [http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/ ABS-CBN News].</ref>

The [[Mutual Defense Treaty (U.S.–Philippines)|Mutual Defense Treaty]] between the Philippines and the United States has not been updated since its signing in 1951. {{as of|2013}}, discussions were underway for a formal U.S.-Philippine Framework Agreement detail how U.S. forces would be able to "operate on Philippine military bases and in Philippine territorial waters to help build Philippine military capacity in maritime security and maritime domain awareness."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/|title=News Archive|website=U.S. Department of Defense}}</ref> In particular, this Framework Agreement would which would increase rotational presence of American forces in the Philippines.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/351920/news/nation/phl-us-inch-closer-to-deal-on-increased-rotational-presence-of-us-troops|title=PHL, US inch closer to deal on increased rotational presence of US troops|work=GMA News Online|date=March 10, 2014 }}</ref>

Longstanding treaties, such as the aforementioned 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and the [[United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]] (UNCLOS) of 1982,<ref>Department of Environment and Natural Resources/United Nations Development Programme/Marine
Environment and Resources Foundation, Inc. (2004) ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Archipelagic Development.
</ref> are of great importance to the Philippines in supporting maritime security in particular; respectively, their legally binding nature provides long-term effectiveness for mutual defense cooperation and for the development of the Philippine maritime and archipelagic domain.

Philippine defense operations are supported in part through U.S. Section 1206 ($102.3 million) and 1207 ($16.02 million) funds. These funds are aimed at carrying out security, counterterrorism training and rule of law programs.<ref>Serafino, N. (2013). Security Assistance Reform: "Section 1206" Background and Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress. Accessed from: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22855.pdf</ref> Overall, the United States is increasing U.S. funding for military education and training programs in Southeast Asia. The most recent U.S. Department of Defense budget for the region includes $90 million for programs, which is a 50 percent increased from four years ago.<ref>Voice of America (August 26, 2013). U.S. Significantly Boosts Military Funding for SE Asia. Voice of America. Accessed from: https://www.voanews.com/a/hagel-se-asia-corrected/1737438.html</ref>

Defense Secretary [[Voltaire T. Gazmin]] formally ended the PDR Program on June 23, 2016, because the upcoming administration of Rodrigo Duterte, which would begin its term later that month, had indicated that it wanted to set its own direction for the running of Philippine defense matters.<ref name="ReneAcosta2016PDRProgramEnded">{{Cite news |last=Acosta |first=Rene |date=June 23, 2016 |title=Gazmin closes Philippine Defense Reform Program {{!}} Rene Acosta |language=en-US |url=https://businessmirror.com.ph/2016/06/23/gazmin-closes-philippine-defense-reform-program/ |access-date=June 18, 2021}}</ref>