Editing Apollo 1 (section)

== Political fallout ==
[[File:NASA Administration Before the Senate Regarding Apollo 1 - GPN-2002-000084.jpg|right|thumb| 240px|Deputy Administrator [[Robert Seamans|Seamans]], Administrator [[James E. Webb|Webb]], Manned Space Flight Administrator [[George Mueller (NASA)|George E. Mueller]], and Apollo Program Director [[Samuel C. Phillips|Phillips]] testify before a Senate hearing on the Apollo accident.]]

Committees in both houses of the [[United States Congress]] with oversight of the space program soon launched investigations, including the [[United States Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences|Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences]], chaired by Senator [[Clinton Presba Anderson|Clinton P. Anderson]]. Seamans, Webb, Manned Space Flight Administrator Dr. [[George Mueller (NASA)|George E. Mueller]], and Apollo Program Director [[Major general (United States)|Maj Gen]] [[Samuel C. Phillips]] were called to testify before Anderson's committee.<ref name="anderson" />

In the February 27 hearing, [[United States Senate|Senator]] [[Walter Mondale|Walter F. Mondale]] asked Webb if he knew of a report of extraordinary problems with the performance of North American Aviation on the Apollo contract. Webb replied he did not, and deferred to his subordinates on the witness panel. Mueller and Phillips responded they too were unaware of any such "report".<ref name="chariots9-3" />

However, in late 1965, just over a year before the accident, Phillips had headed a "[[tiger team]]" investigating the causes of inadequate quality, schedule delays, and cost overruns in both the Apollo CSM and the Saturn V second stage (for which North American was also prime contractor). He gave an oral presentation (with transparencies) of his team's findings to Mueller and Seamans, and also presented them in a memo to North American president [[John Leland Atwood|John L. Atwood]], to which Mueller appended his own strongly worded memo to Atwood.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Phillips Report |date=October 22, 2004 |url=https://history.nasa.gov/Apollo204/phillip1.html |access-date=April 14, 2010 |publisher=NASA History Office}}</ref>

During Mondale's 1967 questioning about what was to become known as the "[[Phillips Report]]", Seamans was afraid Mondale might actually have seen a hard copy of Phillips' presentation, and responded that contractors have occasionally been subjected to on-site progress reviews; perhaps this was what Mondale's information referred to.<ref name="toughDecisions" /> Mondale continued to refer to "the Report" despite Phillips' refusal to characterize it as such, and, angered by what he perceived as Webb's deception and concealment of important program problems from Congress, he questioned NASA's selection of North American as prime contractor. Seamans later wrote that Webb roundly chastised him in the cab ride leaving the hearing, for volunteering information which led to the disclosure of Phillips' memo.<ref name="toughDecisions" />

On May 11, Webb issued a statement defending NASA's November 1961 selection of North American as the prime contractor for Apollo. This was followed on June{{nbsp}}9 by Seamans filing a seven-page memorandum documenting the selection process. Webb eventually provided a [[document control|controlled copy]] of Phillips' memo to Congress. The Senate committee noted in its final report NASA's testimony that "the findings of the [Phillips] task force had no effect on the accident, did not lead to the accident, and were not related to the accident",<ref name="anderson">{{Cite book |last=Anderson |first=Clinton P. |url=http://klabs.org/richcontent/Reports/Failure_Reports/as-204/senate_956/index.htm |title=Apollo 204 Accident: Report of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, with Additional Views |date=January 30, 1968 |publisher=U.S. Government Printing Office |volume=Senate Report 956 |location=Washington, D.C. |ref=Anderson |author-link=Clinton Presba Anderson |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141220043317/http://klabs.org/richcontent/Reports/Failure_Reports/as-204/senate_956/index.htm |archive-date=December 20, 2014}}</ref>{{Reference page|page=7}} but stated in its recommendations:
{{Blockquote|Notwithstanding that in NASA's judgment the contractor later made significant progress in overcoming the problems, the committee believes it should have been informed of the situation. The committee does not object to the position of the Administrator of NASA, that all details of Government/contractor relationships should not be put in the public domain. However, that position in no way can be used as an argument for not bringing this or other serious situations to the attention of the committee.<ref name="anderson" />{{Reference page|page=11}}}}

Freshman Senators [[Edward Brooke|Edward W. Brooke III]] and [[Charles H. Percy]] jointly wrote an ''Additional Views'' section appended to the committee report, chastising NASA more strongly than Anderson for not having disclosed the Phillips review to Congress. Mondale wrote his own, even more strongly worded Additional View, accusing NASA of "evasiveness,{{nbsp}}... lack of candor,{{nbsp}}... patronizing attitude toward Congress{{nbsp}}... refusal to respond fully and forthrightly to legitimate Congressional inquiries, and{{nbsp}}... solicitous concern for corporate sensitivities at a time of national tragedy".<ref name="anderson" />{{Reference page|page=16}}

The potential political threat to Apollo blew over, due in large part to the support of President Lyndon B. Johnson, who at the time still wielded a measure of influence with the Congress from his own Senatorial experience. He was a staunch supporter of NASA since its inception, had even recommended the Moon program to President [[John F. Kennedy]] in 1961, and was skilled at portraying it as part of Kennedy's legacy.

Relations between NASA and North American deteriorated over the assignment of blame. North American argued unsuccessfully it was not responsible for the fatal error in spacecraft atmosphere design. Finally, Webb contacted Atwood, and demanded either he or Chief Engineer [[Harrison Storms|Harrison A. Storms]] resign. Atwood elected to fire Storms.<ref>{{Cite episode |title=The Other Side of the Moon |series=Project Apollo |last=Burke |first=James (presenter) |author-link=James Burke (science historian) |network=[[BBC]] |number=2 |last2=Low |first2=George |author-link2=George Low |last3=Myers |first3=Dale D. |author-link3=Dale D. Myers |last4=Petrone |first4=Rocco |author-link4=Rocco Petrone |last5=Webb |first5=James E. |location=London |air-date=July 20, 1979}} Harrison Storms interview with historian James Burke for BBC television. See {{YouTube|id=puWbQ1b-ljU&NTR|link=tes}} (at 28:11).</ref>

On the NASA side, Joseph Shea resorted to barbiturates and alcohol in order to help him cope.<ref name="murray" />{{Reference page|pages=213–214}} NASA administrator James Webb became increasingly worried about Shea's mental state. Shea was asked to take an extended voluntary leave of absence, but Shea refused, threatening to resign rather than take leave. As a compromise, he agreed to meet with a psychiatrist and to abide by an independent assessment of his psychological fitness. This approach to remove Shea from his position was also unsuccessful.<ref name="murray" />{{Reference page|pages=217–219}} Finally, six months after the fire, Shea's superiors reassigned him to NASA headquarters in Washington, D.C. Shea felt that his new post was a "non-job," and left after only two months.<ref>Ertel and Newkirk, ''Apollo Spacecraft'', Vol IV, p. 119.</ref>